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Abstract
This dissertation is an investigation into the semantics of imperatives and imperative-
like forms (collectively referred to as jussives) in embedded contexts. The long-held
view that imperatives are confined to root (matrix) contexts has been challenged
by recent findings of counterexamples from a variety of languages. This thesis con-
tributes to the debate by introducing novel empirical evidence from Mongolian con-
firming that the restriction on imperative embedding is not universal: Mongolian is
shown to allow for embedding of a a speaker-directed jussive form voluntative and a
hearer-directed imperative. The empirical domain is widenend to include data from
jussive embedding in Korean (drawing on Madigan 2008, Pak et al. 2008b, a.o.).
This thesis takes special interest in the complex combination of properties char-
acterizing the subjects of embedded jussives in Mongolian and Korean, to wit, (i)
their dependence on an antecedent in the embedding clause, (ii) the requirement to
be interpreted de se, and (iii) the presence of <-features. These properties are used
to make a case for an analysis of jussive subjects as instances of Obligatory Control
PRO, and against an analysis as indexical pronouns. In particular, it is demonstrated
how a view of PRO as a syntactically and semantically complex unit closely resem-
bling de re expressions in attitude reports (Percus & Sauerland 2003a) provides an
elegant way of accounting for the combined characteristics of jussive subjects.
Set against the background of a Neo-Davidsonian event semantics, this thesis puts
forward the idea that jussive clauses denote sets of events whose propositional content
amounts to a desire statement. An analysis of jussives as sets of events is shown to
afford a natural extension to matrix occurrences on the assumption that the content
denoted by matrix jussives is anchored to the speech event. Finally, this thesis
proposes to bridge the gap between jussive reports and canonical Obligatory Control
constructions and demonstrates how the presented account can be generalized to
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provide a novel perspective on Obligatory Control constructions as well.
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Introduction
This dissertation is concerned with the occurrence of imperatives and imperative-like
speech acts in embedded position. Embedded occurrences of imperatives and of mor-
phologically marked forms whose illocutionary force resembles that of imperatives
have received much attention in recent linguistic literature. The interest in embed-
ding of imperatives and related forms is influenced by a set of factors: Imperatives
and related forms have long been considered to resist embedding. Recent literature,
however, reports a wealth of counterexamples: Data from multiple languages includ-
ing Japanese (Oshima 2006), Korean (Pak et al. 2008a,b), Slovenian (Stegovec &
Kaufmann 2015), English (Crni6 & Trinh 2009) demonstrate that there is no univer-
sal constraint against embedded imperatives. The formerly widespread belief that
imperatives do not embed may also have been spurred by the fact that embedded
imperatives, if they did exist, would raise significant challenges for linguistic analysis.
This dissertation offers a novel account of occurrences of imperatives and imperative-
like forms - which are grouped under the label jussive - in embedded position. The
necessity of this endeavor is reinforced by new data from Mongolian: Mongolian al-
lows for embedding of jussive clauses. The observation concerns two morphologically
distinct forms, a standard imperative directed at the hearer (correspondingly labeled
imperative), and a form labeled voluntative, which expresses a non-assertive speech
act targeting the speaker. Chapter 1 provides a discussion of the central proper-
ties of these forms in matrix position. Chapter 2 introduces the data showing that
voluntatives and imperatives are not confined to root contexts.
I use the case of Mongolian as a starting point to engage in a discussion of the
semantics of jussives, with an emphasis on their occurrence in embedded position.
Out of the various domains of inquiry pertaining to the semantics of jussives, the
major focus of my work concerns the nature of the jussive subject.
My investigation is guided by a peculiar set of properties displayed by the jus-
sive subject. These properties can be summarized in terms of the following three
characteristics: (i) The subject (and target) of Mongolian jussives refers to a desig-
nated discourse participant, to wit, the speaker (or a group including the speaker)
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in voluntatives, and to the hearer (or a group including the hearer) in imperatives.
Importantly, in embedded jussives, the reference of the subject shifts to a correspond-
ing participant of the reported discourse, viz., the reported speaker in voluntatives,
and the reported hearer in imperatives. (ii) The reported speaker of a jussive must
feature a specific attitude - known as de se attitude in the literature - towards the
jussive subject. (iii) The jussive subject carries 0-features.
My survey of jussive embedding extends beyond Mongolian: In chapter 4, I in-
troduce data from Korean, where jussive embedding is comparably well-researched.
Korean embedded jussives show crucial parallels to their Mongolian counterparts.
However, unlike Mongolian jussives, Korean embedded jussives allow for their sub-
ject to be realized phonologically by means of a person pronoun; Korean thereby
offers overt evidence for the presence of #-features on jussive subjects.
The combination of properties characterizing the jussive subject poses an inter-
esting analytical challenge. I consider two major analytical options: The jussive
subject could be a regular pronominal variable pro, which is optionally spelled out
in Korean; or it could be an instance of PRO as familiar from Obligatory Control
(OC) constructions.
I argue that an analysis of the jussive subject as PRO is preferable over an
analysis of the subject as a regular pronoun. I back my claim by pointing at two
crucial behavioral parallels between OC PRO and the jussive subject: They both
depend on an antecedent in the embedding clause; this property is reflected in the
"shifted" interpretation of the jussive subject (as a reported as opposed to an actual
discourse participant) in embedded position. Moreover, both jussive reports and
canonical OC constructions require that the reported speaker (or the attitude holder
in OC constructions) hold a specific, de se attitude, towards the embedded subject.
Crucially, neither of the first two properties would be expected under a view of the
jussive subject as a regular pronoun: If the subject of jussives were a (typically silent)
indexical pronoun bearing first person features in speaker-directed voluntatives, and
second person features in hearer-directed imperatives, the changed interpretation in
embedded position would amount to an instance of indexical shift; however, Mongo-
lian and Korean indexicals do not generally shift. Furthermore, a simple pronominal
analysis would have difficulty deriving the de se requirement characterizing the jus-
sive subject.
In chapter 3, I introduce two classes of theories pertaining to PRO: In one class of
theories, represented by Chierchia (1989), PRO is analyzed as a semantically empty
element, and the PRO clause constitutes a property (a set of individuals in the
simplest case) rather than a proposition. An alternative line of analysis, which has
its roots in in Percus & Sauerland's (2003a) theory of de re attitudes, holds that
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PRO is a syntactically complex unit involving an individual variable and a variable
ranging over concept generators. I put forward that only the latter view - of PRO
as a complex expression - can successfully account for the combined properties of
the jussive subject. Moreover, it offers an elegant way of deriving its <p-features -
a property that has proven challenging to capture under traditional views of PRO.
The proposed analysis is presented in detail in chapter 5.
In the course of chapter 5, I also outline my assumptions regarding the re-
maining components involved in the derivation of embedded jussives. On the one
hand, I adopt a modal analysis of jussives, following Kaufmann (2012); in partic-
ular, I propose that jussive modality is contributed by a uniform bouletic modal
JUSSIVE present across different jussive forms. The proposed analysis exploits a
Neo-Davidsonian semantics, where predicates denote sets of events, and clausal com-
plements compose with the embedding predicate via modification. While Percus &
Sauerland's (2003a) theory of de re expressions makes use of a standard attitude
semantics, this dissertation demonstrates how the relevant components can success-
fully be imported into a Neo-Davidsonian framework. Finally, though the offered
analysis takes embedded jussives as its reference point, this thesis also shows that
the model developed to account for embedded jussives can be transferred to root
occurrences in a straightforward manner.
No analysis of jussives as modals is complete without addressing the question as
to what explains the specific, performative force of jussives, which distinguishes it
from prototypical modals. This question is dealt with in chapter 6, where I elaborate
on how Kaufmann's (2012) and Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) presuppositional view
of imperative force can be used for the purposes of this work.
Chapter 7 offers a discussion of some of the existing literature on jussive embed-
ding in Korean as well as a review of Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) analysis of
embedded imperatives in Slovenian.
To conclude this work, I propose to bridge the gap between jussive reports and
canonical instances of OC: In chapter 8, I show how my account of jussive reports
can be extended in a way that provides a novel perspective on OC constructions,
and make a concrete proposal whereby PRO clauses and jussive clauses share much
of the same underlying structure.
A terminological remark
I follow Kaufmann (2012) in using the term imperative to designate a specific clause
type, defined as a form-function pair. Kaufmann views the imperative as a pair con-
sisting of a sentence marked with imperative morphosyntax, and a directive speech
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act ORDER, as illustrated in (1) for a German imperative. Together with the declar-
ative and interrogative, the imperative forms a paradigm of three basic clause types,
(2) (Kaufmann 2012:6).
(1) Sei piinktlich!
be.IMP punctual
'Be on time!'
a. Form: special morphology on verb (sei), no overt subject
b. Function: The speaker directs the addressee to be punctual.
(2) A simple Clause Type System
a. declarative := (declarative (sentence), ASSERT)
b. interrogative := (interrogative (sentence), QUESTION)
c. imperative := (imperative (sentence), ORDER)
My discussion extends beyond canonical imperatives and also addresses related,
imperative-like forms such as the Mongolian voluntative, and the Korean promissive
and exhortative. I assign the collective label jussive to these forms. How do these
categories fit into the paradigm? Do they form a separate clause type, or should
they be collapsed with imperatives as instances of the same clause type? For now,
we may think of them as forming separate clause types. However, their joint ap-
pearance in this dissertation is for a reason. As we will see, these cross-linguistically
rarer forms resemble the imperative clause type (as opposed to other clause types)
both morphosyntactically and semantically: To provide a brief glimpse, voluntatives,
promissives, and exhortatives all typically lack an overt subject - much like imper-
atives. Moreover, both the former as well as the latter intuitively refer to what the
world should be like, whereas declaratives and interrogatives are focused on the ac-
tual state of affairs. Therefore, while in the beginning I use the collective label jussive
in a purely descriptive sense and for the sake of convenience, as I go on this usage will
gain conceptual significance. To wit, I will put forward the idea that voluntatives,
promissives, imperatives, and exhortatives constitute instances of a uniform clause
type jussive.
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Chapter 1
The Mongolian voluntative and
imperative
1.1 Preliminaries
The dialect investigated in this work is Khalkha, the main dialect spoken in the
modern state of Mongolia. Below I provide some general typological information on
the investigated dialect. Unless otherwise indicated, Mongolian as used in this work
refers to the Khalkha dialect of Mongolian.
As we will see, Mongolian is a SOV language. While SOV is the unmarked
word order, Mongolian also allows for scrambling of preverbal constituents creating a
marked word order. Pronominal subjects in Mongolian cannot normally be dropped,
i.e., Mongolian is not a pro-drop language. Mongolian CPs are head-final.
Mongolian has morphological markers for various non-assertive speech acts, many
of which are verbal suffixes. In this work, I focus on two morphemes, which I call
VOLUNTATIVE (VOL, following Janhunen 2012) and IMPERATIVE (IMP), respectively.
The speech acts they allow a speaker to express I refer to as voluntative and imper-
ative, respectively. The semantics of voluntatives and imperatives will be taken to
correspond to a modal proposition.
Voluntatives and imperatives differ in the individual targeted by the modal propo-
sition: The voluntative targets a speaker or a group including the speaker, while the
imperative targets a hearer or a group including the hearer. Under the assumption
that the target coincides with the clausal subject, voluntatives can be considered to
call for a first person subject, while imperatives require a second person subject.
For the rest of this work, I subsume the two forms under the term jussive. Recall
that for now, this decision is made merely for ease of reference and does not imply
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any theoretical claims about the relationship between the two forms. However, in
the analysis part of this work, the reference to the two forms as jussives will lose its
purely descriptive status as I will argue that voluntatives and imperatives are in fact
instances of agreement and involve the same underlying modal JUSSIVE.
1.1.1 Data collection
The bulk of the Mongolian data reported in this work were provided by Urandari
Byambadalai. Urandari is in her mid-twenties and grew up in Ulaanbaatar. All
elicitations with Urandari were conducted in Boston between March and November
2017 on a mostly weekly basis. The majority of elicitations were conducted in person;
a few times I elicited data over Skype. As for the discovery of the jussive forms
discussed in this work, the first instances of voluntatives were provided spontaneously
in the context of conditionals such as (1).
(1) Dorj baigaa bol, bi negt-ey.
Dorj be if, I join-VOL
'If Dorj is there, I will join.'
After discovering the existence of the voluntative form, I collected further data on
the voluntative by asking my consultant to translate certain sentences in a way that
involves a voluntative and provide me with judgments on these sentences. Moreover,
I also construed Mongolian sentences and asked my consultant to translate them
back to me and judge their felicity.
The first instances of imperative forms, on the other hand, I elicited in a more
targeted manner, namely, by asking my consultant to translate English imperative
sentences into Mongolian. In her translations, my consultant presented me with a
choice of two productive verbal suffixes to express imperative semantics in Mongolian,
which differ in style. Both forms are discussed in more detail in the following section.
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1.2 The Mongolian voluntative and imperative in
matrix position
1.2.1 Imperative
The Mongolian imperative is associated with at least two different markers: One
is zero morphology (2-a), the other -AArei' (2-b). According to my consultant,
the latter, marked form, represents a more polite version of the imperative; where
relevant, the latter form is glossed IMP.POL to distinguish it from the unmarked
imperative. 2 Neither form is specified for number, though both can combine with
the optional PLURAL marker -tsgee/-tsgoo (which is not specific to imperatives), cf.
(3). In general, the Mongolian imperative seems to closely resemble (second-person)
imperatives in other languages.
(2) a. Shiree-g-ee tseverl-0!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-IMP
'Clean your table!'
b. Shiree-g-ee tseverl-eerei!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-IMP.POL
'Please clean your table!'
(3) a. Shiree-g-ee tseverl-tsgee-0!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-PL-IMP
'Clean (pl.) your table!'
b. Shiree-g-ee tseverl-tsgee-geerei!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-PL-IMP.POL
'Please clean (pl.) your table!'
Semantically, clauses containing an imperative verb form in Mongolian are di-
rected towards the addressee, who can be a single individual or a group. Though I
will revise my assumptions at a later point, for now we can think of imperatives as
having a second-person indexical subject. According to my consultant, the subject
must normally be covert. 3 As evidence for the restriction of imperatives to clauses
featuring a second-person subject, consider the reference of the subject-anaphor -ee
'Capital spelling of vowel letters indicates vowels undergoing harmony, which in this case, yields
the forms -aarei, -eerei, -oorei, -66rei (cf. Janhunen 2012).
2Janhunen (2012:153) takes -AArei to realize what she calls PRESCRIPTIVE, expressing 'a some-
what milder and/or more polite command ('please') than the unmarked imperative.'
3As expected from a cross-linguistic point of view, imperatives can, however, be accompanied
by overt DPs functioning as vocatives, cf. (i).
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in (2), which is unmarked for person, but has to be bound by a second-person sub-
ject in IMPERATIVE clauses: (2-a) cannot be a command to clean the speaker's or
a third person's (excluding the addressee) table. Possession by someone other than
the addressee requires a separate possessive marker such as min 'my' in (4-b).
(4) a. Kh6l-b6 ugaa-gaarei!
foot-ANAPH wash-IMP.POL
'Wash your/*my feet!'
b. Khbl-iig min ugaa-gaarei!
foot-ACC my wash-IMP.POL
'Wash my feet!'
1.2.2 Voluntative
In addition to imperatives, Mongolian has a non-assertive clause type voluntative. A
clause is marked voluntative by means of the suffix -ey/-iy on the verb. Voluntative
clauses target the speaker or a group containing the speaker. Just like imperative
clauses may be represented as having a second-person indexical subject, we can
conceive of voluntative clauses as involving a first-person indexical subject. English
has no direct counterpart to the Mongolian voluntative; to approximate the meaning
of voluntative clauses in English, my consultant used various paraphrases such as
"let me/us", "I/we want to", "I/we would like to". I will stick to this way of rendering
voluntatives throughout this work.
(5) shiree-g-ee tseverl-iy!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-VOL
'I want to/ let me clean my table!'
'We want to/ let us clean our table!'
Most of the time, the subject of voluntatives is covert. However, unlike in the case
of imperatives, there seems to be no principled ban on spelling out the subject, cf.
(6) below. However, as the exact conditions governing the spell-out of voluntative
subjects are unclear and the data insufficient to draw reliable conclusions, I will
ignore the option of overt voluntative subjects for the most part in this work.
(i) Bat, shiree-g-ee tseverl-eerei!
Bat table-ACC-ANAPH clean-IMP.POL
'Bat, please clean your table!'
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(6) a. Bi shiree-g-ee tseverl-iy!
1.SG.NOM table-ACC-ANAPH clean-VOL
'I want to/ let me clean my table!'
b. Bit shiree-g-ee tseverl-iy!
1.PL.NOM table-ACC-ANAPH clean-VOL
'We want to/ let us clean our table!'
Like imperatives and other verb forms, voluntatives can carry plural marking -
tsgee/tsgoo.
(7) Shiree-g-ee tseverl-tsgee-iy!
table-ACC-ANAPH clean-PL-VOL
'Let's (all) clean the table!'
Above I claim that voluntatives are restricted to first-person subjects. The exam-
ples in (8) provide evidence for this claim: Note that the anaphors and possessive
pronouns in the voluntative clauses (8) are in reverse distribution compared to the
imperative sentences in (4). To wit, the anaphor on the object (8-a) refers to the
speaker, while possession by the addressee is expressed by a separate possessive pro-
noun chin, (8-b).
(8) a. Kh6l-66 ugaa-iy!
foot-ANAPH wash-VOL
'Let me wash my/*your feet!'
b. Kh6l-iig chin ugaa-iy!
foot-ACC your wash-VOL
'Let me wash your feet!'
As for overt subjects other than first-person indexicals, my consultant reports
that voluntatives featuring the name of the addressee or an overt second-person
indexical such as chi 'you' are marked and limited to contexts featuring a demanding
or aggressive attitude of the speaker towards the hearer; for example, (9) with an
overt subject Rat/chi could be uttered by a military official or by a director at a
movie set giving instructions to Bat. I ignore cases of this type in what follows for
their markedness and marginal status.
(9) Addressing Bat:
(#Bat/#chi) shiree-g-ee tseverl-iy!
Bat/2.SG table-ACC-ANAPH clean-VOL
intended: 'Bat/you, clean your table.'
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The ungrammaticality of (10), moreover, witnesses the incompatibility of third-
person subjects with voluntatives.
(10) *Tit chama-ig pot-iy!
3.PL 2-ACC shoot-VOL
Intended: 'They should/want to shoot you.'
Voluntative morphology is incompatible with clauses that are marked as yes/no-
questions, cf. (11). This confirms the assumption that voluntative clauses are nec-
essarily performative (non-assertive) and do not merely express modal (bouletic or
deontic etc.) propositions: Note that otherwise voluntatives should allow for descrip-
tive uses and be compatible with the semantics and pragmatics of interrogatives,
parallel to the modal verb want (as in Do I want to play outside?). The fact that
purely descriptive uses of voluntatives are unavailable is also reflected by my consul-
tant's intuition that (5), for example, is "not literally 'I want to clean my table"'. Note
that, therefore, translations of voluntatives using want as in (5) must be regarded as
incomplete and auxiliary.
(11) *Bi gata togl-iy-f6i6?
I outside play-VOL-Y/N
Intended: 'Do I want to play outside?/ Shall I play outside?'
1.2.3 Why single out voluntative and imperative clauses?
I do not claim that voluntative and imperative a priori form a natural class, to
the exclusion of other non-assertive, morphologically marked clause types. However,
there are several reasons why I single out these two clause types in my work. First,
both clause types seem to be highly frequent and productive; it is worth noting that
the first instances of voluntatives and imperatives were provided on an active basis
by my consultant, that is, as translations of English sentences with corresponding
meanings.
Moreover, the two clause types also share certain syntactic and semantic charac-
teristics: For example, as shown above, both voluntative and imperative predicates
target discourse participants; certain other semantic similarities will be discussed
later in this work. Last but not least, both clause types can be embedded under
certain predicates of speech; this property, which constitutes the focus of my work,
will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
I conclude that the above commonalities make a shared treatment of voluntative
and imperative clauses expedient. In the remainder of this work, I will frequently
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collapse voluntative and imperative clauses and refer to them together as jussive
clauses.
1.2.4 Further morphemes marking non-assertive speech acts
Mongolian has at least another addressee-oriented form marked by -aach, called
precative in Janhunen (2012), which seems to be less common than the IMPERATIVE
0/-AArai. I do not investigate this form in this work.
(12) Tfiin-d tusl-aach
3-DAT help-PREC
'Help him/her!'
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Chapter 2
The Mongolian voluntative and
imperative in embedded position
Mongolian exemplifies a property that has traditionally been considered absent from
natural languages: Mongolian allows for embedding of imperatives and voluntatives.
In this respect, Mongolian is in line with other languages such as Japanese, Korean,
and Slovenian, among others, which have recently been found to falsify the claim
that imperatives are confined to matrix position. The section at hand will provide
detailed evidence that embedding of imperatives and voluntatives, subsumed under
the term jussives, is possible in Mongolian.
Let me elaborate on the general distribution of embedded jussives in Mongolian.
Embedded jussives in Mongolian cannot occur under any old predicate selecting for
a clausal complement; rather, Mongolian embedded jussives are limited to speech
reports. The predicate most commonly found to embed jussives is khelekh 'say'; the
data presented in 2.1.1 is limited to instances of that kind. However, a few other
lexical items are compatible with jussive embedding as well. Concretely, jussives
have also been found embedded under the phrasal verb sanal bolgokh 'suggest, make
a suggestion', and under the clause-final particle gesen, which marks a clause as a
speech report; see section 2.1.2. (Note that this list, of course, cannot be taken to
be exhaustive.)
Many languages allow for quotative constructions to be string-identical to in-
stances of subordination. This is the case in English and German: Both languages
have a class of predicates that are compatible with the complementizer being absent
in their clausal complement. Crucially, say and German sagen are members in that
class.
(2) illustrates the two readings that can be assigned to sentence (1) containing
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say. Crucially, in the reading sketched in (2-b), the indexical I in (1) is interpreted
as Sue. However, as indexicals in German and English are known to only allow for a
strict interpretation (i.e., to disallow shifting), the only possible analysis of (1) with
reading (2-b) is as a quotative construction.
However, (1) also has a reading (2-a) under which the complement is a paraphrase
of what Sue actually said to Joe, which could have been something like "Milena likes
cherry liqueur". This reading is associated with another available parse of (1), namely,
as an instance of subordination.
(1) a. Die Susi hat zum Josef gesagt [ich mag Kirschlikbr]. 1
b. Sue said to Joe [I like cherry liqueur].
(2) Readings for (1)
a. Sue said to Joe that I like cherry liqueur.
b. Sue said to Joe: "I like cherry liqueur."
The same ambiguity holds for khelekh 'say' in Mongolian. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to ensure that purported instances of embedded jussives are not merely in-
stances of jussives rendered in quotation. To ensure the status of the jussive clause
as genuinely embedded and exclude cases of direct speech, I tested jussives in con-
structions that feature syntactic dependencies between the jussive clause and the
embedding clause. Specifically, the data presented below involves (i) wh-questions
featuring long-distance wh-dependencies, with the wh-item originating in an embed-
ded jussive clause, (ii) relative clauses involving a long-distance dependency between
a noun phrase in the jussive clause and a relative operator in the superordinate
clause, (iii) jussive clauses containing an NPI that is licensed by a clause-external
element. Moreover, (iv) I tested long-distance topicalization out of an embedded jus-
sive clause; however, the divergent, more permissive behavior of topicalization with
respect to phenomena such as indexical shift observed below, compared to other em-
bedding environments, will raise the question if topicalization in Mongolian is indeed
an adequate means to ensure embedding.
The data is sorted by the type of syntactic dependency, as listed above. I first
discuss these types of syntactic dependency under the predicate khelekh 'say' (section
2.1.1) before going on to other embedding environments in section 2.1.2.
'In Southern dialects where this example is taken from, proper names are preceded by articles.
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2.1 Syntactic embedding
2.1.1 Jussive embedding under khelekh 'say'
khelekh 'say' appears to be the most common environment for voluntative and im-
perative embedding. By means of diagnostics commonly used to probe for syntactic
embedding, in what follows I provide evidence that khelekh allows for genuine em-
bedding of jussives. 2
wh-dependency Mongolian wh-questions normally feature the wh-item in-situ.
However, as is common for SOV languages, Mongolian also allows for wh-items to
scramble. wh-scrambling is often hard to distinguish from wh-extraction, including
in embedded jussives, where wh-items have frequently been found outside their base
position. For the sake of concreteness, I will refer to such instances as scrambling,
however, nothing in my work hinges on this decision. Interestingly, embedded jussives
have more often than not been found to be compatible or even require the wh-item
to scramble, although the exact properties governing the presence of scrambling in
jussives remain unclear. 3
(3) VOLUNTATIVE
(Yuu-g) Bat Naraa-d [(??bi) (yuu-g) tseverl-iy gej] khel-sen ve?
what-ACC Bat Naraa-DAT I what-ACC clean-VOL that say-PST WH.QU
'What did Bat tell Naraa that he wants to clean?'
My consultant infrequently accepts an overt subject in embedded voluntative clauses
2 Poppe (1951) provides an early example of what he considers a reported imperative (i). Though
Poppe fails to support this claim since the sentence is compatible with a quotation parse, the
example is interesting for a different reason: It involves an accusative DP namaig in the matrix
clause, translated as the addressee of the speech act and the target of the imperative. Note that the
addressee argument of khelekh 'say' is normally marked dative. One hypothesis is that accusative
can be non-structural and serve as topic marking, which would be corroborated by other data
elicited; this is also intimated by Poppe's (1951:62) remark about one use of the accusative as
accusativus relationis, 'with respect to, regarding'.
(i) Nama-ig [ir gej] khel-sen.
1-ACC come.IMP that say-PST
'He/She told me to come.' (literally: 'With respect to me, he/she said, come!')
(Poppe 1951:62, brackets added, modified transcription)
3The wh-item yuug in (3) is spelled out in exactly one of the two indicated positions; the same
holds for (5) and parallel examples.
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(4), although judgments are somewhat unstable. Singular bi 'I' is more frequently
rated as acceptable than plural bit 'we'. Note that there is an alternative parse of
(4) with who originating as the matrix dative argument, cf. 'Whom did Bati tell that
hei wants Naraa to kiss himi?'. This parse is less interesting for our purposes.
(4) VOLUNTATIVE
Khen-di Bat Naraa-d {(?bi) ti uns-ul-iy gej] khel-sen ve?
who-DAT Bat Naraa-DAT I kiss-CAUS-VOL that say-PST WH.QU
'Whoi did Bat say to Naraa that he wants ti to be kissed by?'
(lit.: 'Whoi did Bat say to Naraa, let mej have him/heri kiss mej?')
Imperatives can similarly be embedded; overt imperative subjects are disallowed in
both matrix and embedded imperatives.
(5) IMPERATIVE
(Yuu-g) Bat
what-ACC Bat
'What did Bat
Naraa-d f(yuu-g) tseverl-eerei gej] khel-sen ve?
Naraa-DAT what-ACC clean-POL.IMP that say-PST WH.QU
tell Naraa to please clean?'
Relative clause dependency Relative clauses in Mongolian precede the head
noun they modify. They lack a relative pronoun or other overt elemento in C in-
troducing the relative clause. The subject of relative clauses is normally marked
Genitive. Consider (6) for a simple example of a relative clause.
(6) [Min-ii nom bg-sbn] khun ten-d bai-na.
1.SG-GEN book give-PST person there-LOC be-DUR
'The person to whom I have given a book is there.' (Janhunen 2012:273)
In the following examples, containing an embedded jussive, a relative operator stands
in a dependency relation with an argument in a lower jussive clause (or, in pre-
theoretical terms, the head of the relative clause is associated with an element in the
jussive clause). Overt jussive subjects were found to be ungrammatical across-the-
board in this environment.
(7) VOLUNTATIVE
[Bat-iin [(*bi) ti id-iy gej] khel-sen] khooli chinix bai-san.
Bat-GEN I eat-VOL that say-PST food yours COP-PST
'The foodi Bat said he would like to eat ti was yours.'
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(8) IMPERATIVE
[Av-iin akh-t
father-GEN brother-DAT
'I don't like the womani
[ti giril gej] khel-sen] emygdee-ti bi dur-giii.
marry.IMP that say-PST woman-DAT I like-NEG
my father told my brother to marry ti.'
NPI licensing The focus particle -ch is an NPI: -ch is ungrammatical in non-DE
environments such as (9-a) but licensed in the scope of negation (9-b).
a. *Bi neg-ch
I one-FOC
intended: 'I
b. Bi neg-ch
I one-FOC
'I didn't see
khun khar-san.
person see-PST
saw someone.'
khun khar-aa-giii.
person see-PST-NEG
anyone.'
-ch is contained in jussive clauses in (10) and (11). The fact that it can be licensed
by propositional negation -gui in the respective matrix clauses further attests to the
nature of jussive embedding in these examples as genuine.
(10) VOLUNTATIVE
Khen-ch [yamar-ch khun uns-iy gej] khel-ee-giii.
who-FOC which-FOC person kiss-VOL that say-PST-NEG
'No onei said they, would like to kiss anyone.'
(11) IMPERATIVE
Dorj Naraa-d [66r-d6n yamar-ch yum bg-66rei gej] khel-ee-giii.
Dorj Naraa-DAT ANAPH-DAT some-FOC thing give-IMP that say-PST-NEG
'Dorj didn't ask Naraa to give anything to him.'
Topic extraction Both voluntative and imperative clauses allow for topicalization
of a DP argument to a clause-external topic position indicated by the topic marker
bol, cf. en dzaxjaag 'this letter' in (12) and en urgudulig 'this proposal' in (13).
Surprisingly, in both cases the embedded subject can be expressed overtly. This is
at odds with the behavior of embedded voluntatives and imperatives elsewhere (as
well as matrix imperatives), which typically require the subject to be covert.
(12) VOLUNTATIVE
[En zakhidal-g]i bol Dorj [(bi) ti bich-iy
this letter-ACC TOP Dorj I write-VOL
'As for this letter, Dorj said he would like to
gej] khel-sen.
that say-PST
write it.'
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(9)
(13) IMPERATIVE
[En urgudul-igli bol Dorj Naraa-d [(chi) ti bich-eerei gej] khel-sen.
this proposal-ACC TOP Dorj Naraa-DAT you write-IMP that say-PST
'As for this proposal, Dorj asked Naraa to write it.'
Clauses out of which a topic has been extracted have been found to be exceptionally
permissive also in other respects: It will be shown that, unlike in other examined em-
bedded environments, indexicals in these clauses can receive a relative interpretation
when embedded under speech predicates, i.e., they can be shifted to the context desig-
nated by the reported speech event. This peculiarity, together with the acceptability
of overt jussive subjects in the examples above, raises the question if my speaker
might be able to repair an embedded clause out of which a topic has been extracted
and analyze the repaired clause as a quote, i.e., an instance of direct speech. In other
words, topic extraction might not be qualified to ensure syntactic embedding.
Note that a direct quote analysis of the jussive clause still does not explain the
fact that an overt subject is acceptable in the embedded imperative (13), given that
overt subjects have been judged as degraded even in root imperatives.
2.1.2 Other embedding environments
As noted above, two other expressions have been found to embed jussives more or
less consistently: the predicate sanal bolgokh 'make a suggestion, suggest', and the
clause-final particle gesen, which marks its complement as a past speech event.
Both expressions in principle seem to allow both voluntatives and imperatives
as their complements, though my data only contains one instance of an embedded
imperative clause under sanal bolgokh, cf. (17)', involving a relative operator depen-
dency as a diagnostic for embedding. (14) through (16) are cases of voluntatives
under sanal bolgokh, with covert wh-movement, relative operator dependency and
NPI licensing, respectively, as evidence for subordination. My speaker consistently
assigned a plural semantics, i.e., let's ... to instances of voluntatives under sanal
bolgokh, which I take to follow from the meaning of the embedding predicate. (Recall
that plural marking by way of the suffix -tsgee/-tsgoo is optional.); the plural reading
is translated as partial control involving PROi below, with PROi+ referring to the
matrix subject with index i plus others.
(14) Bat [yamar kinoo uts-iy gej] sanal bolgo-son ve?
Bat which movie see-VOL that suggestion make-PST WH.QU
4One could speculate that a tension between the lexical semantics of sanal bolgokh and the se-
mantics of the imperative might be responsible for the relative rarity of corresponding combinations.
28
'Which movie did Bati suggest PROi+ to see?'
(15) [Bat-iin [ti 6g-iy gej] sanal bolgo-son] kinooi goi kinoo bai-san.
Bat-GEN give-VOL that suggestion make-PST movie good movie COP-PST
'The movie thati Bat suggested PROi+ to give away was a good movie.'
(16) Bat [yamar-ch kinoo-g bg-iy gej] sanal bolgoo-giii.
Bat which-FOC movie give-VOL that suggestion make-NEG
'Bati didn't suggest PROi+ to give away any movie.'
(17) En bol [tiiiin-ii [ti uts-eerei gej] sanal bolgo-son] kinooi.
this TOP 3SG-GEN ti see-IMP that suggestion make-PST movie
'This is the movie that he, recommended PROjoi to watch.'
The examples below are instances of jussive embedding under the speech particle
gesen. Note that gesen is in complementary distribution with the otherwise obliga-
tory complementizer gej. Interestingly, gesen is sometimes accompanied by an overt
speaker argument (an additional hearer argument was judged as degraded), cf. (18)
and (19), which raises the question as to its actual syntactic category. The bracket-
ing used below is therefore tentative; for now I analyze gesen as a head external to
the jussive clause rather than a complementizer within the jussive clause.
In (18) and (19), gesen takes as its complement a voluntative and an imperative
clause, respectively, whose object arguments are targeted by a wh-question. (18)
involves an additional level of embedding: The gesen clause is nominalized and
forms the internal argument of the matrix predicate khel-sen 'said'.
(18) VOLUNTATIVE
yamar vinoo-gi Naraa [Bat [ti av-iyJ gesn-iig] Urna-d khel-sen
which wine-ACC Naraa Bat buy-VOL PART-ACC Urna-DAT say-PST
ve?
WH.QU
'Which wine did Naraa tell Urna that Bat said he wants to buy?'
(19) IMPERATIVE
Context: Naraa is talking to Bat about his family.
Naraa (??Bat-id) [yamar iil-ajil-gaa-d jav-tsgaa-0 gesen ve?
Naraa Bat-DAT which event-work-ANAPH-DAT come-PL-IMP PART WH.QU
'What event did Naraa say (to Bati) that theyi+ should attend?'
The embedded voluntative and imperative clauses in (20) and (21), respectively, are
part of a larger relative clause headed by the direct object arguments khool and
kinoo-g of the jussive clauses.
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(20) VOLUNTATIVE
[[Bat-iin [ti id-iy] gesen] kholi chinix bai-san.
Bat-GEN eat-VOL PART food yours COP-PST
'The food Bat (said he?) would like to eat was yours.'
(21) IMPERATIVE
Urna [[ti uts-eerei] gesen] kinoo-gi songo-son.
Urna watch-IMP PART movie-ACC choose-PST
'Urna picked a movie that was recommended. (literally: that people said to
watch).'
2.2 The dependent interpretation of jussive subjects
Recall that matrix instances of voluntative and imperative clauses differ in the indi-
vidual they target: Matrix voluntatives target the speaker, whereas matrix impera-
tives target the hearer. Assuming the target to correspond to the syntactic subject,
we may think of voluntatives and imperatives as having different subjects. Crucially,
syntactic embedding affects the interpretation of the jussive subject (the target of
the jussive): In syntactically subordinated jussive clauses, the target shifts in its
reference from the actual to the reported discourse participants. This means that
the subject of embedded imperatives refers to the reported hearer (Naraa in (22))
rather than the actual hearer, and the subject of embedded voluntatives refers to the
reported speaker (Bat in (23)) rather than the actual speaker.
(22) [Naraa-d [4 av-aarei gej] Bat-iin khel-sen] vinooi un-tei bai-san.
Naraa-DAT 4 buy-IMP that Bat-GEN say-PST wine.NOM price-INSTR COP-PST
'The wine that Bat told Naraai that shei/*you should buy was expensive.'
(23) Yuu-gi Bat Naraa-d [4 tseverl-iy gej] khel-sen ve?
what-ACC Bat Naraa-DAT 4 clean-VOL that say-PST WH.QU
'What did Bati tell Naraa that hei/*I want(s) to clean?'
The interpretation of jussive subjects in unembedded and embedded position plays
a central role in an analysis of jussive embedding: Any analysis, in order to be
adequate, needs to capture the fact that the subject referent is selected from among
the actual discourse participants in matrix jussives and from the reported discourse
participants in embedded jussives. Note that the interpretation of the jussive subject
in embedded position could be described using terminology from Obligatory Control
(OC) constructions and the interpretation of OC PRO: The subject of the embedded
imperative in (22) could be thought of as being controlled by the object of the higher
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clause, i.e., embedded imperatives would compare to instances of object control. The
subject of the embedded voluntative in (23), on the other hand, would be described
as being controlled by the subject of the higher clause and thus resemble an instance
of subject-controlled PRO.
Talk of the jussive subject as PRO, however, is at odds with the tentative pro-
posal made in a previous section whereby the jussive subject may be analyzed as
a silent indexical pronoun, i.e., pro.1 or pro.2. Is an indexical analysis of the jus-
sive subject compatible with the newly observed fact that the interpretation of the
subject depends on the reported rather than the actual utterance context in embed-
ded jussives? Asked differently, which additional assumptions would an indexical
analysis require to capture the interpretation of embedded jussive subjects? The
interpretation of an indexical pronoun in embedded position as a reported rather
than an actual discourse participant constitutes an instance of indexical shift. The
phenomenon of indexical shift is familiar from languages such as Japanese, Nez Perce,
Slave, Uyghur, among many others (cf. Deal 2017 for a comprehensive overview). Is
there evidence that Mongolian allows for indexicals to be shifted as well? In the
following section, I demonstrate that overt indexical pronouns in Mongolian never
shift. My conclusion, given this observation, will be that an alternative explanation
of the dependent interpretation of the jussive subject in embedded position is desir-
able: Specifically, as may be suspected based on the discussion above, I will argue
that in a more adequate analysis the jussive subject consitutes an instance of PRO.
2.2.1 Sharpening the problem: Against indexical shift in Mon-
golian
In many accounts of imperatives, imperative subjects are analyzed as indexical pro-
nouns (cf. Pak et al. 2008b for Korean, Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015 for Slovenian).
If we were to adopt an indexical account of imperative and voluntative subjects for
Mongolian as well, the changed interpretation of the jussive subject in embedded
position would have to be viewed as an instance of indexical shift. However, Mon-
golian generally does not allow for indexical shift of overt indexicals; this even holds
for indexicals in the complement of predicates found to embed jussives. The sen-
tences provided below illustrate this restriction by exemplifying the unavailability of
a shifted reading for various indexicals embedded under khelekh 'say'.
(24) demonstrates that indexical subjects of declaratives only allow for a strict
interpretation: namaig in (24) can only refer to the actual speaker and does not
permit an interpretation as the speaker of the reported utterance, Bat.
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(24) Yuu-gi Bat [nama-ig/*bi tj uts-sen gej] khel-sen ve?
what-ACC Bat 1-ACC/1.NOM ti see-PST that say-PST QU
'What did Bati say that Ipeake,/*hei saw?'
In some languages, e.g., Uyghur (cf. Shklovsky & Sudo 2014), a correlation has
been found between the case of an indexical and its shiftability: In Ugyghur, NOM
but not ACC subjects can be shifted. Could the same mechanism be in place in
Mongolian and prevent a shifted interpretation of the ACC subject in (24)? Note
that Mongolian seems to disallow NOM on subjects of embedded declaratives if that
subject is indexical, which makes a direct comparison between NOM and ACC subjects
and their shiftability impossible. However, NOM in this position is licit if the subject
is a full DP; if Mongolian worked like Uyghur, indexicals embedded inside NOM DP
subjects should be eligible for shifting. However, examples of that type such as (25)
seem to suggest that Mongolian does not in fact parallel Uyghur: The possessive
indexical chin inside the embedded subject cannot receive a shifted interpretation,
regardless of whether the subject is assigned NOM or ACC.
(25) [Naiz-zaluu/ naiz-zaluu-g chin khen-iig uns-sen gej] Bat Naraa-d
friend-guy.NOM/ friend-guy-ACC 2.GEN who-ACC kiss-PST that Bat Naraa-DAT
khel-sen ve?
say-PST QU
'Who did Bat say to Naraai that youradr,ji boyfriend kissed?'
Could it be that indexical shift is somehow contingent on the illocutionary force of
a clause such that indexicals are shiftable in jussive but not in declarative clauses?
This hypothesis is defeated by (26): The embedded clause contains a VOL, yet the
2PS DATIVE object chamt must be interpreted absolutely, i.e., as the actual hearer.
The same holds for the indexical locative adverbial, end 'here' in (27): Its standing
in an imperative clause does not make it eligible for a shifted interpretation. In fact,
there is no evidence that non-subject person indexicals or spatial indexicals ever shift
in Mongolian, regardless of the mood of the clause they appear in.
(26) Yuui Dorj Naraa-d [cham-t 4 avch-bg-iy gej] khel-sen ve?
what Dorj Naraa-DAT 2-DAT 4 buy-give-VOL that say-PST QU
'What did Dorji tell Naraaj that he, wants to buy youad,/*herj?'
(27) Bat cham-t lend yamar tavilga bairluul-0 gej] khel-sen ve?
Bat you-DAT here which furniture store-IMP that say-PST WH.QU
'Which piece of furniture did Bat tell you to store here (at speaker's/*Bat's
location)?'
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Finally, one could wonder if Mongolian may distinguish between overt and covert
indexicals with respect to shiftability such that only covert indexicals are allowed to
shift. Jussives, which do not allow for overt subjects, could be explained as instances
of covert indexical shift under such an analysis. However, since non-jussive clauses, by
contrast, do not allow for subject drop in Mongolian, the minimal contrasts predicted
by such an analysis between overt and covert indexical subjects in otherwise identical
environments could not be tested empirically.
I do not have evidence that the hypothesis of covert indexical shift in Mongolian is
inadequate. However, I argue that, a priori, an indexical shift analysis is no better or
worse than alternative analyses that capture the facts equally well. Therefore, unless
an indexical shift analysis can be argued to be more minimal than the analysis I put
forward in the remainder of this work and assuming that my analysis can account for
the same or a larger set of facts, I consider myself justified in choosing my analysis
over an alternative analysis involving indexical shift. In fact, my approach seems
favorable on the grounds that it explains phenomena by means of already existing
concepts such as PRO and, in contrast to an alternative indexical shift analysis,
circumvents the need to invoke new categories such as covert indexicals that can
shift. Of course, this argument can only be maintained if independently motivated
concepts can similarly replace covert indexicals in other languages for which they
have been posited. (Thanks to Mikhail Knyazez, p.c., for discussion of this point.)
Based on the above arguments, I dismiss a hypothesis whereby indexicals in
Mongolian are shiftable. Abandoning an indexical shift analysis necessitates a change
in our assumptions about the nature of the jussive subject, in order to be able to
account for its interpretation in embedded jussives. I will arrive at the conclusion that
the jussive subject is an instance of PRO. However, before developing my account
of jussive PRO, I will present another set of properties that provides strong support
for such an analysis.
2.3 The de se requirement
By uttering a Mongolian voluntative report in which the voluntative clause is syn-
tactically genuinely embedded, we necessarily ascribe to the reported speaker (i.e.,
Bat in (28)) a de me attitude about the subject of the embedded voluntative. (The
term de se is used as a broader category comprising both de me and de te attitudes;
de te attitudes become relevant in the context of embedded imperatives.)
If Bat has a de me attitude about some individual, call it A, being A is compatible
with all of Bat's beliefs. The de me property of embedded voluntatives comes to the
surface in contexts where Bat does not have a de me attitude towards the referent
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of the voluntative subject, i.e., where it is not true that Bat thinks of himself as the
target of the voluntative. Such contexts, represented by (29), cannot felicitously be
described using a voluntative report.
For purposes of illustration, consider first the sentence in (28). The sentence is
only acceptable in a scenario where Bat's original utterance expresses a de se attitude,
as in "I want to clean x". I.e., (28) is infelicitous if prompted by a scenario where
Bat sees his own reflection in a window and, mistaking it for an actual person, says
to Naraa, "He (pointing at his own reflection) wants to clean x".
(28) Yuu-gi Bat Naraa-d [ti tseverl-iy gej] khel-sen ve?
what-AcC Bat Naraa-DAT clean-VOL that say-PST WH.QU
'What did Bati tell Naraa that hei wants to clean?'
Another example illustrating the ascription of a de se attitude to the reported speaker
in voluntative reports is provided in (29): The sentence in (29) is infelicitous as a
report of the described situation, i.e., its only meaning is (29-b) as opposed to the
intended (29-a). 5
(29) Context (adopted from Deal 2017, modified): Bat, at the hospital for a
checkup, happens to glance at the chart of a patient's blood work. A doctor
himself, Bat gathers from the chart that the patient is very sick and must be
very weak. As the name on the chart is hard to read, Bat fails to realize that
the chart is about himself. He says to the nurse when she comes in, pointing
at the chart, "This guy should rest".
#Bat suvilagch-d [amr-ey gej] khel-sen.
Bat nurse-DAT rest-VOL that say-PST
a. intended: 'Bati said to the nurse hei should rest.' (non-de se)
b. 'Bat said to the nurse, "let me rest".' (de se)
Embedded imperatives in Mongolian are subject to a parallel, de te requirement:
The reported speaker, Bat in the following examples, must have a de te attitude
towards the referent of the embedded imperative subject (note that the imperative
subject corresponds to the matrix addressee). For Bat to have a de te attitude
towards some A means that it is compatible with Bat's beliefs that his addressee is
A.
5Note that an alternative, quote parse is available for (29) (as well as (31)), where syntactic
embedding is not enforced structurally. However, this does not change the reported judgments as
the de me/de te requirement also applies to the subject of unembedded voluntatives and imperatives,
respectively.
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The imperative report (30) could be used if Bat had said to Naraa "Buy this
wine!" or "I want you to buy this wine", but it would be infelicitous if Bat had said
to Naraa, mistaking her for her twin Urna, "I want Naraa to buy this wine".
(30) [Naraa-d [ti av-aarei gej] Bat-iin khel-sen] vinooi un-tei bai-san.
Naraa-DAT buy-IMP that Bat-GEN say-PST wine.NOM price-INSTR COP-PST
'The wine that Bat asked Naraa to buy was expensive.'
As before, we can bring the de te requirement of imperative reports to the surface by
creating a scenario such as (31), where Bat does not think that he is talking to Naraa.
Using the imperative report below to describe the given scenario is infelicitous.
(31) Context: Bat is examining two twins, Naraa and Urna, at the same time
although in different rooms. He walks into Naraa's room to talk to her about
her results and starts explaining them to her, but then thinks that he's ac-
tually in the wrong room and is talking to Urna. He apologizes, and just
before leaving tells Naraa, "Well, I shouldn't have told you all that, but, in
summary, since Naraa is so weak, she should rest".
#Bat Naraa-d [amr-aarei gej] khel-sen.
Bat Naraa-DAT rest-IMP that say-PST
a. intended: 'Bat said to Naraai shei should rest.' (non-de te)
b. 'Bat said to Naraa, "you should rest".' (de te)
One might wonder if the reason for why the jussive reports are infelicitous in the
described contexts could be that they are considered unfaithful reports of the original
utterance. We can exclude this hypothesis at least in the case of the imperative
report: My speaker reports that a direction given using a deontic modal (32-a) can
felicitously be reported by way of an imperative (32-b).
(32) a. Context: Bat is addressing his patient, Naraa:
Amr-akh khereg-tei.
rest-INF need-INSTR
'You should rest.'
b. Bat Naraa-d [ambr-aarei gej] khel-sen.
Bat Naraa-DAT rest-IMP
'Bat said to Naraa, rest.'
To sum up, whoever the subject of an embedded jussive refers to must be this
individual also according to the beliefs of the individual reported as the speaker of the
jussive. This requirement is suggestive evidence for an analysis of embedded jussive
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subjects as PRO: A de se interpretation is, notably, one of the canonical properties
of the PRO subject in Obligatory Control constructions. Shifted indexicals, on the
other hand, vary in whether or not they require a de se interpretation (see Deal 2017)
and cannot, a priori, by expected to behave one way or the other.
36
Chapter 3
Towards an analysis: the jussive
subject as PRO
The previous section provided evidence that jussive clauses can occur in syntactically
embedded environments in Mongolian. Specifically, embedded jussives were found
under predicates asserting the occurrence of a speech event, to wit, khelekh 'say',
sanal bolgokh 'make a suggestion', as well as under the particle gesen 'it was said'.
Much attention was paid to the semantic properties of the jussive subject in
embedded contexts. Let me remind you of the central observations: In section 2.2 it
was shown that the reference of the jussive subject coincides with one of the discourse
participants reported in the clause embedding the jussive. In more technical terms,
the jussive subject was found to have a controller or antecedent DP in the matrix
clause. Furthermore, we discovered a correlation between the form of the embedded
jussive and the choice of controller: If the embedded jussive is a voluntative, its
subject is controlled by the speaker DP in the higher clause, and if the embedded
jussive is an imperative, its subject is controlled by the hearer DP in the higher
clause. We also noted that this correlation imitates the dichotomy of subject vs.
object control in Obligatory Control constructions.
Another property of jussive reports was laid out in section 2.3: The speaker
reported to have uttered a jussive speech act (in all our examples: the matrix subject)
must have a de se attitude towards the jussive subject; this attitude amounts to a
de me attitude if the embedded jussive is a voluntative, and a de te attitude if the
embedded jussive is an imperative.
On the one hand, both of these properties are properties also found in standard,
obligatorily controlled PRO, which seems to be a good argument in favor of a corre-
sponding analysis. Moreover, a possible alternative analysis of the jussive subject as
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a silent indexical pronoun was dismissed on the grounds that Mongolian indexicals
do not allow for shift elsewhere. The de se property constitutes another parallel
between jussive subjects and PRO and thus further heightens the appeal of a PRO
analysis compared to an indexical analysis: Shifted indexicals vary in whether or not
they require a de se interpretation (cf. Deal 2017); a priori, there is no expectation
for them to behave one way or the other.
In the following sections, I will lay out the details of such an analysis for the
jussive subject. As hinted at earlier in this work, I will select from two approaches
to PRO: a "simple" view of PRO, in which PRO is a semantically empty element (cf.
Chierchia 1989), and a view of PRO as a more intricate constituent of type e with
internal structure and interpretable #-features. The Mongolian data can be captured
using either approach to PRO. This is why I refer to Korean as a language where
jussive embedding parallels jussive embedding in Mongolian in all crucial respects
except for one: Embedded jussive subjects can be overt in Korean. This feature, as
I will demonstrate, helps to differentiate between analyses and provides evidence in
favor of a complex-PRO analysis.
3.1 The semantics of PRO: two views
I pursue an analysis of the jussive subject as PRO based, largely, on two properties
the jussive subject shares with obligatorily controlled PRO: (i) The jussive subject
is controlled by a DP argument in the higher clause. (ii) The reported speaker of the
jussive necessarily has a de se attitude towards the referent of the jussive subject.
Various approaches to PRO in Obligatory Control constructions have been sug-
gested in the literature. In what follows, I highlight two of them.
3.1.1 Empty PRO (Chierchia 1989)
Chierchia (1989) is concerned with the fact that PRO complements require a de se
reading of the PRO subject: (1) is false as a description of the scenario in (1-b).
(1) Mary wants PRO to win.
a. True if Mary thinks "Hopefully I will win the competition".
b. False if Mary, not realizing she is listening to her own recording, thinks
"This violinist plays better than me. I think she should win the competi-
tion."
To capture this limitation, Chierchia (1989), building on Lewis (1979), suggests
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to analyze PRO clauses as properties rather than propositions, and attitude reports
like (1) as relations between individuals and such properties. A Control predicate
like want is correspondingly taken to select for properties instead of propositions; its
denotation is provided in (2).
(2) wantjw = AP(s,et).Ax.x wants P in w
To achieve a property semantics for the complement, Chierchia analyzes PRO as a
semantically vacuous element, which does not fill an argument position. I implement
this view by assuming that PRO obligatory moves (for the sake of concreteness,
this could be V-to-T movement), leaving a trace (a variable over individuals) to be
abstracted over. This mechanism enables PRO to bind variables, which will be useful
in accounting for PRO clauses containing local anaphors (such as (5)). Crucially, a
PRO clause constitutes a property (s, et) and not a proposition (st) in such an
analysis. The assumed structure and meaning of a PRO clause is sketched in (3).
(3) [PRO A, [tj to win]fl = Aw.Ax.x wins in w
tfi
If want is assigned the meaning in (2), the sentence in (1) then states that Mary
desires having the property of winning.
What makes reference to properties necessary to account for the contrast in (1),
in other words, why is a proposition-centered view insufficient to distinguish de se
attitudes? Let us review Lewis's (1979) original argument.
Lewis (1979) contends that the conceptually basic definition of attitudes is in
terms of properties and not propositions, and that property-type attitudes subsume
corresponding propositional attitudes. In his famous example, Lewis puts forward
that two gods, Jehovah and Zeus, could be omniscient in terms of propositional
knowledge yet they may lack knowledge of a certain form: Suppose Jehovah lives on
top of the tallest mountain and throws down manna, and Zeus lives on top of the cold-
est mountain and throws down thunderbolts. Assume both Jehovah and Zeus know
that Jehovah throws manna from the tallest mountain and Zeus throws thunderbolts
from the coldest mountain. Yet Jehovah also believes "I throw thunderbolts from the
coldest mountain", and Zeus believes "I throw manna from the tallest mountain". In
other words, neither of them knows which of the two gods he is. Note that both
gods still know exactly which world out of a set of possible worlds they live in, in
other words, they know every proposition that is true of their world. Therefore, their
ignorance cannot be described as a lack of propositional knowledge. However, their
knowledge is incomplete as they do not self-ascribe all the properties they possess:
Jehovah would be closer to omniscience if he self-ascribed the property of living on
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the tallest mountain.
Lewis shows that propositional attitudes subsume attitudes in terms of properties.
In the words of Pearson (2013: 4), "for any item of propositional knowledge, there is
a corresponding piece of property-type knowledge". To illustrate with an example,
"[i]f I know (or believe, or hope) that it is a beautiful day today, then I
locate myself in a world in which it is a beautiful day today. I examine
the set of world-individual pairs (w', x) that are candidates for the pair
consisting of the actual world and myself, and exclude those in which it is
not a beautiful day. Equivalently, I self-ascribe the property of inhabiting
a world in which it is a beautiful day today." (ibid.)
As indicated by Pearson, this relationship is not limited to doxastic attitudes and
extends to attitudes of all types, such as Mary's bouletic attitude in (1): As already
mentioned above, by (1) Mary self-ascribes the property of winning in her desire
worlds; put differently, Mary is reported to desire having the property of winning.
A proposition-based description of the attitude whereby it is true in Mary's desire
worlds that Mary wins could not capture the difference in truth value in the two
contexts.
Having established that reference to properties is necessary to distinguish de
se attitudes, let us return to the semantics assigned to attitude verbs such as want.
Crucially, we can deploy a modification of a Hintikkan attitude semantics to render de
se attitudes in a more familiar way: Assume that, like want in traditional treatments,
Control want introduces desires by way of quantification; however, by (4-a), the
domain of quantification is formed by centered worlds (pairs of type (se) that consist
of a world and its individual center) rather than by simple worlds.' A corresponding
accessibility relation DESIREsW,X denotes the set of centered worlds (w', x') such that
being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in w.
(4) a. [wantjw AP(,t.Ax.V(w',x') E DESIRESw,2: P(w')(x') 1
b. DESIRESw, := {(w', x'): being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of
x in w}
Given (1-b), sentence (1) is false in the non-de se scenario (1-b) since it is not the case
that in all such (w', x') compatible with Mary's wishes, x' wins; quite on the contrary,
Mary's desires are such that she would rather be x' in w' and have some other y'
("the woman playing", who she does not identify with herself) win the competition.
'This way of thinking about de se attitudes goes back to Lewis (1986).
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Or, in Chierchia's terms, Mary in this scenario does not find self-ascription of the
property of winning desirable. 2
3.1.2 Against empty PRO
As is widely known, Obligatory Control (OC) PRO has q-features (cf. for example,
Radford 1988). Among others, features on PRO are reflected in the overt shape
of PRO in languages where PRO can be spelled out (as shown for Korean in sec-
tion 3.2), and in the form of local anaphors in languages like English, where PRO
is always covert. Consider (5) as an instance of covert PRO: Given that reflexive
anaphors such as herself need to be bound locally, normally, within their clause, her-
self must be taken to be bound by PRO rather than by the matrix subject Sue. The
ungrammaticality of forms with alternative sets of 0-features, e.g., himself, myself
etc. suggests that PRO's 0-features are specified as {3,SG,FEM}.
(5) Suet expected PROQ to get herselfi/*himselfi/*myselfi/*oneselfi promoted.
How does a Chierchia style analysis handle the presence of features on PRO, given
that PRO is semantically empty?
A view that seems appealing at first exploits the assumption that features on
bound variables are not semantically interpreted and only present at PF (Kratzer
1998, Stechow 2003, Heim 2008): Under this view, the features on PRO are merely a
phonological reflex of agreement with a binder in the matrix clause. This, of course,
raises the question as to the type of binding instantiated in these constructions. Con-
sider the sentences in (6). The asymmetry in grammaticality suggests that PRO can
be bound by (and hence agree with) Pavarotti but not with Olga. What determines
this asymmetry?
(6) a. *Pavarotti promised Olgai PROi to restrain herselfi.
b. Pavarottij promised Olga PROi to restrain himselfi.
The question whether a given matrix DP can bind PRO is not a matter of syntactic
function: PRO agrees with the matrix subject in (6) involving promise but with the
2Note that under such an analysis, we will need to say something about Control predicates
which alternatively combine with finite - declarative or interrogative - complements, e.g., expect,
hope, ask, tell: Corresponding predicates would have to be ambiguous between a ((s, et) , et) item
paralleling want in (2) or (4-a), and a homophonous item of type (st, et) imitating standard attitude
verbs. A complex PRO analysis as sketched in the following section avoids having to postulate such
lexical ambiguity.
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object in (7) featuring tell.3
(7) a. Pavarotti told Olgai PROi to restrain herselfi.
b. *Pavarottij told Olga PROi to restrain himselfi.
Rather, agreement seems to track controller choice: PRO agrees with the matrix
subject under Subject Control verbs like promise but with the object under Object
Control verbs such as tell. Unfortunately, this correlation between the semantics
(controller choice) and the syntax (agreement via binding) does not fall out from the
system under the current analysis. Let me explain why.
In Chierchia's account, controller choice is lexically encoded. For example, promise
in (8-a) attributes the property denoted by the PRO clause to the external (as op-
posed to the internal) argument's counterpart. At the same time, the assumed
semantics is blind to co-indexation between PRO and a matrix argument: By (8-a),
the complement is a property whose holder is Pavarotti's (the attitude holder's) coun-
terpart x' regardless of whether PRO is co-indexed with Pavarotti or Olga. In other
words, unless we add a syntactic stipulation that prevents co-indexing between Olga
and PRO, (6-a) is identical in meaning to (6-b).
(8) a. [(6-a)]w'9 - [(6-b)]W = 1 iff
V (w', x', y') E PROMISEw,Pavarotti,oiga : [Aw".Az.z restrains z](w')(x')
b. PROMISE,xy := {(w', x', y'): being x' in w' addressing y' is compatible
with what x promises y in w}
If we want to maintain a Chierchia style semantics while also accounting for the
agreement facts, we have to make some rather non-canonical assumptions. Let me
present two implementations to illustrate this.
On the one hand, we could add an independent lexical rule that maps semantic
control relations to a (morpho-)syntactic relation of agreement or feature sharing
Agree(X, Y):
(9) For an attitude verb taking a property complement P(s,et) and quantifying
over triplets (s, e, e), Agree(X, Y) is defined over pairs of lexical items (X, Y)
such that [XJ's counterpart is the individual center [Yj in the triplet (s, e, e)
of which P is predicated.4
3 This, for example, rules out an analysis in which agreement is mediated by the Control predicate
along the lines of Stechow's (2003) assumption of binding by verbs: Under such an analysis, the
Control predicate would gets its features from the syntactic subject through subject-verb agreement
and transmit them to PRO as its bindee.
4 The way the rule is formulated it does not cover quantificational antecedents. However, an
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By this rule, Y (corresponding to PRO) would be x' under the Subject Control
verb promise, but y' under Object Control ask; it would therefore agree with the
external argument in the former case, but with the internal argument in the latter
case. However, we would need to make significant adjustments to allow a syntactic
operation like agreement to be determined in this way inside the lexicon. 5
(10) a. V (w', x', y') E PROMISE,,, : P(w') (')
b. V (w', x', y') E ASK,,,y : P(w')(y')
Landau (2018:11) mentions a similar rule that is applied outside narrow syntax,
though he locates it post-LF rather than before the derivation:
One option is to make substantial changes in the theory of agreement.
Most importantly, agreement would have to be able to operate postsyn-
tactically, and even post-LF, at the semantic component. In particular,
Agree (x, y) would have to be defined over pairs (x, y) such that "y binds
the individual variable that is the doxastic counterpart of x" [This rule
is not designed to deal with Object Control verbs.] Although possible
in principle, such a move seems very undesirable. Even ignoring the
characterization of the dependency itself, the very idea that agreement
applies to semantic representations goes against the grain of much work
in generative grammar.
To conclude, we would have to make significant theoretical concessions if we were
to adopt a proposal along the above lines.
So far I did not dispute the idea that PRO's features are uninterpretable. Could
a Chierchia style analysis be saved if all occurrences of q-features, including on PRO,
are in fact not vacuous, but semantically present (as presuppositions)? Could failure
to "agree" simply be a result of semantic anomaly?
Such an analysis would work for simple cases such as (6) and (7). To illustrate,
in (6-a) a feature [FEMI on herselfi would introduce a presupposition that its referent
g(i) is female. This presupposition is transmitted to (vacuous) PRO via binding.
(PRO is assumed to undergo obligatory abstraction as shown in (3).) The property
denoted by the PRO clause would end up being [Aw.Ax : x is female. x restrain x
in wJ. (Martin Hackl, p.c.).
extension should be straightforward and the simplified version is used for readability.
5 One may ask if agreement could use semantic predication (of the PRO clause property to the
controller) as its vehicle. This does not seem feasible: As Landau (2018) points out, the property is
predicated of the attitude holder's doxastic counterparts (of herself or her addressee), rather than
of attitude holder herself.
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Assuming that the presupposition on PRO projects into the restrictor of promise,
upon composition, we derive the following meaning (using promise in (8-a)).
(11) [Pavarotti promised Olga PROi to restrain herselfIw = 1 iff
V (w', x', y') [(w', x', y') E PROMISEw,Pavarotti,Olga, & x' is female in w' =:' x'
restrains x' in w'I
The created restrictor would be empty in the described scenario since Pavarotti pre-
sumably identifies as male in all worlds compatible with his promise. The conditional
would thus be trivially true. To avoid semantic deviance of this type, himself must
be used, which creates the appearance of agreement between PRO and the controller
Pavarotti.
Unfortunately, a semantic approach leads to wrong predictions in other cases. Let
me present two such instances.
Overt variables bound by PRO can be ambiguous between de se and de re read-
ings. The latter option causes problems in Chierchia's framework. Consider the
following example, inspired by Landau (2018):
(12) Context: After reading an impressive article by a politician, Palin says to
Bill: "I promise to vote for this politician." What she doesn't notice is that
she herself authored the article.
Palin promised Bill [PROi to vote for herselfi/heri1
In this context, herself is interpreted de re. However, since herself is locally bound
by PRO, it will inevitably be interpreted de se together with PRO by Chierchia's
semantics, i.e., the property denoted by the PRO clause would be [Ax.x votes for
x]. To capture the de re interpretation of herself, herself must be bound directly by
Palin; this, however, leads to the wrong expectation of ungrammatical her instead
of observed herself.
There is another argument against semantically active 4-features on empty PRO,
brought up by Schlenker (2003). Consider the following sentence.
(13) Alice (a transsexual) wants to become a man, and PROi to buy herselfi/*himselfi
a car. (Schlenker 2003)
If the derivation of (13) proceeds analogous to (11) and the presupposition on gram-
matical herself projects into the restrictor of want, the resulting meaning is as follows.
(14) [Alice wants PROi to buy herselfi a car]w = 1 iff
V (w', x') [(w', x') E DESIRESW,Alice & x' is female in w' '. x' buys herself a
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car in w'
Note that the restrictor of the desire modal is empty in the described context given
that Alice identifies as male in all her desire worlds. Consequently, the conditional is
trivially true! Unlike for (6-a), derived in (11), the prediction of semantic deviance is
undesirable in the case of (13) and at odds with the actual well-formedness of herself
in the described context.
Before I close this section, let me highlight one option we have not yet explored:
Could the controlled subject be a regular bound variable pro, and the Control verb
a standard attitude predicate whose complement is a proposition (st)? This option
is illustrated below.
(15) a. Pavarottij promised Olga proi to restrain himselfi.
b. [(15-a)]wg = promisejw (Aw. Pavarotti restrains himself in w)(Olga)
(Pavarotti)
= 1 iff Vw' compatible with Pavarotti's promises to Olga in w, Pavarotti
restrains himself in w'.
Regarding such an account, note that Chierchia's analysis was developed precisely
because a classical attitude analysis along the above lines does not capture the obli-
gatoriness of de se for PRO: By the truth conditions in (15-b), (15-a) would falsely
be predicted to be true also if Pavarotti, watching a taped performance, promised to
Olga that "this tenor will restrain himself" in his next performance, unaware that he
himself is that tenor.
To summarize, we saw that the presence of features on PRO that match the
features of the controller DP creates significant problems for a property analysis
of PRO clauses as suggested by Chierchia (1989): On one side, a PF analysis of
PRO's features would fail to account for the correlation between feature matching
and controller choice, unless we introduce certain theoretically highly controversial
assumptions. On the other side, an alternative analysis that takes the 0-features on
PRO to be semantically interpretable would make wrong predictions in a range of
cases including de re readings of bound variable readings.
My conclusion, which is in line with Landau (2018), is to abandon Chierchia's
semantics for PRO and Control verbs in favor of an analysis along the lines of complex
PRO. This analysis is anticipated in rough terms in the next section, and will be laid
out in more detail in section 5.2.
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3.1.3 Anticipating complex PRO
In an alternative view of PRO, PRO amounts to an individual-type element with a
more complex semantics and, in one implementation of the view, internal structure.
Specifically, I put forward the following structure for PRO.
(16)
DP[O] ..
PROe ...
G xGi Xi [01
A crucial property of PRO in (16) is the presence of an individual variable x. x is
bound by the controller DP and agrees with its binder in 0-features. Importantly,
the features observed on PRO hence originate inside PRO, on x.
A distinguishing property of a complex PRO analysis is that, unlike an analysis of
PRO as semantically empty, PRO's features can be taken to have semantic content.
In other words, a corresponding analysis allows us to dispense with the assumption
that features on PRO are semantically inert. This possibility will become amply
clear in chapter 5; moreover, it connects to recent proposals (Spathas 2010, Bassi &
Longenbaugh 2018) which argue against the idea of semantically empty features on
bound variables (counter to Kratzer 1998, Heim 2002, among others).
In the same chapter I will also show that the correlation between agreement and
controller choice is not coincidental: As will be proven in section 5.5.3, the iden-
tity of the controller (the binder) has a direct impact on the semantics in such an
analysis, and the wrong choice of controller leads to a semantic violation (presuppo-
sition failure or contradiction). Moreover, I will demonstrate how such an analysis is
able to successfully handle examples such as (13) and (12), which turned out to be
problematic for a property analyis of PRO clauses.
However, before I present the details of this analysis, I ask the reader to bear
with me and return to the topic of embedded jussives and their subject.
The following section presents evidence that not only regular PRO has 0-features:
The subjects of Korean embedded jussive, which parallel Mongolian jussive subjects
in most respects including the de se interpretation, display reflexes of 0-agreement
with their controller.
I will use this fact as an argument that a complex PRO analysis is also the right
analysis for jussive subjects in Korean and, in the interest of uniformity, should be
assumed to underlie jussive subjects in Mongolian as well.
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3.2 PRO has q-features: evidence from Korean
In this section I provide evidence that 0-features on subjects of Control complements
are not limited to OC PRO: Using the case of Korean, I show that q-features must
also be taken to characterize the PRO subject of jussive clauses.
There is borad consensus in the literature that Korean allows for embedding
of jussives (Portner 2004, 2007; Pak et al. 2008b; Madigan 2008; Park 2011, 2014,
2018). Korean jussives come in three different forms. Embedded jussive subjects
of all three forms are characterized by the same properties familiar from embedded
jussives in Mongolian, which we identified as properties also found on PRO: Like their
Mongolian counterpart, embedded jussive subjects in Korean have a controller in
the matrix clause. Moreover, also like in Mongolian, Korean jussive subjects require
that the speaker of a jussive report have a de se attitude towards the jussive subject.
However, different from Mongolian, Korean jussive subjects are optionally overt, in
which case they show reflexes of 0-agreement with their controller in the matrix
clause (cf. also Park 2011:470pp.). The examples below illustrate this possibility:
(17) shows agreement of the embedded subject, spelled out as nayka, with its iPS
controller nayka. Similarly, the 2Ps embedded subject neyka in (18) agrees with its
controller, the matrix object ne-eykey. Finally, the embedded subject in (19) reflects
the 1PS feature on one of its two controller DPs.
(17) Nay-ka inho-eykey [(nay-ka) swuni-lul towacwu-ma-ko] malhayss-ta.
I-NOM Inho-DAT I-NOM swuni-ACC help-PROM-C said-DECL
'I said to Inho that I promise to help Swuni.' (Pak et al. 2008b)
(18) Inho-ka ne-eykey [(ney-ka) chayk-ula ilk-ula-ko] hayss-ta.
Inho-NOM you-to you-NOM book-ACC read-IMP-C said-DECL
'Inho told you to read the book.' (Portner et al. 2014)
(19) John-un na-eykey [(wuli-ka) ttena-ca-kol ceyanhayss-ta.
John-TOP I-DAT we-NOM leave-EXH-C proposed-DECL
'John, proposed to mej PROiaj to leave.' (Park 2011)
The assumption that PRO is complex along the lines of (16) is bolstered by the
existence of overt jussive PRO in Korean: As I hope to have shown in the preceding
section, once PRO can be argued to have 0-features, a complex PRO analysis is
superior to an analysis of PRO as a semantically empty element in the style of
Chierchia (1989).
I take the role Korean plays in my argument as an opportunity to expound on
Korean jussives and their occurrence in embedded position in the next chapter. After
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familiarizing the reader with the basic facts, I pick up where we have left off and
continue to develop an analysis of embedded jussives in Mongolian and Korean in
chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
The Korean jussive in matrix and
embedded position
4.1 The Korean jussive in matrix position
Korean marks clause type, or illocutionary force, by means of different clause-final
particles. This includes particles for declarative and interrogative clauses, illustrated
in (1) and (2), as well as particles marking various kinds of non-assertive speech acts.
(1) Cemsim-ul mek-ess-ta.
lunch-ACC eat-PST-DECL
'I ate lunch.'
(2) Cemsim-ul mek-ess-ni?
lunch-ACC eat-PST-QU
'Did you eat lunch?'
I focus on three non-assertive clause-types that are known as promissive, imperative,
and exhortative in the literature on Korean and often collapsed under the term
jussives. The three jussive forms are associated with different clause-final particles,
-ma, (e)-la, -ca, respectively, as illustrated in (3-b) through (5) (examples from Pak
et al. 2008b).
(3) Promissive: lSG/1EXCL SUBJECT
a. Nayil 0 cemsim-ul sa-ma.
tomorrow 0 lunch-ACC buy-PROM
'I will buy lunch tomorrow.'
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b. Nay-ka cemsim-ul sa-ma.
I-NOM lunch-ACC buy-PROM
'I will buy lunch.'
(4) Imperative: 2 SUBJECT
(Ney-ka) cemsim-ul mek-ela.
you.SG-NOM lunch-ACC eat-IMP
'Eat lunch!'
(5) Exhortative: 1INCL SUBJECT
(Wuli-ka) cemsim-ul mek-ca.
we-NOM lunch-ACC eat-EXH
'Let's (you and I) eat lunch.'
Jussives differ in the individual targeted by the modal proposition. By way of a
descriptive generalization, we could say that promissives combine with a first-person
singular or a first-person plural exclusive subject, imperatives with a second-person
subject, and exhortatives with a first-plural inclusive subject, assuming that the
target coincides with the clausal subject.
The above examples show that jussives allow for overt pronominal subjects be-
sides null subjects. The interpretation and syntactic properties (person/number
features) of the subject are reflected in the pronominal forms. Additionally, promis-
sives and imperatives permit referential DPs in subject position, presumably to the
extent that the DPs can be used to refer to the speaker (in the case of promissives),
the addressee (in imperatives), or the two together (in exhortatives), cf. (6) through
(8) from Pak et al. (2008a, 2008b). Pak et al. note that even in the presence of
referential DP subjects, the subject seems to have active first (promissive) or second
(imperative) person features, judging by the form of the anaphors referring to the
subject, nay 'my' and ney 'your', respectively.
(6) Emma-nun nay/emma il-ul ha-ma.
mommy-TOP my/mommy work-ACC do-PROM
'Mommy will do her work.'
(7) Inho-nun ney/inho il-ul hay-la.
Inho-TOP your/Inho work-Ace do-IMP
'Inho do your work.'
(8) Emma-lang Inho-ka kati chengso ha-ca.
Mommy-with Inho-NOM together clean do-EXH
'Let's clean together, mommy and Inho.'
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To strengthen their argument that jussive subjects are syntactically first or second
person even when expressed by referential DPs, Pak et al. (2008b) contrast jussives
with declarative and interrogative clauses that involve a referential DP subject pick-
ing out the speaker or hearer: in clauses of that type, a subject anaphor must either
be null or a repetition of the noun, but cannot be first or second person. This is
illustrated by (9): The third-person subject emma refers to the speaker, but the
possessive anaphor must be null or a repetition of the subject noun emma rather
than a first person pronoun.
(9) Emma-nun (emma) aki-lul salanghay-yo.
mommy-TOP (mommy) baby-ACC love-DECL(polite)
'Mommy loves (mommy's) baby.'
4.2 Arguments for a uniform clause type jussive
(Pak et al. 2004, 2008a)
Pak et al. (2004, 2008a) make a case for the treatment of Korean promissives, imper-
atives, and exhortatives as inflectional forms of a uniform clause type jussive, based
on certain features these clauses share to the exclusion of other clause types. To
implement this idea, Pak et al. (2008b) take jussive clauses to involve a uniform
morpheme JUSSIVE, which they represent as the head of a dedicated Jussive Phrase.
In what follows, I review the set of features that are common to all jussive types
in Korean according to Pak et al. (2004).
4.2.1 Restriction on overt subjects in embedded position
As noted by Pak et al. (2004), the subject in Korean embedded declaratives and
interrogatives can be realized by referential DPs, cf. (10) and (11), or it can be null,
cf. (12).1
(10) John-i tom-eykey [mary-ka cip-ey kass-ta-ko] malhayss-ta.
John-NOM Tom-DAT Mary-NOM home-to went-DECL-C said-DECL
'John told Tom that Mary went home.'
'The availability of overt pronominal subjects is generally heavily constrained in Korean, which
is a pro-drop language. However, even jussives allow for overt pronominal subjects under certain
circumstances related to agreement with a DP in the matrix clause. These cases, which play a
central role in my analysis, will be discussed in detail in section 4.3.4.
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(11) John-i tom-eykey [mary-ka cip-ey kass-nya-ko] muless-ta.
John-NOM Tom-DAT [Mary-NOM home-to went-QU-C asked-DECL
'John asked Tom whether Mary went home.'
Null subjects of declaratives and interrogatives can have an antecedent in the matrix
clause or get their reference from context:
(12) Na-nun [swuni-lul towacwu-lke(t-i)-la-ko] sayngkakhan-ta.2
I-TOP swuni-ACC help-will-(COP)-DECL-C think-DECL
'I think that I/he/she/they will help Swuni.'
Different from declaratives and interrogatives, embedded promissives, impera-
tives, and exhortatives generally ban full referential DPs from subject position, cf.
(13) through (14). (Pak et al. do not include a corresponding example of an embedded
exhortative, though their claim does cover exhortatives as well.) 3
2 The embedded sentence final particle -1a is an allomorphic variant of the declarative sentence
final particle -ta, which occurs in embedded copula constructions.
3Pak et al. 2008b, a.o.) note that referential DP subjects are exceptionally licensed in embedded
jussives if the subject stands in a subset relation to the referent of the matrix DP targeted by the
jussive:
In (i), involving an embedded EXHORTATIVE, the DP in embedded subject position picks out a
subset of the matrix speaker and addressee (according to Pak et al. (2008b), though it is not clear
from the translation that the matrix speaker, John, is part of the subset in this case), namely, those
people who want to eat rice cake.
(i) John-i haksayngtul-eykey [ttekpoki-lul mek-ko sip-un salamtul-un
John-NOM students-DAT ricecake-ACC eat want-PRES people-TOP(CONTR)
kati ka-ca-ko] malhayss-ta.
together go-EXH-C said-DECL
'John said to the students that those people who want to eat rice cake go with him.'
In (ii), the DP subject of the embedded IMPERATIVE refers to a subset of the matrix addressee, the
students, namely, to those students who have finished their homework.
(ii) John-i haksayngtul-eykey [swukcey-lul ta han salamtul-un cip-ey
John-NOM students-DAT homework-ACc all finish people-ToP(CONTR) home-to
ka-la]-ko malhayss-ta.
go-IMP-C said-DECL
'John told the students that those who have finished their homework should go home.'
In both examples, the embedded subject is a DP with an overt head modified by a relative clause.
In the absence of an overt head, one could have potentially analyzed the example as PRO modified
by a relative clause and derive the subset relation as the result of intersecting the reference of the
controller the students with the relative clause.
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(13) John-i tom-eykey [(*mary-ka) nayil tasi o-ma-ko]
John-NOM Tom-DAT Mary-NOM tomorrow again come-PROM-C
malhayss-ta.
said-DECL
'John promised Tom that he would come back tomorrow.'
(14) John-i tom-eykey [(*mary-ka) cip-ey ka-la-kol malhayss-ta.
John-NOM Tom-DAT Mary-NOM home-to go-IMP-C said-DECL
'John ordered Tom to go home.'
Pak et al. (2004) suggest that, across languages, overt subjects of jussives are neces-
sarily contrastively or emphatically focused in both matrix and embedded environ-
ments, and that this carries over to Korean. Considering the marginality of full DP
subjects in embedded jussives as opposed to full DP subjects in matrix jussives (cf.
(6) through (8) for examples of the latter), the conclusion, not drawn explicitly by
the authors, must then be that subject focus is more difficult to achieve in embed-
ded position. Park (2011) suggests that overt pronominal jussive subjects are also
obligatorily focused, thus strengthening Pak et al.'s claim that focus on overt jussive
subjects is obligatory. Provided this claim is correct, we must assume that focus does
not need to be expressed overtly (e.g., using the focus marker -i or the contrastive
topic marker -un), judging by the absence of corresponding markers, in particular,
on overt pronominal subjects (but also on full DP subjects in matrix jussives as in
(8)).
Furthermore, Pak et al. (2008b: 169) note that unlike subjects in other types
of embedded clauses, null subjects of embedded jussives are limited to one inter-
pretation, determined by the respective jussive form: The subject of an embedded
promissive always refers to the matrix subject (John in (13)), the subject of an em-
bedded imperative refers to the matrix object (Tom in (14)), and the subject of
an embedded exhortative to a group consisting of both matrix subject and matrix
object.4 5
4 Referring to syntactic functions rather than thematic roles is somewhat misleading, since, for
a given predicate, what remains stable across voice alternations is the thematic role rather than
the syntactic function of the controller. For example, transitive expect is standardly classified as an
Object Control verb, even though the controller of PRO is the matrix subject if expect is passivized.
In a later section I show that the priority of thematic roles over syntactic functions also derives the
behavior of the perception verb hear in Korean, where hear can embed jussives. However, following
the tradition prevalent in the literature on Control, I adopt this terminology despite the confound
pointed out above.
5 Note that the situation reported by Pak et al. and described in this work conflicts with judg-
ments provided by Dorothy Ahn (p.c.), who allows for the subject of embedded imperatives to have
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4.2.2 Negation
According to Pak et al. (2004,2008a), jussives differ from declaratives and interrog-
atives in the type of negative marker they require, -ani or -mal: Declaratives and
interrogatives mark negation by way of -ani, while -mal is licensed only in the pres-
ence of deontic modality (Han & Lee 2002, in Pak et al. 2008a). On the other hand,
-mal is the only option to express negation in imperatives and exhortatives, and in
promissives -mal can be used besides -ani, see (15). The use of -mal in jussives does
not require the presence of an overt deontic marker.
(15) (Pak et al. 2008b)
a. Ka-ci mal/an(i)h-u-ma. (PROM)
eat-NOM NEG(+do)-u-PROM
'I promise not to go.'
b. Ka-ci mal/*an(i)-a-la. (IMP)
eat-NOM NEG-a-IMP
'Don't go.'
c. Ka-ci mal/*an(i)-ca. (EXH)
eat-NOM NEG-EXH
'Let's not go.'
4.2.3 Incompatibility with evidential and evaluative particles
Korean has certain mood particles, broadly classified as evidential and evaluative
particles in Pak et al. (2008a). The set of particles cited in Pak et al. (2004,2008a)
includes the following forms: retrospective (RTR) -te, apperceptive (APE) -kwun, sup-
a contextual referent not expressed by any of the matrix DPs: Suppose that the director says to
me "Dorothy should go". I can felicitously report this directive to Dorothy in the following way.
(i) Director-ka [(ney-ka) ka-la-kol malhayssta.
director-NOM you-NOM go-IMP-c said
'The director said that you should go.'
Interestingly, Ahn also reports that the sentence becomes ungrammatical (as is expected under
a Control analysis to begin with) if the matrix addressee is expressed overtly. (Leaving out the
embedded subject makes it worse.)
(ii) Director-ka na-eykey [?*(?ney-ka) ka-la-ko) malhayssta.
director-NOM me-DAT you-NOM go-IMP-c said
'The director said that you should go.'
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positive (sup) -ci, and apprehensive (APR) -ney. As the authors point out, the avail-
ability of these markers correlates with clause type distinctions and varies between
declaratives, interrogatives, and jussives: In declarative clauses the entire above set of
mood markers is available, while interrogative clauses are compatible with retrospec-
tive and suppositive marking but rule out apperceptive and apprehensive marking, cf.
(16). Promissives, imperatives, and exhortative, on the other hand, cannot co-occur
with any of the abover markers, cf. (17).
(16) a. John-i cemsim-ul mek-ess-tey-yo./?
John-NOM lunch-ACC eat-PST-RTR-POL 6
'John ate lunch./ Did John eat lunch?'
b. Cemsim-ul mek-ess-ci-yo./?
John-NOM lunch-ACC eat-PST-SUP-POL
'(Of course,) John ate lunch./ John ate lunch, right?'
c. John-i cemsim-ul mek-ess-kwun-yo./*?
John-NOM lunch-ACC eat-PST-APE-POL
'(Ah,) you ate lunch.'
d. John-i cemsim-ul mek-ess-ney-yo./*?
John-NOM lunch-ACC eat-PST-APR-POL
'John ate lunch.'
(17) (from Pak et al. 2008a)
a. *Nay-ka nayil cemsim-ul sa-te/kwun/-ci/-ney-ma. (PROM)
I-NOM tomorrow lunch-ACC buy-RTR/APE/SUP/APR-PROM
b. *Ne cemsim-ul mek-te/kwun/-ci/-ney-la. (IMP)
you lunch-ACC eat-RTR/APE/SUP/APR-IMP
c. *Wuli cemsim-ul mek-te/kwun/-ci/-ney-ca. (EXH)
we lunch-ACC eat-RTR/APE/SUP/APR-EXH
4.2.4 Incompatibility with temporal markers
Pak et al. (2004, 2008a) point out that promissives, imperatives and exhortatives
are, moreover, similar in not allowing tense markers.
(18) a. *Mek-ess/-ul/-nun-u-ma
eat-PST/FUT/PRES-PROM
b. *Mek-ess/-ul/-nun-e-la.
eat-PST/FUT/PRES-PART-IMP
6POL stands for the politeness marker.
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c. *Mek-ess-/ul/-nun-ca
eat-PST/FUT/PRES-EXH
4.2.5 Coordination
Imperatives can be conjoined with promissives and exhortatives by means of the
coordinators -(kuli)ko 'and' and -kena 'or', cf. (19), which generally only conjoin
clauses of the same type. I.e., as Pak et al. point out, -(kuli)ko and -kena can
connect declaratives with declaratives but not with interrogatives. The coordination
facts are taken as a further argument supporting the assumption of a shared clause
type jussive uniting the three forms under discussion. (Pak et al. (2008b) point out
that the imperative marker may be dropped in the presence of -ko, and must be
dropped with kena, but that "the imperative interpretation is still clear". It would be
interesting to know if there are other environments where imperatives correlate with
null marking; note that in simple imperative clauses, null marking does not seem an
option.)
(19) IMP & EXH with -(kuli)ko
Ne-nun sakwa-lul mek(-ela.kuli)ko na-nun pay-lul mek-u-ma.
you-FOC apple-ACC eat(-IMP)-and I-TOP pear-ACC eat-u-PROM
'You eat an apple and I promise to eat a pear.'
(20) IMP & PROM with -(kuli)ko
Minswu, ne-nun cip-ey ka(-la.kuli)ko yenghi-wa na-nun hakkyo-ey
Minswu you-FOC home-to go-and Yenghi-and I-TOP school-to
ka-ca.
go-EXH
'Minswu, you go home and Yenghi and I, let's go to school.'
(21) IMP & EXH with -kena
John, ne cip-ey honca ka-kena na-lang tosekwan-ey ka-ca.
John you home-to alone go-or I-with library-to go-EXH
'John, either you go home by yourself or let's go to the library with me.'
4.2.6 Semantic parallels
Pak et al. (2008a,b) argue that the syntactic parallels are matched by certain inter-
pretational similarities between promissives, imperatives, and exhortatives: In their
view, all three forms can be considered to express requests or directives that differ
merely in the targeted discourse participants. To capture this semantic parallel, Pak
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et al. (2008a) refer to Portner's analysis of imperatives, whereby imperatives add
a property to the addressee's TO-Do-LIST (which, by way of a specific pragmatic
mechanism, is then understood as a requirement imposed on the addressee): Adopt-
ing this assumption, Pak et al. assume promissives and exhortatives to work similarly
in that the former adds a property to the speaker's TO-Do-LIST, while the latter
adds a property to both the speaker's and the addressee's TO-Do-LISTS.
In my analysis of Korean jussives (and, similarly, of jussives in Mongolian), I
adopt a similar stance towards the relationship of the different jussive forms and
assign to them a uniform meaning. In contrast to Pak et al. however, I take jussive
force to have a counterpart at LF and be contributed by a silent universal modal
akin to bouletic want, which is present in all jussive clauses.
4.3 The jussive in embedded position
There is strong consensus in the literature that all three Korean jussive forms, i.e.,
promissive, imperative, and exhortative, can be embedded. Reports to that effect
can be found in Pak et al. (2004, 2008a,b); Madigan (2008); Park (2011).7
In the section at hand, I present some of the evidence found in the literature,
according to which Korean jussive embedding is genuine. Moreover, I highlight two
semantic properties of Korean jussives that have also been found in Mongolian em-
bedded jussives: First, I show that, like in Mongolian, embedded jussive subjects
in Korean are coreferent with a specific DP argument in the higher clause, in other
words, that Korean jussive subjects have a controller. Second, I summarize the data
found in the literature which can be used to argue that the speaker of jussive reports
must have a de se attitude towards the embedded jussive subject in Korean as well.
Last but not least, as pointed out before, Korean jussives are set apart from their
Mongolian counterparts by the possibility to be spelled out in embedded position.
I provide an overview of the relevant data and, moreover, highlight the agreement
pattern overt jussive subjects obey in this position.
4.3.1 Syntactic embedding
Korean promissive, imperative, and exhortative clauses can be syntactically subordi-
nated. The data referenced below is taken from Pak et al. (2008b: 170). Note that
7Dorothy Ahn (p.c.) points out that for her and, as she suspects, other speakers of younger
generations voluntative embedding (as opposed to embedding of exhortatives) is ungrammatical.
She also points out that voluntative embedding is reported in dictionaries and speculates that there
might have been a historical shift in its availability.
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the jussive subject in the below examples is silent.
(22) Ku salam-i inho-eykey [swuni-lul towacwu-ma]-ko malhayss-ta.
that person-NOM inho-DAT swuni-ACC help-PROM-C said-DECL
'Hei said to Inho that hei promises to help Swuni.'
(23) Ku salam-i inho-eykey [swuni-lul towacwu-la]-ko malhayss-ta.
that person-NOM inho-DAT swuni-ACC help-IMP-C said-DECL
'He said to Inhoi PROi to help Swuni.'
(24) Ku salam-i inho-eykey [swuni-lul towacwu-ca]-ko malhayss-ta.
that person-NOM inho-DAT swuni-ACC help-EXH-C said-DECL
'Hei said to Inhoj let'si j help Swuni.'
Diagnostics to ensure embedding
Recall that the superficial similarity of instances of direct and indirect speech in
many languages requires us to apply certain tests to ensure that the structures we
are dealing with are in fact instances of genuine embedding. To that effect, I resort
to Park (2011:337ff.), who provides evidence that jussive embedding in the above
examples and parallel structures is indeed genuine.
Park argues that the complementizer -ko, which also introduces the jussive clauses
above, is specified for subordination: -ko generally introduces declarative and inter-
rogative complements in Korean. -ko is traditionally distinguished from a second
complementizer -lako, which has been argued to mark clauses as quotes. (I assume
that the distinction made in the literature is correct and, in view of the limitations
of my work, do not attempt to reproduce the arguments used to corroborate this dis-
tinction.) Note that the existence of a dedicated subordinating complementizer and
its compatibility with jussive clauses is expedient in that it allows us to distinguish
embedded jussives from jussives that are quotes in a straightforward manner. Recall
that Mongolian does not have this convenient feature. Though jussives are usually
introduced by gej, which I similarly located in C, gej has a much wider range of uses:
Besides embedded CPs, gej may be used in the CP of quotes and can also appear in
the CP of matrix clauses.
Jussive embedding is confirmed by another standard diagnostic: Embedded jus-
sives that contain a wh-item can induce interrogative force on the root level. This is
demonstrated by the examples below taken from Park (2011:342).8
8Park, furthermore, shows that the minimally different sentences involving the quotative com-
plementizer -lako do not admit a matrix question reading.
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(25) PROMISSIVE
John-un Mary-eykey [nwukwu-eykey cenhwaha-ma-ko] malhayss-nya?
John-TOP Mary-DAT who-DAT call-PROM-C said-QU
'Who did Johni tell Mary that hei would call?'
(26) IMPERATIVE
John-un Mary-eykey [nwukwu-eykey cenhwaha-la-ko malhayss-nya?
John-TOP Mary-DAT who-DAT call-IMP-C said-QU
'Who did John tell Mary to call?'
(27) EXHORTATIVE
John-un Mary-eykey [nwukwu-eykey cenhwaha-ca-ko] malhayss-nya?
John-TOP Mary-DAT who-DAT call-EXH-C said-Qu
'Who did Johni tell Maryj that theyi+j should call?'
The range of jussive-embedding predicates in Korean
Korean jussives can occur under a variety of predicates: The set of reported jussive
embedding predicates consists, to a large part, of speech predicates. Like in Mongo-
lian, Korean 'say', mal-ha-, literally 'say-do' is unselective with respect to the type
of jussive it embeds. The examples provided in the preceding sections, most of which
involve malha- in the matrix clause, illustrate this fact.
Other predicates are found only with certain jussive forms. yaksok-ha 'promise-
do' is reported in connection with promissives (28) as well as exhortatives (29). (All
examples are taken from Madigan 2008:171pp., unless noted otherwise.)
(28) Eme-nim-kkeyse ai-eykey [kongwen-ey ka-ma-ko yaksok-ha-si-yess-ta.
mother-HON-NOM child-DAT park-LOC go-PROM-C promise-do-HON-PST-DECL
'The motheri promised the child PROi( ) to go to the park.'
(29) Hwun-i Inho-eykey [kongbwu-ha-ca-ko yaksok-ha-yess-ta.
Hwun-NOM Inho-DAT study-do-EXH-C promise-do-PST-DECL
'Hwuni promised Inho, PROj+j to study together.'
Further predicates compatible with exhortatives are ceyan-ha-'propose-do' and seltuk-
ha 'persuade-do'.
(30) Jwuhi-ka Inho-eykey [yenghwa-lul po-ca-ko] ceyan-ha-yess-ta.
Jwuhi-NOM Inho-DAT movie-ACC see-EXH-C propose-do-PST-DECL
'Jwuhi, proposed to Inhoj PROi+j to go watch a movie together.'
(31) Jwuhi-ka Inho-eykey [cip-ey ka-ca-ko] seltuk-ha-yess-ta.
Jwuhi-NOM Inho-DAT home-LOC go-EXH-C persuade-do-PST-DECL
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'Jwuhii persuaded Inhoj PROi , to go home together.'
Predicates selecting for imperative complements are myenglyeng-ha-'order-do', yokwu-
ha- 'require-do', chwungko-ha- 'advise-do', and seltuk-ha 'persuade-do'.
(32) Chelswu-ka haksayng-eykey mence tuleka-la-ko myenglyeng-ha-yess-ta
Chelswu-NOM student-DAT first enter-IMP-C order-do-PST-DECL
'Chelswu ordered the studenti PRO to go in first.'
(33) Sensayng-nim-i haksayng-eykey [yaksok-ul cikhi-la-ko]
teacher-HON-NOM student-DAT appointment-ACC keep/adhere-IMP-C
yokwu-ha-si-ess-ta.
require-do-HON-PST-DECL
'The teacher required the studentsi PROi to adhere to the appointment.'
(34) Inho-ka Hwun-eykey, [casin-i, mal-ul cosim-ha-la-ko]
Inho-NOM Hwun-DAT self-NOM words-ACC care-do-imp-C
chwungko-ha-yess-ta.
advise-do-PST-DECL
'Inho advised Hwuni PROi to watch his words.' (Madigan 2008:248)
(35) Inho-ka Jwuhi-eykey
Inho-NOM Jwuhi-DAT
'Inho persuaded Jwuhi
[cip-ey ka-la-ko] seltuk-ha-yess-ta.
home-LOC go-IMP-C persuade-do-PST-DECL
PROi to go home.' (Madigan 2008:65)
Moreover, different from Mongolian, Korean allows for imperatives embedded under
the perception verb hear (36) as well as under passivized order (37). Crucially, the
subject of the embedded imperative tracks the thematic role of its controller and not
its syntactic function: Parallel to imperatives under speech predicates, the imperative
subject under hear coincides with the reported addressee of the imperative. Note
that in the case of hear and passivized order, the addressee role is associated with the
subject of the higher clause, compared to the object in the case of speech predicates.
I will show how my analysis deals with these cases in a later section.
(36) Inho-ka chayk-ul ilk-ula-ko tul-ess-ta.
Inho-NOM book-ACC read-IMP-C hear-PST-DECL
'Inho heard the order to read the book.'
(37) Inho-ka cip-ey ka-la-ko myenglyeng-pat-ass-ta.
Inho-NOM home-LOC go-IMP-c order-PASS-PST-DECL
'Inho was ordered to go home.'
(Madigan 2008:173)
(Madigan 2008:172)
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As we can see, the range of predicates reported to embed jussives in Korean
is wider than the set of corresponding predicates found in Mongolian. Though for
neither language the list of predicates discussed in this work should be considered
exhaustive, we may wonder if this difference is real and Korean is indeed more liberal
with respect to jussive embedding. One property that points in this direction is the
grammaticality of Korean jussives under hear and passivized order illustrated above.
At the same time, the limited nature of the investigation into Mongolian compared
to the wealth of data available on Korean renders the divergence in the number of
embedding environments somewhat less surprising.
4.3.2 The dependent interpretation of jussive subjects
According to Madigan (2008), Pak et al. (2008b), the jussive subject is always coref-
erent with a specific DP argument in the matrix clause; i.e., Korean jussive subjects
are argued to have a similar dependent interpretation as embedded jussive subjects
in Mongolian. In particular, parallel to Mongolian, there is a correlation between the
form of the jussive and the choice of DP ("controller") argument that determines the
reference of the jussive subject: To wit, the subject of embedded promissives refers
to the reported speaker of the promissive (which in the above examples, as in most
cases, is the matrix subject), the subject of embedded imperatives corresponds to
the reported addressee (the matrix object in the examples above), and the subject of
embedded exhortatives is coreferent with the unit of reported speaker and reported
addressee. From the point of view of Control constructions, embedded promissives
could thus be taken to induce subject control, while embedded imperatives give rise
to object control, and embedded exhortatives compare to instances of split control.
The stripped-down renderings (38) of the sentences in section 4.3.1 summarize
the interpretations of jussive subjects in embedded position, phrased in terms of
different Control relations. Note that embedded jussives lose the option of directly
targeting actual discourse participants.
(38) a. Hei said to Inho that hei/*Ip help-PROM Swuni. ("subject control")
b. He said to Inhoi that hei/*youe,, help-IMP Swuni. ("object control")
c. Hei said to Inhoj that theyi+j/*wesp+adr help-EXH Swuni. ("split
control")
Interestingly, the situation reported by Pak et al. and described in this work conflicts
with judgments provided by Dorothy Ahn (p.c.): Ahn allows for the subject of
embedded imperatives to have a contextual referent not expressed by any of the
matrix DPs. Crucially, my analysis only addresses the situation reported in Pak et
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al.
No indexical shift in Korean
I assume that indexicals in Korean cannot be shifted, following Pak et al. (2008b),
Portner et al. (2014), Dorothy Ahn (p.c.). The lack of indexical shift is illustrated by
(39): The person indexicals in the embedded clause can only be interpreted strictly,
as participants of the actual context.9
(39) Appa-ka Yumi-eykey nay/ney-ka ttokttokha-ta-ko hasiess-e.
Dad-NOM Yumi-DAT I/you-NoM bright-DECL-C said.HON-DECL
a. 'Dad told Yumi that I/you am/are bright.'
b. *'Dadi told Yumij that hei/shej is bright.'
(Portner et al. 2014:13)
Pak et al. (2008b) distinguish between covert and overt indexicals with regard to their
shiftability: In their view, indexical shift is not principally unavailable in Korean
but it is restricted to covert indexicals. I dismiss such a view of Korean on the
same grounds that led to me to argue against such a view in the case of Mongolian
indexicals, see section 2.2.1.
4.3.3 The de se requirement
Madigan (2008) illustrates that an exhortative report is only felicitous if the reported
speaker of the exhortative has a de se (or, more accurately, de nobis) attitude towards
the individuals targeted by the embedded exhortative, namely, the reported speaker
him or herself and his/her addressee.
(40) Context: A man with amnesia, Bill, is watching television with his friend
Mary. They are presently watching a program where Bill and Mary are shown
in a current and ongoing courtroom case. Furthermore, it seems as if both
of them may go to jail. Suddenly, Bill has the thought that Mary and the
man on TV, who he does not know is himself, should lie in order to not go
to jail. So ...
9However, there seems to be variation in Korean regarding the shiftability of indexicals. This
is also pointed out by Portner et al. (2014): "Some researchers claim that they are shiftable across
clause types (Kim 2008; Park [2014, reporting both person and adverbial indexicals to be shiftable],
among others) while others contend that they are strict indexicals (Lee 2012; Lim and Lee 2012)."
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#Pil-i meyli-eykey [wicung-ha-ca-ko] ceyan-ha-yess-ta.
Bill-NOM Mary-DAT perjure-do-EXH-C propose-do-PST-DECL
a. 'Bill proposed to Mary to perjure themselves.' (de se)
b. intended: 'Bill, proposed to Maryj that theyi j should perjure them-
selves.' (non-de se)
(Madigan 2008:155)
Kaufmann (2014) cites a similar interpretational restriction for embedded impera-
tives: The Korean imperative report below is infelicitous in the described scenario,
where the reported speaker John fails to identify his addressee with Mary, the subject
and target of his deontic statement.
(41) Context: At a party, John is told that 'Mary' is being particularly obnoxious.
He tells the person he is having a conversation with that 'Mary should leave'.
But that person is none other than Mary herself.
#John-ka Mary-eykey [ttena-ra]-ko malhayssta.
John-NOM Mary-DAT leave-IMP-ko say.PST
a. 'John told Mary to leave.'
b. intended: John told Maryi that shei should leave.
(Kaufmann 2014:20)
No explicit statement could be found in the literature regarding the interpretation
of embedded promissives. However, absent evidence to the contrary, I assume that a
corresponding requirement extends to promissive reports and that promissives nec-
essarily involve a de me attitude on the part of the speaker.
4.3.4 Overt jussive subjects: distribution and restrictions
As foreshadowed in previous sections, especially 4.3.4, jussive subjects can be spelled
out in embedded position by a range of personal pronouns. In this section, I outline
the morphosyntactic properties of overt jussive subjects in more detail, in particular,
the fact that their shape is determined by 0-feature agreement with their controller
in the matrix clause. Recall that the possibility of overt subjects distinguishes Ko-
rean from Mongolian. It plays a central role in my analysis and will be employed
as an argument that the jussive subject, which I view as a version of PRO, is inter-
preted and carries 0-features, countering the view that PRO is a semantically empty
element.
The range of pronouns used to make embedded jussive subjects overt comprises in-
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dexicals, as well as long-distance reflexives and the third-person pronoun ku. Pronom-
inal subjects of jussives exhibit nominative case marking.
In (42)-(44), repeated from section 3.2, the embedded subject is pronounced by
means of a person indexical. In all cases the pronoun shares the features of its matrix
controller.
(42) Nay-ka inho-eykey [(nay-ka) swuni-lul towacwu-ma-kol malhayss-ta.
I-NOM Inho-DAT I-NOM swuni-ACC help-PROM-C said-DECL
'I said to Inho that I promise to help Swuni.' (Pak et al. 2008b)
(43) Inho-ka ne-eykey [(ney-ka) chayk-ula ilk-ula-kol hayss-ta.
Inho-NOM you-to you-NOM book-ACC read-IMP-C said-DECL
'Inho told you to read the book.' (Portner et al. 2014)
(44) John-un na-eykey [(wuli-ka ttena-ca-ko ceyanhayss-ta.
John-TOP I-DAT we-NOM leave-EXH-C proposed-DECL
'Johni proposed to me, PROi, to leave.' (Park 2011)
(45) and (46) feature long-distance reflexives caki and casin as jussive subjects.10
(45) John-uni Mary-eykey [(caki-ka ) tangcang nonmwun-ul ssu-ma-ko]
John-TOP Mary-DAT self-NOM right.away paper-ACC write-PROM-C
yaksokhay-ss-ta
promise-PST-DECL
'John promised Mary to write a paper right away.' (Park 2011:472)
(46) Inho-ka Hwun-eykey; tcasin-is mal-ul cosim-ha-la-ko
Inho-NOM Hwun-DAT self-NOM words-ACC care-do-IMP-C
chwungko-ha-yess-ta.
advise-do-PST-DECL
'Inho advised Hwun to watch his words.' (Madigan 2008:248)
Moreover, the 3rd person pronoun ku is also eligible as a subject in embedded jussives.
(47) Tom-i Bill-eykeyi [ku-kaj Mary-lul manna-la-ko]
Tom-NOM Bill-DAT he-NOM Mary-ACC meet-IMP-C
'Tom ordered Billi PROi to meet Mary.'
myenglyenghay-ss-ta.
order-PST-DECL
(Park 2018:307)
The shape of overt subjects is strictly regulated by the person features of the
controller in the higher clause: Overt subjects need to agree in person features with
10This is not an exhaustive list. For example, according to Park (2018), the local anaphor
cakicasin can similarly take that position, though Park does not provide examples.
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their controller (Park 2011:470pp.). The following examples (from Park 2011:474)
illustrate this requirement.
(48) *Johni-un Mary-eykey [nays-ka ttena-ma-ko] yaksokhayssta.
John-TOP Mary-DAT I-NOM leave-PROM-C promised
a. (hypothesized) 'John promised Mary to leave.'
b. (hypothesized) 'John promised Mary that Is, would leave.'
(49) *John-un Maryi-eykey neys-ka ttena-la-ko] seltukhayssta.
John-TOP Mary-DAT you-NOM leave-IMP-c persuaded
a. (hypothesized) 'John persuaded Mary to leave.'
b. (hypothesized) 'John persuaded Mary that youad, would leave.'
(50) *Johni-un Maryj-eykey [wulii+_-ka ttena-ca-ko] ceyanhayssta.
John-TOP Mary-DAT we-NOM leave-EXH-C proposed
a. (hypothesized) 'Johni proposed to Maryj that theyi+j would leave.'
b. (hypothesized) 'John persuaded Mary that wespadr would leave.'
The pattern exemplified by the sentences above falls out from a control analysis
given the assumption of feature agreement between PRO and its controller. As
for an alternative explanation, although the unavailability of the a.-interpretations
above could also be derived from the lack of indexical shift in Korean, this fact
is not sufficient to explain the general ungrammaticality of the above sentences,
which extends to the hypothesized strict readings of the embedded indexical subject
rendered in b.
Below I summarize the agreement pattern observed to hold between the embedded
jussive subject and its matrix controller.
(51) nay 1SG 'I'
a. Ii/*youi/*shei to B [Cp nayi-NOM PROM-C ... said.
b. A to mei/*youi/*heri [CP nayi-NOM IMP-C ... J said.
(52) ney 2SG 'you'
a. Youi/*Ii/*shei to B tCp ney-NOM PROM-C ... said.
b. A to youi/*mei/*heri [cp neyi-NOM IMP-C ... said.
(53) wuli 1PL 'we'
a. Ii/*youj/*shei to B, [CP wuliity-NOM EXH-C ... ] said.
b. Ai to mei/*youj/*herj [Cp Wuli -NOM EXH-C ... ] said.
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(54) caki 3PS long-distance reflexive
a. He i*Ii/*youi to B [Cp Cakii-NOM PROM-C- ... J said.
b. A to himi/*mei/*youi [CP cakii-NOM IMP-C .. . said.
(55) ku 3Ps 'he/she'
a. Hej/*I/*youi to B [Cp kui-NOM PROM-C .. . said.
b. A to himi/*mei/*youi [cp kui-NOM IMP-C ... I said.
A note on caki
Variable judgments can be found regarding the distribution of caki as jussive subject
and specifically, its compatibility with object control besides subject control. While
the literature is unanimous regarding the availability of caki as jussive subject with
a subject controller, not all speakers allow for caki under object control, which in our
case mainly boils down to instances of embedded imperatives such as (56). The dis-
tribution sketched above assumes a more liberal dialect, represented by Park (2011),
Madigan (2008:244), which also permits object-controlled caki as in (56). Crucially,
for Park (2018), caki is limited to subject-control constructions, which would rule
out structures like (56)."
(56) John-un Maryi-eykey [cakii-ka honca nonmwun-ul ssu-la-kol
John-TOP Mary-DAT self-NOM alone paper-ACC write-IMP-C
seltukhay-ss-ta.
persuade-PST-DECL.
'John persuaded Maryi PROi to write a paper alone.' (Park 2011:472)
I am agnostic as to whether in those dialects where caki is restricted to subject-
control, caki also rejects split control (i.e., controllers that include the object). The
answer to this question should predict its (un)availability as a subject of embedded
EXH clauses.
"Madigan (2008:244) notes that "by adding the adverb cikcep 'directly' to the matrix clause, even
those few consultants who were strongly biased towards caki being exclusively a subject-oriented
reflexive accepted that caki must take an object antecedent" in examples paralleling (56).
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Chapter 5
An analysis of embedded jussives in
Mongolian and Korean
5.1 Desiderata and proposed responses
Let me start this chapter by outlining the objectives of my analysis of jussive embed-
ding in Mongolian and Korean.
A pressing question that has received much attention in the literature on imper-
ative embedding concerns the derivation of the illocutionary force associated with
imperatives and forms expressing similar non-assertive speech acts. Given the pre-
dominance of imperatives in root contexts and the long-standing belief that imper-
atives are limited to those contexts for principled reasons, many approaches to the
semantics and pragmatics of imperatives have been developed with root imperatives
in mind. The occurrence of imperatives in embedded position creates a certain kind
of benchmark for analyses of imperatives: Is a given analysis amenable to embed-
ded uses of imperatives, or can we modify the analysis in a way that would make it
compatible?
I adopt the view that jussive force is contributed by a silent modal, thereby
following the view defended, most prominently, in Kaufmann (2012, a.o.). Moreover,
addressing the specific cases of Mongolian and Korean, I assume the same silent
modal, which I call JUSSIVE, to be present in all subtypes of jussive clauses discussed
in this work.
The focus of my analysis, however, is on the nature of the subject in jussive clauses.
As foreshadowed in section 3, I argue for an analysis of the subject of jussives as a
version of PRO. The type of PRO analysis pursued in this work - an analysis of
PRO as a semantically active element - is influenced by properties, which, in their
67
plurality, are most apparent in Korean jussives, but are argued also to underlie the
subject of Mongolian jussives. Let me recount these properties:
(i) In both Mongolian and Korean, the jussive subject is coreferent with a DP
argument in the higher clause. I suggested to think of embedded jussives as instances
of Obligatory Control, with the jussive subject as PRO and the higher DP argument
as the controller.
(ii) The adoption of a PRO analysis is motivated by another property shared
with standard cases of Obligatory Control: We observed that jussive reports in both
Mongolian and Korean require that the reported speaker has a de se attitude towards
the jussive subject.
(iii) The subject of Korean embedded jussives can be spelled out, in which case it
shows #-feature agreement with the coreferent DP (the controller DP) in the higher
clause.
I opt for an analysis that assumes PRO to comprise an individual variable and
a variable over concept generators. Obligatory Control (property (i)) results from
binding of the individual variable by the controller DP. The de se attitude (property
(ii) follows from a presupposition on the concept generator variable or, more accu-
rately, the acquaintance relation it is mapped to. Finally, the varying shape of overt
jussive subjects in Korean is simply a reflex of the subject's #-features, and feature
agreement with the controller DP a repercussion of binding.
My approach to PRO in jussives builds on the treatment of de re DPs in attitude
contexts developed in Percus & Sauerland (2003a) and taken up in Santorio (2014),
who applies a version of this idea to the analysis of PRO. The specifies of a corre-
sponding analyses, including the notion of concept generators, will be discussed in
the course of my analysis.
As mentioned above, I take jussive clauses to be uniform in their modality. What
do the semantic differences between the different jussive forms, then, consist in? And
how can we derive the distinct morphology of voluntatives and imperatives in Mon-
golian, and promissives, imperatives, and exhortatives in Korean? With regard to
the first question, recall that different jussive forms can be characterized as involv-
ing different types of control. I claim that the presence of different controllers fully
derives the semantic differences between the various jussive forms.
Technically, I locate the variation within PRO: Different jussives involve different
flavors of PRO, expressed by way of different features on PRO. Each flavor of PRO
imposes a slightly different presupposition on PRO or, more accurately, its concept
generator variable.
Concerning the morphological variation across jussive clauses, I propose that the
choice of verbal suffix/particle reflects agreement of T with PRO's feature. Impor-
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tantly, however, no semantic contribution is made by jussive morphology itself in
my proposal. To sum up, the the only semantic difference between jussive forms is
induced by the different features on PRO, which correlate with different presupposi-
tions.
A complete analysis entails providing a semantics for the predicate embedding
the jussive clause. I adopt an event semantics for speech predicates such as say
(following Elliott 2016), which is modeled on the treatment of attitude predicates
as sets of attitude events developed in Kratzer (2006), Moulton (2009). Crucially,
in corresponding approaches, the attitude is introduced by the complement as the
content of the attitude or speech event. As we will see, a crucial advantage of such a
semantics is that it allows for a unified semantics of say and similar predicates that
have both declarative- and jussive-embedding uses.
Last but not least, it is in my interest to develop an analysis that can be trans-
ferred to uses of jussives in root contexts. To that end, I propose that the actual
speech context is syntactically present as an event pronoun e* at the root of a sen-
tence (cf. Speas & Tenny 2003; Hacquard 2006, a.o.). While the open event argument
of jussive clauses is existentially closed if the jussive is embedded, it is saturated by
e* if the jussive occurs in a root environment.
5.2 The jussive subject as complex PRO
Recall the structure I assign to PRO in embedded jussives.
(1)
D Pj ,].
PROe ...
Gi xj [0
In this section it will be shown how a corresponding structure for PRO plays a
central role in accounting for the properties of embedded jussive subjects in Korean
and Mongolian, which are as follows: (i) Jussive PRO is obligatorily controlled by
a DP argument in the higher clause, (ii) the reported speaker has a de se attitude
towards the jussive subject, (iii) overt subjects of embedded jussives in Korean agree
in <0-features with their controller.
My analysis could be viewed as the result of combining three assumptions found
in the literature about de re and de se attitudes: For one, I adopt the analysis of DPs
and their de re interpretation in attitude contexts developed by Percus & Sauerland.
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At the same time, I follow the view that overt person pronouns read de se have the
same semantics and syntax as PRO (Heim 2002). Thirdly, I take the stance that
attitude reports involving de re attitudes and de se attitude reports are construed
in the same way, i.e., have a uniform LF.
In combination, these assumptions lead to the view of jussive PRO defended in
this work: to wit, the view that jussive PRO is semantically and structurally complex,
analogous to DPs in attitude contexts in Percus & Sauerland (2003a).
My view closely matches Landau's (2018) semantics for Obligatory Control and
is a version of Santorio's (2014) analysis of PRO.1 Anand (2006), to my knowledge,
is the first to point out that Percus & Sauerland's LF for de re reports could be
adopted to describe de se attitudes as well, including de se attitudes induced by
"obligatory de se expressions" such as PRO.
The unified account of de re and de se adopted in this work is characterized by
involving existential quantification over concept generators. Moreover, it is known as
in-situ account of de re, to distinguish it from accounts of de re involving so-called
res-movement of the de re DP.
5.2.1 Percus & Sauerland (2003a): de re and acquaintance
relations via concept generators
Percus & Sauerland (2003a, henceforth P&S, cf. also Percus & Sauerland 2003b)
develop a novel, in-situ approach to the well-known problem of de re readings in
attitude contexts. de re readings are illustrated by (2): The sentence in (2) has a
true reading in the described scenario if the DP Peter is read de re.
(2) Context: Mary's orchestra is conducting the final round of auditions for a
vacancy. Mary, who is part of the jury, knows that her acquaintance Peter is
one of the two final candidates. Both candidates play behind a curtain. One
of the two candidates plays the Brahms violin concerto. Mary thinks about this
candidate: "This candidate plays much better than Peter and will be selected
for the position." She does not know that the person playing is in fact Peter.
Mary believes that Peter will get the job.
Note that de re readings can be derived in various ways. What is the motivation
for Percus & Sauerland's (2003) view and the introduction of concept generators?
'Santorio (2014) derives de re/de se attitudes using multiple assignments, while my analysis
follows the linguistic tradition of assuming a tighter form-meaning correlation and assigns internal
structure to PRO, parallel to Landau 2018).
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Charlow & Sharvit (2014) argue for P&S's theory by pointing at a certain type of at-
titude report that involves a de re anaphor bound by a quantifier. Such reports have,
among their readings, a so-called multiguise reading. Charlow & Sharvit's (2014)
claim is that, among approaches to de re, only P&S account can successfully derive
this reading and at the same time avoid generating unattested interpretations. Before
I introduce P&S's proposal, I shall lay out Charlow & Sharvit (2014) argument.
Motivating a concept generator approach in light of alternative approaches
to de re: Charlow & Sharvit (2014)
Charlow & Sharvit (2014) make a case for Percus & Sauerland's (2003) theory on
the basis of a specific type of attitude reports where the clausal complement of the
attitude verb contains a quantifier and a pronoun bound by the quantifier, cf. (3).
Their argument rests on an observation and a theoretical claim.
(3) John believes that every female studenti likes heri mother.
First, the observation: The authors notice that examples like (3) have a "multiguise"
reading where the quantifier every female student and her are both interpreted de re,
buth with different acquaintance relations. For example, (3) is true in the following
scenario: Suppose John is presented with two pictures each of three female students,
whose real names are Alice, Betty, and Cora. One set of photos shows them dressed
up as artists, while on the other set they are depicted wearing sports gear. John
says, "(pointing at the picture of Alice as a painter) this person likes (pointing at the
picture of Alice in a ski suit) that person's mother". John further says that "this third
person (pointing at the picture of Betty as a violinist) likes that person's (pointing
at Betty in a wetsuit) mother", and, finally, "this person (Cora as a circus artis)
likes that person's (Cora in gym clothes) mother". Note that for no pair of photos
(Alice1 , Alice 2 ), (Betty,, Betty 2 ), (Corai, Cora 2 ), John realizes that they depict the
same person; i.e., John ascribes to each woman that she likes her own mother rather
coincidentally.
Charlow & Sharvit (2014) claim that none of the considered alternative ap-
proaches to de re readings can derive this reading.
To begin with, an attempt to utilize Quantifier Raising 2 for this purpose fails.
Under QR, de re readings arise when a noun phrase is interpreted outside the scope
of the attitude operator, which can be achieved either through movement of the res
NP or, given the assumption of covert world variables, in situ by way of co-indexing
2The authors refer to approaches where the de re/de dicto contrast is a result of the scopal
relation between an NP and an attitude verb, as Russellian approaches, citing Russell (1905).
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the relevant NP with the matrix world wo. The following LF, in which every female
student is interpreted in the actual world w*, is an attempt at deriving the relevant
interpretation.
(4) John believes-w* [Al [every female student-w* [A2 [t2 likes-wi her 2 mother-
will]] = 1 iff
Vw' E DOXw*,John: [Vx : x is a female student in w* -> x likes in w' x's mother
in w'
Crucially, the derived meaning only attributes beliefs of the form x likes x's mother
to John. Therefore, it is false of the described scenario, where John, pointing at the
two photos (Alice1 , Alice 2) of Alice (a student) says, "This person (I think her name
is Ruth), likes that person's (who I think is Sue) mother".
In fact, an alternative way of deriving de re is also needed in the face of previously
discussed constructions, where a locally bound anaphor in a de se attitude report is
interpreted de re; cf. our earlier example repeated below: If all we had available were
scopal interactions, the only avenue for deriving the de re reading of herself would
be through binding by the matrix subject Palin; however, such binding leads to the
expectation of ungrammatical her in place of grammatical herself.
(5) Context: After reading an impressive article by a politician, Palin says to
Bill: "I promise to vote for this politician." What she doesn't notice is that
she herself authored the article.
Palin promised Bill [PROi to vote for herselfi/heri]
A more serious contender for the derivation of the considered multiguise reading is
an account of de re DPs in belief ascriptions developed by Cresswell & Von Stechow
(1982), following Kaplan (1968) and Lewis (1979) (see also Heim (1994)), which
assumes a "relational" semantics for attitude verbs such as believe in (2) and (3),
expressed in terms of a predicate believere: As shown in 2, believere selects the res
DP as its first argument, and a property-denoting expression of type (e, st) as its
second argument. It asserts that an acquaintance relation holds uniquely between the
believer and the res in the actual world, and between the believer and some individual
in the believer's doxastic alternatives. Syntactically, this can be implemented via
obligatory sideways movement of the res-DP into an argument position of believe, as
worked out in Heim (1994) for de re readings of tense pronouns.
(6) For any x, z in De, any w in D8, any P in De,,,t, any assignment g,
[believere]"(w)(z)(P)(x) = 1 iff there's a suitable acquaintance function F
such that
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a. F(w) = z, and
b. DOX,W C {w' E D: P(F(w'))(w) = 1}.
(Charlow & Sharvit 2014:12)
Using believer", Charlow & Sharvit (2014) experiment with several possible LFs
in an aim to derive the multiguise reading - none of which seems satisfying.
In the LF (7), the two res, her and female student, are not co-indexed, which
allows them to be associated with different acquaintance functions, as desired. How-
ever, by moving her outside the scope of every, we also give up on the bound reading
of her, i.e., her can only be interpreted referentially. 3
(7) John [[believesre-w* her3] female-student-w*] [A3 A4 Al [[every T4] [A 2 [t2 likes-
w 1 t3's mother-will]]
A different LF (8-a) has the QP scope outside believe"6 and bind both a trace-
res and a pronoun-res, which are co-indexed with each other. This structure would
capture the multiguise reading (provided a corresponding extension of believere to
allow for res that are quantified over), as shown in (8-a).
(8) a. [every female-student-w*l [A2 [John [[believesre-w* t 2] her 2] [A4 A3 Al [t4
likes-wi t3 's mother-wil]]
b. Vx s.t. x is a female students in w*:
(i) 3F1, F2 s.t. F(w *) = F2 (w *) = &
(ii) Vw' E DOXW*,Joh,: Fi(w') likes the mother of F2(w') in w'
However, as Charlow & Sharvit (2014) note, allowing for such configurations would
also predict the generation of unattested readings, in particular, in the presence of
downward-entailing quantifiers: A similar LF (10-a) for the sentence in (9-a) would
yield (9-b) as its denotation, formalized in (10-b). However, this reading is not
available. It is unclear how we could permit (8-a) yet block parallel (10-a) without
stipulating differences in QR between every and no-QPs.
(9) a. John is certain that no female student passed the exam.
b. Unattested reading: No actual female student x is such that John says to
himself, with certainty, "x passed the exam".
3This LF requires the assumption that believere is type-flexible and can take more than one 'res'-
argument - an assumption that is needed independently to account for the possibility of multiple
de re expressions such as John believes that Mary introduced Bill to Sue in a scenario where John,
witnessing the introduction but failing to correctly identify the involved individuals, thinks "Alice
introduced Carl to Tess".
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(10) a. [no female-student-w*I [A2 [John [believesre-w* t2 [A4 A, [t 4 passed-wi
the examl]]
b. -,x: [x is a female student in w* &
(i) 3F s.t. F(w*) = x &
(ii) Vw' E DOXw*,Jon: F(w') passed the exam in w']
Another attempt to deploy relational believere to account for the multiguise read-
ing involves a view of [herl as a function (e, e), specifically, the identity function
Ax.x. Acquaintance functions F would optionally be of type (s, (ee)) rather than
(s, e); Charlow & Sharvit (2014) hypothesize that, in the relevant multiguise sce-
nario, further specified in (11-a) below, John "mistakes" the identity function for
some other function such that, in his mind, John is pointing at two different individ-
uals, for every pair of the form (x, x) he is actually pointing at. I.e., F would be as
in (11-b).
(11) a. The set of actual female students is (a, b, c) and John is looking at the
pairs (a, a), (b, b), (c, c) (more accurately, pairs of the corresponding
pictures), but he thinks the pairs are (a, b), (b, c), (c, a) (and he doesn't
know that a, b, and c are students).
b. F = Aw. the (e, e)-function indirectly presented to John in w via the
pairs he's looking at in w
Charlow & Sharvit (2014) object that on such a theory, first, we would need to explain
what it means to be acquainted with functions. Moreover, even if this complaint can
be overcome, the theory also make incorrect predictions such as the following:
[The multiguise sentence (3) should be] felicitous in a situation where
John sees every actual female student once, identifies each student cor-
rectly and says "for each x such that x is one of these individuals, x likes
the mother of x's aunt". [... I This can happen, for example, if John con-
fuses the identity function with the aunt-of function for example, when
John confuses the identity function with the aunt-of function (even if
he doesn't have any confusion regarding the identity of the individuals
themselves). (Charlow & Sharvit 2014: 17)
Charlow & Sharvit's (2014) conclusion is that a theory along the lines of P&S is
needed in order to account for the attested range of de re scenarios.
In what follows, I outline P&S's (2003a) proposal for the semantics of de re
reports. My interest lies in capturing the observed features of embedded jussives,
in particular, the peculiar properties of the jussive PRO subject. Therefore after
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introducing P&S proposal, I will proceed by first discussing an application of the
theory to PRO in regular Control constructions before returning to the problem of
multiguise readings in section (36).
Percus & Sauerland (2003a): The proposal
P&S suggest that e-type expressions in attitude contexts are accompanied by a vari-
able G ranging over concept generators as their sister. Concept generators are covert
variables G of type (e, ce), defined in (13), which map individuals to acquaintance re-
lations such as (12). (c is the type of centered worlds, which are tuples (w, x, (y, ... )
of a world and its one or multiple individual center(s).) 4'
(12) Possible acquaintance relations
a. A (w, x). the y who x talks to in w
b. A (w, x). the y whom x hears play Brahms at the audition in w
c. A (w, x).x (= self-relation)
(13) G of type (e, ce) is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for individual x
in w iff
a. Dom(G) = {y: x is acquainted with y in w}
b. For all y in Dom(G), if G(y) = R, then:
(i) R is an acquaintance relation
(ii) x bears R uniquely to y in w (i.e., G(y)((w, x)) = y)
4Specifically, D, is the union of the domains of singly and multiply-centered worlds, i.e., D, =
D(s,ei) UD(s,ei,e2) . . .UD(s,e,...,en). I sometimes use the more specific notation (s, e(e, . . )) to render
the type of centered worlds.
'Note that P&S actually assign the simpler type (e, se) to G. For reasons of simplicity and
consistency with my analysis to come, I use the adjusted definition of concept generators from
Santorio (2014) right away. P&S (2003a:10) original definition is as follows.
(i) Definition: G is a concept-generator for individual x in w iff
a. G is a function from individuals to individual concepts
b. Dom(G) ={z: x is acquainted with z in w}
(ii) Definition: G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for individual x in w iff
a. G is a concept-generator for x in w
b. the concepts G yields are "acquaintance-based" in the sense that, for all z in Dom(G),
1) there is some acquaintance relation R such that x bears R uniquely to z in w
2) for all (y, w') e DOXx,,, y bears relation R uniquely to G(z)(w') in w'.
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(iii) for all centered worlds (w', x') in x's doxastic set at w, the center
x' bears R uniquely to G(y)((w', x')) in w'.
(Santorio 2014, following P&S 2003a)
The de re reading of Peter in (2) would be rendered by means of the following LF
in P&S's account (modulo world variables and their binders): Peter is accompanied
by a concept generator variable G5 , which is bound by a A abstractor inserted at the
edge of clause.
(14) Mary believes [cp that AG5 [TP [ G5 Peter] [T' will get the jobi]
P&S semantics for de re attitudes goes along with a semantics for attitude predi-
cates as existential quantifiers over concept generators. P&S's entry for the doxastic
attitude verb believe reads as follows.
(15) [believe] = AP((e,,e),(e,,t).Ax.Aw. there is some acquaintance-based concept-
generator G for x in w s.t. V(y, w') in DOX,w : P(G)(y)(w') = 1. (P&S
2003a: 13)
The LF (14) is true in the scenario (2) as we can come up with a concept generator
that satisfies the existential statement made by (15) in the given derivation: This
is the concept generator in (16), call it G2, that maps Peter to the acquaintance
relation holding between centered worlds (w, x) and the individual y whom x hears
play Brahms in w.
(16) Relevant concept generator for (2):
[G2]c'g s.t. g(2)(Peter) = A (w, x). the y whom x (= the center of w) hears
y play Brahms at the audition in w
Let me return to de se reports and the relationship between de re and de se in P&S
(2003a). Crucially, P&S assume that the derivation of de se proceeds via a different
mechanism and involves an LF that is distinct from the LF of a homophonous de re
report.
To give a concrete example, consider (17): Mary has a de se attitude towards the
subject of her beliefs in (17-a), but lacks such an attitude in (17-b). Both scenarios
can be described by (17).
(17) Mary 2 believes she2 will win.
a. Mary believes: "I will win the competition." (de se)
b. Mary, not realizing she is listening to her own recording, believes: "This
violinist plays better than me and will win the competition." (de re)
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Under the assumption that pronouns have a separate de se reading (cf. Heim (2002)
for arguments to that effect), this means that (17) is ambiguous between a de se
and a de re report. In a P&S style analysis, the two readings would be associated
with two different structures: Though the complement CP in both cases involves an
abstractor over concept generators, in the de se LF, binding by AG 3 is vacuous, and
AG3 is present purely for type reasons - recall that believe (15) takes a complement
of type P((e,se),(e,st)). she raises and is interpreted outside the attitude context. 6
In the de re LF, on the other hand, she remains in the scope of believe, and AG 3
binds a variable G3 accompanying she.
(18) a. Mary believes [AG3 she2 [Aw 4 w 4 t2 will win]] (de se)
b. Mary believes [AG3 [Aw 4 w 4 [[G 3 she] w 4] will win]]] (de re)
Different from P&S, I aim for a unified derivation of de se and de re attitudes.
Specifically, while in P&S, concept generators make a meaningful contribution solely
in de re reports, I extend the use of concept generators and take de se reports to
be derived in a similar fashion. Specifically, I claim that de se pronouns carry a
presupposition which forces the concept generator to map its sister variable to the
self-acquaintance relation.' The relevance of this unification in the context of my
work consists in the fact that the proposal will also be applied to PRO, including
jussive PRO, parallel to overt de se DPs. In this respect I follow proposals made in
Santorio (2014) and Landau (2018). The following section outlines my approach.
5.2.2 de se as a special case of de re: a presuppositional anal-
ysis of PRO
I suggest that the de se reading of DPs in attitude contexts as well as the obligatory
de se reading of PRO can be derived via a similar mechanism and using an LF that
is parallel to the LF assumed for de re constructions such as (18-b) in P&S. In partic-
ular, the obligatoriness of de se on PRO will be derived by way of a presupposition
on the concept generator variable accompanying PRO. Recall that, ultimately, our
'In a semantics using a world parameter rather than overt world pronouns this would be rendered
by way of she raising across the attitude predicate.
7P&S's exact motivation for choosing a movement analysis of de se pronouns as opposed to
analyzing them in-situ and using presuppositions to constrain their interpretation is unclear to
me. It appears that P&S may try to preserve a one-to-one correlation between LF structures
and available interpretations. However, as Landau (2018) points out, the assumption of lexical
ambiguity (for example, by allowing for two versions of pronouns such as she, one of which carries
a feature that imposes the self-presupposition) is just as valid a means to derive interpretational
ambiguity, as deploying syntactic ambiguity.
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goal is to account for the de se property of jussive subjects, which was argued to be
best analyzed as a version of PRO.
It is well-known that standard PRO forces a de se reading. Let me repeat example
(1) from chapter 3 to illustrate this property.
(19) Mary wants PRO to win.
a. True if Mary thinks "Hopefully I will win the competition".
b. False if Mary, not realizing she is listening to her own recording, thinks
"This violinist plays better than me. I think she should win the compe-
tition."
We further observed that the de se condition also characterizes jussive subjects in
Mongolian and Korean, as exemplified by the Mongolian voluntative report below
(repeating (29) from chapter 2).
(20) #Bat suvilagch-d [ambr-iy gej] khel-sen.
Bat nurse-DAT rest-VOL that say-PST
a. True if Bat said to the nurse "Let me rest"
b. False if Bat said to the nurse, pointing at a patent chart which he fails
to recognize as his own, " This person should rest".
As noted above, Anand (2006) points out that the de se property of PRO could be
captured by way of a presupposition on a concept generator variable accompanying
PRO (though he does not adopt this analysis). I.e., he suggests the entry for PRO
in (21), whereby "PRO is treated as a variable which introduces the presupposition
that its concept generator sister sends it to f&eif". (Note that fseij is equivalent to
the function encoded by AUTH, which is such that AUTH(i) = author, with i a tuple
(author, addressee, time, world).)
(21) [PRO(eeg = AG : G(g(i)) = AUTH. g(i) (Anand 2006:29)
I take up Anand's idea for the semantics of PRO and generate PRO's de se
reading by way of a presupposition on the concept generator variable inside PRO
(see Santorio (2014)', Landau (2018) for a similar analysis). I associate PRO with the
structure (22), and the lexical entry in (23). Note that different from Anand (2006),
I take PRO to be a complex constituent dominating a concept generator variable as
well as an individual variable, rather than the individual variable itself.
8As mentioned before, in Santorio's (2014) system concept generators are values of a dedicated
index on DPs and PRO rather than overt variables.
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(22) PRO
Gi xi
(e, ce) (e)
where Gi an acquaintance-based concept generator as defined in (13) and
xj an individual variable.
By (23), PRO presupposes that for any daughters Gi and x, of PRO, Gi applied
to xj maps to fself defined in (24), which is the relation holding between centered
worlds and their individual centers. (Note that we could also think of f&elf as the de
me instantiation of de se.)
(23) If g(i)(g(j)) = fself, [[pRo Gi j]C'g = )(g(A))(C),
else undefined.
(24) &1f = A (w, x) .x9
With these assumptions in place, we can derive the semantics of subject-controlled
PRO, where the relevant de se relation is the de me relation fself holding between a
centered world and its individual center.
Example derivation
Let me start with a remark on the compositional mechanism I assume. Note that,
instead of a world parameter, I assume expressions to be evaluated against a param-
eter c, which is a pair (w, x) of a world w and its individual center x (i.e., a centered
world c). 10
(25) For any semantic expression,
a. JaJ'9 is the semantic value of a at c. (EXTENSION)
b. Ac. I[ca'c (abbreviated: [a]g) is the function that assigns to any cen-
tered world c the extension of a in c. (INTENSION)
I assume concept generator variables G to be of type (e, ce), in line with the type
canonically assigned to them. The definition of concept generators is repeated in
(26).
9 Equivalently, using the abbreviated type c for centered worlds, felf = Ac. center(c).
10c can easily be extended to include two or more individuals, i.e., it could be used as a multiply-
centered world. This possibility will be exploited to account for de te readings.
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(26) G of type (e, ce) is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for individual x
in w iff
a. Dom(G) ={y : x is acquainted with y in w}
b. For all y in Dom(G), if G(y) = R, then:
(i) R is an acquaintance relation
(ii) x bears R uniquely to y in w (i.e., G(y)((w, x)) = y)
(iii) for all centered worlds (w', x') in x's doxastic set at w, the center
x' bears R uniquely to G(y)((w', x')) in w'.
However, this type creates a certain technical problem: Since the centered-world
argument c is not the innermost argument, c cannot a priori be targeted and shifted
under Intensional Functional Application. As a fix for this issue, I posit a dedicated
interpretation rule for concept generator variables G (27) that effectively switches
the order of arguments by way of abstracting over G's e-type argument. The merits
of this rule will become apparent in the derivations to follow.11
(27) Interpretation rule for concept generators G(e,ce) (short: ICG)
a. [Gijc'g = Ax.g(i)(x)(c) (EXTENSION)
b. [Gjg = Ac.Ax.g(i)(x)(c) (INTENSION)
In what follows I provide a sample derivation of the Obligatory Control construction
involving want in (29). The semantics assumed for want builds upon the semantics
for attitude predicates in P&S (2003a) such as (15). As a technical innovation, I sug-
gest to replace the abstractor AGi over the concept generator variable Gi by a binder
index on the embedding verb itself, as shown in wante. The interpretation of want
and its propositional complement containing Gi is regulated by a syncategorematic
entry Ewant' 01 in (28)."
"Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for help with this issue.
12I omit the CP layer of the PRO clause as it is not crucial for our current purposes.
"The motive behind this adjustment is a technical complication that would otherwise be raised
by the type of want in relation to its complement: An entry (i) of type ((ece, ct) , et) would be
closer to P&S's denotation; however, composition of want in (i) with the embedded clause, whose
extension would be of type (ece, t) due to lambda abstraction over G would not be within the
domain of Intensional Functional Application. Replacing lambda abstraction over G with a binder
index for G directly on the embedding verb resolves this problem. Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for
help with this solution.
(i) [want c = AP((ece,ct),(e,ct)).Ax.-G for x in world(c) s.t. V(w', ') [being x' in w' is compat-
ible with the desires of x in world(c) => P(G)((w', x'))]
(ii) [TP Mary 3 [T' wants((ece,ct),(e,ct)) [(ece,t) AG2 ITPt [PROe G2(ece) X 3(e) ] to win the compe-
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(28) [want 0]c, - Ax.3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for x in world(c) &
(ii) 4 j9--G is defined &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in world(c)
N4~giq5JJ ((W, X')
(29) TP
Mary 3  T'
wants2  TPt
PROe T'
G2(ece) X3[3.SG.FEM to win the competition
(30) a. If g(2)(g(3)) = fself, [[pRo G2 x3flC'= g(2)(g(3))(c), (by ICG)
else undefined.
b. fself = A (w, x) .x
(31) [Mary3 wants 2 [pRo G2 x 3] to win the competition C)9
Ax.3G s.t. (by rule (28))
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for x in world(c) &
(ii) [[PRO G 2 X31 to win the competition] 2 -G is defined &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in world(c)
- [PRo G 2 X31 to win the competition [,2-G,3-,Mary ((W x))
(Mary)
(32) [( 2 9)]clg = 1 iff 3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for Mary in world(c) &
(ii) G(Mary) = felf & (by (30-a))
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w
-+ G(Mary)((w', x')) wins the competition in w'I
tition Hi]
81
What is the significance of the existence statement about concept generators in a
PRO construction, where PRO presupposes a specific value for the concept generator
variable applied to its sister - namely, that it map to the fseij-function defined in
(30-b)?
Note that by my interpretation rule for want in (28), the existential statement
contains a conjunction of conditions, including the condition that its complement 0
be defined. In the case of a PRO complement, 4 is only defined if the presupposition
contributed by PRO is satisfied. Inclusion of this condition has the effect of local
accommodation, similar to Beaver & Krahmer's (2001) A-operator: If the presup-
position is satisfied, it is accommodated; if the presupposition is not satisfied, the
sentence is predicted to be false.
Let us consider what happens when the former holds and the presupposition is
satisfied. The presupposition of PRO requires the concept generator variable applied
to its sister (here: G(Mary)) to map to a specific value, fef. Therefore, for the
existential statement to be true, fself is the only possible value for G(Mary). This in
turn means that existential quantification is rendered trivial. As long as we replace
G(Mary) with fer in conjunct (iii), we can eliminate the existential statement from
the truth conditions. The crucial meaning component that remains is the universal
statement expressing the desire. This is shown in (33) below.
(33) [(29)1Cig = 1 iff
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w ->
LeiL((w', x')) wins the competition in w'
... = 1 iff (iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in
w => x' wins the competition in w'
Let me illustrate how the above entry correctly rules out non-de se uses of Control
constructions. Consider example (34): This scenario described in (34-a) cannot be
described by the Subject Control construction in (34-b). This conflict is derived as
follows: Mary does not have a particular desire for herself to be on the task force.
This means that, for all we know, being an x that does not join the task force is
compatible with Mary's desires. Thus there are tuples (w, x) among Mary's desire
worlds of which it is not the case that x joins the task force, i.e., of which the
consequent is false.
How does this play out formally in my semantics, where de se is secured by way of
a presupposition? In the non-de se scenario below, the presupposition introduced by
PRO is failed. This means that conjunct (ii) in the existential statement - that 4 be
defined - is false and, consequently, and everything else being equal, the existential
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statement is false. (The truth conditions are repeated in (35) below.) Again, we thus
achieve a similar result as we would using an A-operator.
Is the prediction of falsity in a non-de se context adequate? Let us look at an
example and consider the PRO construction in (34) uttered in the described non-de
se scenario. Intuitions as to the nature of the oddity - is it falsity or rather infelicity?
- are somewhat blurry. Barring evidence to the contrary, for now I thus stick with
my analysis.
(34) a. Scenario: Mary, not realizing that she is reading her own CV, says "This
woman sounds great and should be selected as part of the task force on
climate change" (We do not know about Mary's conscious, i.e., de se
desires regarding herself.)
b. */#Mary wants to be part of the task force on climate change.
(35) j(34-b)]Cmg - 1 iff -,G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for Mary in world(c) &
(ii) G(Mary) =fsel &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w
=> G(Mary)((w', x')) wins the competition in w'
Consequences for the (un)interpretability of 0-features
The analysis of PRO as a complex unit has exciting ramifications for a theory of
q-features: As foreshadowed in chapter 3, the proposed analysis allows us to chal-
lenge the claim represented by Kratzer (1998), Stechow (2003), Schlenker (2003),
Heim (2008) whereby 0-features on bound pronouns are invisible to the semantic
component.
Recall that an analysis of PRO as a semantically empty element made the as-
sumption of semantically inert 0-features h la Kratzer (1998) inevitable. However,
under the current proposal, this assumption (albeit consistent) is no longer needed
given that the #-features on PRO and any variables bound by PRO sit inside the
argument of the concept generator. As a result, the features are interpreted exclu-
sively outside the attitude context, as presuppositions on the DP controller binding
the variable (e.g., Mary in example 2), cf. condition (ii) below.
(36) PRO in (29): If g : [3 -* Mary]
(i) g(2)(g(3)) = fei &
(ii) g(3) -# (speaker V addressee) & g(3) is a female,
f[PRo G 2 x3 [3.G.FEMjCg
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else undefined.
This property of my analysis is in line with recent proposals that have called into
question the existence of purely phonological features: Spathas (2010) shows that
cases involving focus alternatives (cf. Only I did my homework), which have been
used as a central motivation in the introduction of PF features (see Heim 2002), are
amenable to a "semantic" account of -features on bound variables. Moreover, Bassi
& Longenbaugh (2018) claim that a semantic alternative is in fact superior to a PF
account, citing as evidence a novel type of examples involving donkey pronouns in
focus contexts. The feasibility of associating PRO's h-features with semantic content
could be viewed as another piece of data to corroborate the view that q-features on
bound variables are no different from q-features on referential pronouns.
Some desirable predictiois
First I would like to revisit two types of cases brought up in section 3.1.2 that
could not be accounted for under a property ("empty PRO") analysis of Control
complements. Then I will return to conclude Charlow & Sharvit's (2014)argument for
a concept generator approach and demonstrate its success in dealing with multiguise
readings.
The first type of case concerns de re readings of local anaphors in the PRO
clause. We noted that (37) has a true reading in a context where Palin, after reading
an article written by a politican, says to Bill " I want to vote for this politician",
unaware that she herself wrote the article.
(37) Palin promised Bill to vote for herself.
Under a property analysis, herself, which is locally bound by PRO, is necessarily
interpreted de se, and (37) is predicted to be false in the described scenario.
A complex PRO analysis, on the other hand, offers the option of assigning to
herself a variable G7 different from G3 inside PRO, as shown in (38)14: In contrast
to G3, the reference of G7 is contextually determined and not constrained by a
presupposition that it map to the self-relation; G7 in the given example maps Palin
to the relation holding between Palin's belief worlds and the individual whom Palin
4 See also Landau (2018), who suggests a similar solution.
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believes to have written the article. 15' 16
(38) [Palini promised3, 7 Bill [[PRO G 3 X1J to vote for [G7 herself1] cg = 1 iff
3G, 3G' s.t.
(i) G, G' are acquaintance-based concept-generators for Palin in w, &
(ii) G(Palin)= f&elf &
(iii) V(w', x', y') E PROMISEwc,Palin,Bill : G(Palin)((w', x', y')) votes for
G'(Palin)((w', x', y')) in w'I
A second case of interest regards gender features on pronouns bound by PRO:
As Schlenker (2003) points out, Alice wants PROi to buy herself% a car is a truthful
report about Alice, a transsexual, announcing "I want to become a man and buy
myself a car". As discussed in section 3.1.2, under a Chiercia style analysis of PRO
clauses the gender feature [FEM] on herselfi must be uninterpretable: If [FEMI were
visible at LF, the presupposition it imposes on PRO (which in Chierchia's analysis
binds herself) would result in semantic ill-formedness. (Recall that the presupposi-
tion would confine the property of buying oneself a car to individuals that are female.
Given that Alice's desire attitude does not contain worlds where she is female, we
would end up with a modal want with an empty restrictor.)
Under the current approach, however, the bound variable marked with [FEM]
forms the argument of the concept generator. This means that the presupposition
associated with the FEM feature (that the referent of the bound variable be a female)
will not be reflected in the attitude denoted by the PRO clause.
(39) Alice3 wants to become a man and
"
5For now I abstract away from the fact that the presence of more than one concept generator
in a given clause requires that attitude verbs quantify over sequences of concept generators. This
ultimately inevitable assumption has been worked out by Charlow & Sharvit (2014); the adjusted
denotation is presented below (cf. (43)) in the context of the closely related problem posited by
Charlow & Sharvit's (2014) multiguise reading.
16 Sharvit (2011) labels the grammaticality of herself under the targeted reading an "unexpected
BT effect". However, Sharvit raises this concern in a property analysis of Obligatory Control
complements; while it would seem that the use of concept generators could significantly remedy
that concern, Sharvit dimisses a corresponding approach based on certain objections. Landau
(2018) succinctly responds to these objections; in particular, he points out that Sharvit's probably
gravest objection - the ungrammaticality of a synonymous LF where the de re pronoun is bound
directly by Palin, cf. (i) - may be remedied by an econonmy principle, first suggested as Rule I
in Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993) and "quite general and demonstrably operative in BT effects",
whereby A-binding is preferred over coreference.
(i) Palin promised Bill to vote for her,.
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[she3 wants 5 [[PRo G5 X3[3.SG.FEMJI to buy [G 5 herself3[3.SG.FEM]] a car l
(40) If g : [3 -+ Alice]
(i) g(4)(g(3)) fsei &
(ii) g(3) # (speaker V addressee) & g(3) is a female,
J[PRO 05 X3 [3 .SG.FEM)I c'9 g(5)(g(3))(c),
else undefined.
(41) [(39)]Cl9 = 1 iff V(w', x') E DESIRESwc,Alice : x' becomes a man in w' & x'
buys a car for x' in w'
Finally, let us return to Charlow & Sharvit's (2014) argument for P&S approach
to de re: Recall from section 5.2.1 that neither an approach building on QR, nor
an analysis taking the res to constitute the internal argument of a relational verb
believere seemed capable of deriving the so-called multiguise reading illustrated in
(42) while at the same time not generating any unattested readings.
A concept generator approach offers the following solution: The targeted reading
is associated with the LF in (42), which assigns distinct concept generator variables
G4 and G5 to the QP and its bindee. This way we are able to capture the fact
that John is acquainted with each of the female students in two different guises.
Returning to our original scenario, given a pair of photos (Alice 1 , Alice 2 ) showing
Alice in two different guises, there are, among others, the following two suitable
concept generators G4, G s.t. g(4)(Alicel) maps to [A(w, x). the z s.t. x in w sees
a photo of z showing z as a painter], and g(5)(Alice 2 ) maps to [A(w, x). the z s.t.
x in w sees a photo of z wearing a ski suit] (where Alice1 and Alice 2 correspond
to the subject trace t, and the bound variable her2 , respectively); similar for the
other involved female students. (Note that for the sake of simplicity and legibility,
and parallel to my denotation for want in previous examples, the concept generator
variables are bound by the attitude verb directly rather than by mediating lambda
abstractors in the LF below. However, nothing hinges on this assumption.)
(42) [[every female student] [A 2 [John [believes 4 5 [[G4 t 2J likes [G5 her 2j mother]fl]c,9
= 1 iff 3G, BG' s.t.
(i) G, G' are acquaintance-based concept-generators for John in w, &
(ii) V(w', x') E DOXwc,John: [Vy : y is a female student in w, => G(y)((w', x'))
likes in w' the mother of G'(y)((w', x'))]
Note that, since multiguise readings involve multiple distinct concept generators,
attitude verbs must correspondingly be taken to quantify over sequences of concept
generators, rather than over single variables. As Charlow & Sharvit (2014) illustrate,
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this can be implemented by way of a type-flexible semantics for attitude verbs along
the following lines.
(43) a. believeFGC c,9(w)(p)(x) is defined only if for all S(= (G ... GS)) in
CON(c)2,,,_ such that Doxx,, C {w' E Ds : p(Gf) ... (G)(w') is de-
fined}. 17
b. When defined, [believeFGC c,(w)(p)(x) = 1 iff there is an S(= G .. .GS))
in CON(c)x,w, such that Doxx,w g {w' E Ds: p(G) ... (GS)(w') = 1}
One last note is in place: Charlow & Sharvit (2014) point out that the current
theory is not completely flawless and overgenerates readings if a concept generator
takes as its argument a variable bound by a de dicto expression. For a lack of
alternatives that fare better in an overall respect, this argument does not seem to
threaten their preference for the current account. However, since overgeneration
was used to argue against alternative accounts, it would be appropriate to examine
the predictions made by the current account more closely in order to ensure that
the same stigma attached to competing approaches cannot also be attributed to the
current approach.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. In section 3 I reviewed evidence that PRO bears #-features using
data from English as well as Korean. In the context of this observation, I argued
against a common analysis of PRO as a semantically vacuous element: An analysis
of this type has difficulty accounting for agreement between PRO and its controller.
Moreover, I showed that PRO's features must be uninterpretable for the purposes of
LF in such an analysis, if we want to successfully account for the range of attested
(and unattested) meanings.
In this section I demonstrated that the presence of the concept generator variable
as another daughter of PRO allows us to derive the second property of jussive PRO
(also present in regular PRO), to wit, the obligatoriness of a de se interpretation.
Moreover, the motivation for the existence of concept generators has been argued to
extend beyond PRO: Assuming Charlow & Sharvit (2014) are correct, the existence
of concept generators is required for independent reasons, in order to describe the
availability of multiguise readings arising in attitude contexts where a quantifier
binds a pronominal variable read de re.
17CON(c)x,w,n is a non-empty set of n-long sequences of concept-generators supplied by context
c that are suitable for x in w.
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5.2.3 Jussive PRO in context
To understand my analysis of PRO in embedded jussives, it is necessary to take a
step back and identify some of the other building blocks and their contribution in
embedded jussives. I will start by sketching the LF I assume to underlie jussive
reports. The structure in (47) exemplifies the LF of an embedded promissive in
Korean. The structure of Mongolian jussives is assumed to be identical, modulo
overt PRO and other phonological exponents.
Korean jussives as well as their Mongolian counterpart are introduced by a com-
plementizer. I take the complementizer to have a purely syntactic function and be
semantically empty.
The jussive clause contains two crucial functional projections below the CP, JussP
and TP. Crucially, I separate jussive force from jussive morphology. Jussive force is
located in JussP and contributed by a silent modal JUSSIVE heading the phrase. Note
that I take the same modal to be present in all jussive clauses, i.e., in voluntative
and imperative clauses in Mongolian, and in promissive, imperative, and exhortative
clauses in Korean. This means that, despite morpholgical diversity, the same modal-
ity is taken to underlie all jussive clauses. I take JUSSIVE to be a desire modal. The
exact semantics of JUSSIVE will be discussed in a later section.
Jussive morphology, on the other hand, is expressed in TP, for example, by way
of the promissive particle -ma in T in (47). Importantly, the jussive morpheme
in T makes no semantic contribution in my analysis. Rather, it is considered
a reflex of agreement with the PRO subject in SpecTP, specifically, with PRO's
[VOL/PROM/IMP/EXH feature. Moreover, in order to derive the dependence of jus-
sive morphology on the presence of the JUSSIVE modal, I assume T in jussive clauses
to be marked with another uninterpretable feature, viz., [uJussi, which is checked
by a corresponding interpretable feature [Juss] on the JUSSIVE modal. The lexical
entry for promissive T might thus be rendered as (44).
(44) T[UPROM[UJUSS -+ -ma
The [VOL/PROM/IMP/EXH] features on PRO are crucial in a semantic respect as well:
Given that modality is uniform across jussives, the only semantic difference between
morphologically distinct jussive clauses is induced by these features on PRO - which,
as will be shown later, correlate with different presuppositions.
In addition to "jussive" features, PRO bears h-features, cf. [3PS in (47). PRO
agrees in #-features with its controller in the higher clause. Note that these features
determine the shape of overt PRO in Korean; PRO marked [3PSj, for example, sur-
faces as caki. The lexical entry for Korean PRO, which may alternatively be silent,
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is given in (45). In combination with the lexical entries for general pronouns, which
includes (46), we can derive the form of jussive PRO in Korean.
(45) [[PROM/IMP/EXHI G a ] -+ {[overt pronoun with features of a], 0} (Korean)
(46) [3PS] -+ caki (Korean)
(47) John4 told Mary ...
CP
JussP(Vt) C0
-ko
TPt Juss0
JUSSIVE 5 Juss
PROe (et)
[PROM]
G5  X
(ece) [3Ps]
{caki-NOM, 0} 1
t2 leave Ife4Hii~e
-ma
5.3 The JUSSIVE modal
5.3.1 Semantic background: attitudes as events with content
I adopt an event semantics for attitudes and speech events, following Kratzer (2006),
Moulton (2009), Elliott (2016). In such a semantics, the meaning of attitude verbs
is pared-down: Attitude verbs merely denote a set of corresponding attitude states,
for example, the set of belief states in the case of believe and think, cf. (48). The
attitude itself is introduced by the complement as the content of the attitude state.
This means that, rather than being empty, the complementizer makes a semantic
contribution: that takes a propositional argument p and denotes a set of eventuali-
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ties18 whose content is p, cf. (49). Consider the different denotations of a that-clause
in an event-based view (50-a) vs. a propositional view (50-b). Note that I assume
that an event only exists in one world.
(48) [believej = Ae. belief(e)
(49) [thatj = Ap(,t).Ae.Fc,,t(e) = p
(50) [that Mary will win]
a. Ae.Fc0nt(e) = Aw. Mary will win in w
b. Aw. Mary will win in w
Given that attitude verbs and their clausal complement both describe eventualities,
composition of the two proceeds via predicate (event) modification rather than func-
tional application. A believe predicate including its clausal complement (51) would
be assigned the following representation.
(51) [believe that O1 = Ae. belief(e) & Fc,,t(e)
Let me provide some background on the view just introduced. An approach to
clausal complements as properties of events makes one central assumption, to wit,
that certain types of individuals and eventualities have propositional content.
The idea of entities having propositional content has been inspired, to an impor-
tant extent, by the existence of so-called content nouns such as story or rumor, and
their ability to take clausal complements (52).
(52) the rumor that Petra is innocent
By Kratzer (2006), content nouns describe a specific type of individuals, namely,
individuals that define accessible worlds. Thus, a particular story or rumor in the
actual world can, for any possible world, determine whether that world is compatible
with the rumor or story (Moulton 2009:26). The set of compatible worlds then forms
the content of the rumor or story.
Moulton (2009:27). adopting Kratzer's idea, formalizes this notion of content
by way of a function Tcont (53): Fhct maps (contentful) individuals x onto a set
of possible worlds w compatible with the content of the individual. (Fcoflt can be
thought of as a conceptual primitive, analogous to thematic roles such as AGENT,
GOAL, etc.) that-clauses are analyzed as sets of contentful individuals, cf. the entry
18I do not distinguish between states, events, and eventualities on a semantic level. When talking
about entities of this category, most of the time, I use the notion event. I employ v as the semantic
type of events, and by default use e as a variable ranging over events.
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for that in (54).
(53) Tcont(x) = {w: w is compatible with x}
(54) [that] Ap.Axc.hc0 nt(xc) =p
(Moulton 2009:27, following Kratzer 2006)'9
(55) [the rumor that Petra is innocent] =
tx: rumor (x) & Feont(x) = Aw'. Petra is innocent in w'
An analysis of that-clauses as properties of (contentful) individuals creates the
foundation for a unified treatment of content nouns and their verbal counterparts.
Elliott (2016) works out such a treatment: Elliott expands the class of potentially con-
tentful individuals and assumes it to contain not only abstract objects such as facts
and ideas, but also attitude states such as belief states (cf. (51)) and, crucial for our
purposes, saying events. Using a Neo-Davidsonian approach, where DP arguments
are introduced by functional heads such as AGENT and GOAL (type (et, eet), with
e ranging over individuals and eventualities), Elliott assumes the following meaning
for the vP of a basic speech report.
(56) fivp Abed AGENT said that Shirley is upset]J
Ae. agent(e) = Peter & saying(e) & Feont(e) = Aw'. Shirley is upset in w'
Note that Elliott (2016) subsumes both individuals and eventualities under the same
type e, for entities. I remain open to the possibility of a shared semantic type,
however, for the purposes of my analysis, I stick to the practice of differentiating be-
tween individuals (type e) and eventualities (type v). For me, the crucial innovation
in Elliott's proposal is that CP complements of verbal predicates, including speech
predicates, denote properties of eventualities rather than sets of worlds.
A precedent for the idea that events are semantically more complex than we
might assume can be found in Hacquard (2006), who argues that speech events and
attitude states have content and suggests to recast conversational backgrounds as
being anchored to events rather than worlds; cf. also Anand & Hacquard (2008).
The framework presented in this section provides the basis for my treatment of
the JUSSIVE modal, whose semantics I begin to outline in the following section.
"Moulton uses xc to stand for the subclass of individuals that carry content.
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5.3.2 A preliminary semantics for the JUSSIVE modal
As anticipated in earlier parts of this work, I pursue a modal analysis of jussives in
Mongolian and Korean, thus following a line of analysis of imperatives developed, cru-
cially, in Kaufmann (2012, among others). In my view, jussive clauses in Mongolian
and Korean contain a silent universal modal JUSSIVE, which contributes their special
non-assertive force. JUSSIVE is taken to project its own functional phrase, JussP, as
illustrated in (47). I tentatively assume JUSSIVE to be bouletic in nature: Besides
a circumstantial modal base, it involves a prioritizing ordering source drawing on
a set of desires, akin to English want.20 The presence of the same bouletic modal
across (morphologically distinct) jussive clauses guarantees a uniform semantics for
the different jussive forms.
Recall that the different verbal markers found in jussive clauses are dissociated
from jussive semantics in my analysis, hence not constituting classical mood markers.
As noted before, I attribute the markers (-iy and 0/-Aree in Mongolian, -ma, -Ia,
-ca in Korean) to T and view them as semantically empty agreement with the jussive
subject.
In this chapter, I focus on those semantic properties of the JUSSIVE modal that
interact in a crucial way with the PRO subject and its two central properties: its
dependency on a controller, and the obligatoriness of a de se interpretation. There
are many pressing questions raused by an analysis of non-assertive speech acts as
modal propositions, including the right characterization of the modality involved,
and the question as to how we can derive the performative nature of all clauses
containing JUSSIVE and exclude descriptive uses. However, I will put these questions
aside for now.
Let me outline the general semantic structure of JUSSIVE: In correspondence
with an event-based view of attitude and speech reports, I take jussive clauses to
denote events of a contentful type. The content of the described events, F,,t(e),
is assumed to correspond to a universal statement, which may be thought of as
representing a command (in the case of imperatives), an intention (in the case of
Mongolian voluntatives and Korean promissives), or a prompt (in the case of Korean
exhortatives).
Different from Moulton's (2009) & Elliott's (2016) analyses of standard attitude
and speech reports, I assume that it is JUSSIVE itself rather than the complementizer
20Though it is common to explain the ambiguity found in most standard modal predicates by
way of syntactic decomposition into at least a quantifier and a restrictor component (cf. Kratzer
1991, Heim & von Fintel 2011), nothing in my current analysis would motivate a corresponding
assumption for the JUSSIVE modal, which is why I stick with an analysis of JUSSIvE as a syntactically
simple element.
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which introduces the content of the speech report. Though both Mongolian and
Korean embedded jussives do feature a complementizer, the complementizer plays
no semantic role.
By composing with the embedding predicate - such as say (most commonly), but
also promise, order etc. - by way of predicate modification, the set of events denoted
by the jussive clause comes to be identified as a set of saying (promising, ordering
etc.) events.
In a Neo-Davidsonian semantics, arguments are introduced by functional heads
denoting the various thematic roles, rather than by the predicate itself. This includes
propositional arguments such as attitudes and contents of utterances, which are
introduced by the clausal complement. However, since attitudes and contents of
utterances are typically relative to another argument, i.e, the attitude holder or, in
the case of speech reports, the speaker, the question arises as to how this argument
may be accessed.
Recall that in my analysis it is the JUSSIVE modal that introduces the (bouletic)
attitude expressed by voluntatives, imperatives, etc. The reported attitude is typ-
ically that of the reported speaker, e.g., John in the promissive report (47). How
can we connect the attitude to its holder in the absence of a predicate that intro-
duces both arguments? To resolve this issue, I take JUSSIVE to be equipped with
a presupposition calling for the denoted events to have an agent and a goal. This
presupposition, which is satisfied by the presence of a speaker and a (possibly covert)
hearer argument in the matrix clause, grants the embedded clause access to the ma-
trix arguments: Concretely, the JUSSIVE entry (57) references the (expressed-)desire
worlds of agent(e) as the restrictor of the universal statement.2 1 Note that the strat-
egy of recovering an attitude holder via an eventuality argument is not new and has
been employed in Anand & Hacquard (2008) and Moulton (2009:156).
Not all events can be assumed to have propositional content. To ensure that the
set of events denoted by the jussive clause, moreover, is of a contentful type, I extend
the presupposition carried by JUSSIVE by a condition whereby the denoted events,
besides an agent and goal, also have content.
Below I sketch a preliminary semantics for the JUSSIVE modal that comprises
the components discussed above. To summarize, according to (57) a JussP with
JUSSIVE as its head denotes a set of events, which are presupposed to have an agent,
a goal, and content; he agent and goal presuppositions are satisified by the reported
speakear and the reported hearer of the jussive, for example, by John and Mary in
211 assume that thematic roles are uniquely assigned. In other words, I hold the view that any
agent of some event is the unique agent of this event, and, likewise, this is the case for other thematic
roles.
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the promissive report (47), John told Mary leave,,O. The JussP asserts that the
content of the described events, TFc0 t(e), is a set of worlds in which the agent of e
(claims to) want(s) [TPI; e.g.. for (47), a set of worlds in which agent(e) claims to
want that g(4) (= John) leaves.
(57) [[JussP [TP X4 leave-PROM] JUSSIVEw'9 = Ae:
a. e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (st). (PRESUPPOSITION)
b. Fcont(e) = Aw'. Vw" [w" is compatible with the expressed desires of
agent(e) in w' =+ g(4) leaves in w"1 22  (ASSERTION)
The LF in (47) and the meaning of the JussP (57) is simplified and falls short
of a complete semantics for jussive clauses in the following respects: Crucially, the
given meaning does not account for the de se attitude holding between the reported
speaker and the jussive subject. Relatedly, the structure of the jussive subject (47) is
reduced to a plain variable rather than more complex [PRO Gi xj]. I will successively
move towards a more complete account in the next sections.
5.3.3 Reconciling concept generators with an event-based se-
mantics
The "jussive" attitude of the reported speaker is introduced in the jussive clause as
part of the contribution of the JUSSIVE modal. The simplified semantics for JUSSIVE
above correctly encodes the bouletic modality characterizing jussive propositions, but
disregards the fact that the attitude is necessarily de se: recall that we cannot use a
promissive report John said to Mary [leave-VOL in Korean, for example, to report
a situation where John says to Mary "I want this guy to leave our team", unaware
that he is pointing at his own picture.
In section 5.2.2 I presented an analysis of de se attitudes in Control construc-
tions. My analysis relies on Chierchia's (1989) proposal to describe de se relations
as relations between sets of centered worlds (w, x, (y,.. .)) (tuples of a world and
one or more individuals, short c) rather than between simple sets of worlds. In my
implementation of this idea I drew on Percus & Sauerland's notion of concept gener-
ator variables G inside DPs. I assumed that PRO is a semantically and structurally
221 interpret meta-language agent, marked by italics, as a function of type (v, e):
(i) agent(ve) = Ae.tx : x is the agent of e
The presupposition on e could thus, more formally, be stated as follows: e e (dom(agent) &
dom(goal) & dom(.FYnt)).
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complex expression containing such a G, and showed how the de se component can
be derived via a presupposition on G carried by PRO.
The semantics used for Control PRO constitues one of the pieces that goes into
a more complete analysis of jussive clauses. However, there is another component of
my analysis which has been developed in parallel: This is the view that predicates
denote properties of events, and that attitudes and reported utterances can be seen
as contents of events. Hand in hand with this goes a Neo-Davidsonian semantics
in which arguments are selected by separate thematic heads and composition of the
predicate and its arguments proceeds via multiple instances of modification. The
section at hand confronts the task of bringing together these two strands of my
analysis.
Let us consider the implications of such a view for the JUSSIVE modal: According
to the preliminary entry in (57), the JUSSIVE modal introduces the desire attitude.
However, it lacks direct access to the holder of this attitude, i.e., the external argu-
ment in the higher clause.
Recall that concept generators (26) were defined as concept generators for an
individual x, corresponding to the attitude holder. However, as the JUSSIVE modal
does not take an attitude holder as its argument, a concept generator introduced by
JUSSIVE cannot be defined as a concept generator for some attitude holder x.
A way to overcome this circumstance was anticipated in the last section and
the entry for JUSSIVE in (57): We can exploit the fact that JUSSIVE selects for an
event argument and access the attitude holder as one of the participants of the
event. Note that the event referenced in the definition of the concept generator
will eventually be identified with the event denoted by the matrix speech/attitude
predicate. In the case of jussive reports, this is the reported speech event, in other
words, the event of uttering the jussive. Crucially, the individual we need to access
- the holder of the desire and de se attitude(s) - corresponds to the agent of this
event. Taking advantage of this coincidence, we can rephrase concept generators
as concept generators for some event e, defined as shown in (58). According to this
definition, the domain of a concept generator G for e is the set of individuals agent(e)
is acquainted with in the world where e takes place. Note that the definition I provide
makes employs doubly-centered worlds, i.e., triplets of type (s, e, e) containing two
individuals, rather than simply-centered worlds. This move is necessary to capture
de te attitudes, which arise in Object Control constructions including imperative
reports, in addition to de me in Subject Control constructions.
(58) Given an event e with an agent and a goal, G of type (e, ce) is an acquaintance-
based concept-generator for e iff
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a. Dom(G) = {z: agent(e) is acquainted with z in the world w of e (= we)}
b. For all z in Dom(G), if G(z) = R, then:
(i) R is an acquaintance relation
(ii) agent(e) bears R uniquely to z in we (i.e., G(z)((We, agent(e),goal(e)))
= z)
(iii) for all doxastic alternatives (w', x', y') of agent(e) in relation to
goal(e) in we, x' bears R uniquely to G(z)((w', x', y')) in W'.3
5.3.4 The JUSSIVE modal as quantifier over concept genera-
tors
In section 5.2.2 I presented an analysis of the Control verb want as a quantifier over
concept generators, which enabled us to derive the characteristic de se interpretation
of Obligatory Control constructions.
In the current section, I complete my analysis of the JUSSIVE modal, drawing
on the meaning developed for want in 5.2.2, repeated in (60) below. Specifically, I
demonstrate how we can reconcile quantification over concept generators with the
tentative meaning for JUSSIVE in (57), repeated in (59). The revised meaning for
JUSSIVE is compatible with the presuppositional analysis of PRO introduced in sec-
tion 5.2.2 and allows us to derive the de se property of jussive reports in a similar
fashion as shown for regular Control constructions in section 5.2.2.
(59) [JUSSIVE]''9 = Ap(,t).Ae: e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (st).
Fcont(e) = Aw'. Vw" [w" is compatible with the expressed desires of agent(e)
in w' = p(w")
Recall that for technical reasons, I assumed want to incorporate a binder index for
concept generator variables, cf. want' in (60), rather than positing a separate binder
in the complement of want. The semantics of want was given in the form of a
syncategorematic entry wante q (60) governing the interpretation of want and its
PRO-complement.
(60) [want' 01c,9 = Ax.3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for x in world(c) &
23Defining doubly-centered worlds (w', x', y') that are doxastic (or any attitude) alternatives for
some participant of an event e is tricky if we cannot make reference to the specific nature of the
event. If we assume that being a goal implies being addressed in some way by the agent, the most
specific we can get is to say that (w', X', y') are doxastic alternatives for agent(e) in relation to
goal(e) in w iff "it is compatible with the beliefs of agent(e) to be x' addressing y' in w"'.
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(ii) J19G is defined &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in world(c)
i- *G(W x']
I transfer these aspects of the semantics of want to JUSSIVE, however, maintaining
the view that jussive clauses form properties of events rather than propositions (in
conformance with (59)): The meaning of JUSSIVE' q in (61) is a function from events
to truth values. Correspondingly, as reflected in condition (i) in (61)), we now refer
to concept generators relative to an event e (58) (as opposed to P&S's original notion
of concept generators for an individual x).
JUSSIVEi 0' denotes a set of events e for which there is an appropriate concept
generator G. The crucial innovation compared to (59), apart from the integration of
concept generators, consists in the relativization of truth values to centered worlds.
This update is reflected in two places in the entry below: first, in the content of the
denoted events, Fcont, which is a property of centered worlds and, second, in the
desire expressed by the jussive, which is similarly described as a condition on sets
of centered worlds. Note that the entry makes reference to doubly-centered worlds
(w, x, y), with y corresponding to the addressee of x, instead of pairs (w, x): this
extension is necessary to represent de te attitudes found, among others, in imperative
reports.
(61) JUSSIVE' c = Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct).
-G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) 9 is defined &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A(w, x). V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) =4 [ (wxG
The implication in the above entry that jussive clauses contain a de se component
in two places might be unexpected based on what we have heard so far: While I have
made it clear that an imperative report of a desire proposition is only felicitous if the
original speaker's desires were about the subject of the imperative de te, I have not
explained why the content Fc0,t(e) should similarly be relativized to world-individual
pairs. I make up for this in section 5.5.2.
However, I would like to clarify already at this point what it means for the content
Fcont of an event to be a set of centered worlds p(se,t). Recall from section 3.1.1
Chierchia's property analysis of de se attitudes and the interpretation assigned to
attitude verbs with such complements: Crudely, x wants P is true iff x self-ascribes
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P in x's desire worlds.
A similar principle helps elucidate the notion of Fe0nt(e). By (61), a sentence
JUSSIVE # identifies the content of the jussive event Fc,,t(e) with the centered-world
proposition []j (more explicitly, A (w, x) .[#]j((w, x))).
To understand these truth conditions, certain implicit components are pivotal:
First, e (which can be an attitude state or speech event) is anchored to an agent
(secured by a presupposition); it is agent(e)'s attitude or utterance that is at stake.
Moreover, we need to settle the interpretation of x in (w, x). Our goal is to
identify x with agent(e). To that end, I suggest an interpretation principle whereby
(w, x) E TFcont(e) iff agent(e) wants/believes/asserts etc. to be x in w. Therefore,
Fcont(e) = A (w, x) . [#]((w, x)) is true iff the agent of e wants/believes/asserts to
be x in w and that []J((w, x)) = 1, or - to bridge the gap to Chierchia's analysis -
iff the agent self-ascribes [j# along the relevant dimension (whose nature - beliefs,
desires, what has been said, or something else - is determined by the matrix predicate
and mediated through e).
We now have most of the tools required to derive jussive reports in Mongolian and
Korean. In the following section I discuss the remaining ingredient: the semantic
difference between PRO in different jussive clauses; note that this diversification has
the central function of deriving the observed correlation between different jussive
forms and the specific type of Control associated with them.
5.4 Flavors of jussive PRO
The analysis of de se adopted in this work crucially relies on the assumption that
PRO is a complex constituent [PRO Gi xJ, which presupposes a specific value for
We have seen already how a presuppositional semantics for PRO plays into the
meaning of a standard Subject Control construction. Let us now consider the specific
nature of PRO in jussive clauses (aka "jussive PRO").
I showed that there is corelation between jussive forms and different types of
Control. Table 5.1 summarizes this correlation.
Recall from section 5.2.3 that jussive PRO is marked with a feature representing
the type of jussive, such as [VOL] in voluntatives and [IMP] in imperatives. I argue
that the feature on PRO is the sole difference between the LFs of different jussive
types, i.e., between voluntative, imperative etc. clauses. The correlation between
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TYPE OF CONTROL JUSSIVE FORM
Subject Control voluntative (Mongolian),
promissive (Korean)
Object Control imperative (Mongolian, Korean)
Split Control exhortative (Korean)
Table 5.1: Correlation between jussives and types of Control
jussive forms and types of Control is derived in the semantics as a result of the
variation in PRO's features.
PRO in jussives is marked with one of [VOL]/[PROM]/[IMP]/[EXH]. Syntactically,
these features check an uninterpretable counterpart IuVOLI/[uIMPI etc. on T and,
thereby, indirectly determine the spell-out of T.
What is the semantic import of these features? As alluded to above, each flavor
imposes a slightly different presupposition on PRO or, more precisely, its constituents.
The denotations for the various flavors of PRO are provided in (62) below.
I collapse the semantics of the PRO[vogl subject of Mongolian voluntatives and
PRO[,OM] in Korean promissives. Likewise, the subject of imperatives is assumed to
be the same item PRO( IMP in Mongolian and Korean. PRO marked with the feature
[EXH], on the other hand, is specific to Korean. The different presuppositions are
rendered as functions f from doubly-centered worlds to individuals, cf. (63). They
may be viewed as versions of the f ef-relation presupposed by Subject Control PRO.
Though difficult to see at this point, in a felicitous jussive report the individual
centers x and y in (63) will be identified with the speaker and the addressee of
the jussive and their respective doxastic alternatives. Roughly, we hence derive the
Control relations in 5.1 by virtue of making voluntative and promissive PRO map to x
(the speaker), imperative PRO to y (the addressee), and exhortatives to the plurality
x e y: the different outputs will lead to (Subject) Control and the corresponding de
me attitude, addressee (Object) Control and the corresponding de te attitude, and
Split Control associated with a de nobis attitude, respectively.
(62) Denotation of jussive PRO(s)
a. If g(i)(g(j)) fprom/vol, [[PROPROM/VOL] Gi xj]fc' = g(i)(g(j))(c), else
undefined.
b. If g(i)(g(j)) =fimp, [PROIMP] Gi xjf]c'9 = g(i)(g(j))(c), else undefined.
C. If g(i)(g(jek))= fexh, [I[PRO[EXH 1 Gi Xies]]'g = (i)(g(i))()
else undefined. (specific to Korean)
99
(63) a. fprom/vol = A (w, x, y) X24
b. fimp A (w, x, y).y
C. fe = A (, x, y) .x e y
In the next section, I demonstrate in more detail how the variation in the seman-
tics of jussive PRO conspires with the other ingredients, including concept generators
as defined in (58), to yield the Control relations in table 5.1, as well as, indirectly,
determines an appropriate matrix DP as the binder of the individual variable inside
PRO.
5.5 Deriving the semantics of jussive reports
5.5.1 Example derivation: Korean imperative report
I will illustrate how the various parts of my analysis in the analysis of jussive reports
using the example of an imperative report in Korean, (64). (65) provides the LF
underyling the sentence.
My main focus has been on the interpretation of jussive subjects. Recall that
the central semantic properties of embedded jussive subjects we were striving to
capture concerned, first, its dependence on a matrix DP controller and, secondly,
the obligatoriness of a de se attitude between the reported speaker and the jussive
subject. As we have seen already, in imperative reports these two properties manifest
themselves in the following ways: The subject is dependent on the reported addressee
as its controller. Moreover, the reported speaker has a de te attitude towards the
embedded subject.
The semantics derived below reflects both these properties.
24This entry disregards the fact that voluntatives and promissives can both have a 1EXCL subject.
A more appropriate entry might be (i).
(i) fprom = A (w X, y) : !z salient in the context s.t. x C z. tz salient in the context s.t. x C z
As for the distribution of promissives and exhortatives in Korean, note that the salient plural
individual presupposed by fprom never includes y (the goal argument), i.e., split control semantics
seems incompatible with promissives. This could be an implicature from the availability of a
competing item PRO[ EXH connected to exhortatives in Korean, which presupposes an acquaintance
relation fmxh that creates exactly such an individual x e y.
On the other hand, it is questionable if it is really impossible for PRO in imperatives (and
exhortatives) to pick out a larger plurality including y (or x e y). If this is a possibility, the
asymmetry suggested by my entry is unprincipled (Irene Heim, p.c.).
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(64) Tom-i Bill-eykey 4 [ku-ka4 Mary-lul manna-la-ko] myenglyenghay-ss-ta.
Tom-NOM Bill-DAT he-NOM Mary-ACC meet-IMP-C order-PST-DECL
'Tom ordered Billi PROi to meet Mary.' (Park 2018:307)
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(65) LF of imperative report (64) (Korean)
e P(Vt)
Tom-NOMe V'(evt)
AGENT V'(vt)
((Vt),(e,Vt))
V 0  VP(vt)
Bill4 -DATe V'(evt)
[3ps]
GOAL V)(Vt)
((t),(e,vt))
CP(Vt) ordered (vt)
JussP(vt) -ko
TPt Juss0
JUSSIVE 5
PROe (et)
G5 x 4  Ax 2  T't
(ece) [3ps]
ku-NOM 0
t2 meet Mary
uss]
-la
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Lexicon
(66) t 2 meet Maryc'9 = g(2) meets Mary in world(c)
(67) (= (62-b))
a. If g(i)(g(j)) fimp, IpPRoMP Gi x]C' W = (g W))(c)
else undefined.
b. fimp = A (w, x, y) .y
(68) -la in T: semantically vacuous
(69) -ko in C: semantically vacuous
(70) jorderc,9 - Ae. order (e)
(71) a. [AGENT c'g = Af(ot).Ax.Ae. agent(e) - x & f(e)
b. GOALcg = Af(,t).Ax.Ae. goal(e) = x & f(e)
Calculation
(72) TPC'9 4-Bfl1,5-+G
= Az. [T'g2,z (DPRo,,, G 5 x41] " )
= G(Bill)= fimp :[Az. [T']c9-q"'](G) (Bill) (c)
= G(Bill)= fimp : [Az. z meets Mary in world(c)I(G) (Bill) (c)
= G(Bill)= fimp : 1 iff G(Bill)(c) meets Mary in world(c)
(73) JUSSIVE 5 TPl c,g4 -+Bill = (by JUSSIVE rule (61))
= Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct). 3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) [TP]g 4 - +Bill,5-+G is defined &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) =>
[TPJ ; 4- +Bill,5-+ ((WG
= Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (Ct). IG s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) G(Bill)= fimp &
(iii) Fc,,t(e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) => fimp((w', x', y'))
meets Mary in w']
= Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct).
(i) & (ii) fprom((we, agent(e), goal(e))) = Bill & (by (58-b-ii))
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(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) =# y' meets Mary in
w']
(74) [Tom ordered Bill4 [[PRO[,,p] G5 x 4 1 meet Mary IMP JUSSIVE 5 _ko c,
= 1 iff 3e : order(e) & agent(e) = Tom & goal(e) = Bill &
(i) & (ii) fimp((we, agent(e), goal(e))) = Bill &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) =* y' meets Mary in
w'
1 iff 3e : order(e) & agent(e) = Tom & goal(e) = Bill &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) ' y' meets Mary in
w'
Roughly, the final meaning of the imperative report can be paraphrased in the fol-
lowing way: It asserts the existence of an ordering event with Tom as its agent (i.e.,
the one issuing the order), Bill as its goal (the addressee of the order), and a specific
content 25 - namely, the set of centered worlds (w, x) where it is true that x wants
any y who x does not mind being his addressee, to meet Mary.26 As explained for
the first time in the context of standard Control under want (see section 5.2.2), the
existence statement about concept generators is rendered trivial in PRO clauses as
only one acquaintance relation - in the above case fimp - satisfies the presupposition
carried by PRO. Consequently, we are left with the content of the jussive event - the
universal statement, which assimilates the JUSSIVE to a desire statement - as the
main meaning component.
In the following subsection I provide a brief discussion of the two ways in which
2 Recall that the content of a speech (e.g., order) event is defined as the set of (centered) worlds
that are compatible with was said (ordered).
26The semantics above is imprecise in a certain respect: I take the complement of T' to be of
type t. I aside the fact that at some point lower in the phrase, we must have dealt with a property
of events (vt), whose event argument must have been saturated first to yield a t type constituent.
If we assume predicates in jussive clauses to be closed by an existential operator below the JUSSIVE
modal similar to root predicates, a more complete semantics would reflect this in the consequent of
the universal statement, for example, along the following lines.
(i) (6 5 )c',g = 1 iff 3e: order(e) & agent(e) = Tom & goal(e) = Bill &
Ycont (e) = A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is compatible with the
expressed desires of x in world(c) => 3e' in w' s.t. e' is an event of y' meeting Mary]
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jussive reports are de se, together with some examples showing how the denotation
above enforces the required attitude in a given scenario.
5.5.2 Breaking down de se in jussives
There are two respects in which jussive reports are necessarily de se: The desire
must be recognized as one's own desire, and the individual targeted by the desire
(assumed to be jussive PRO) must be recognized as the target of one's desires. This
is reflected in the use of centered worlds in two different spots in the truth conditions
of a jussive report. Let me illustrate this by means of the imperative report analyzed
above, whose denotation is repeated in (75). The relevant parts are underlined.
(75) [Tom ordered Bill4 [PRO[,mp G5 x 4 meet Mary IMP JUSSIVE 5 kolJ~g = 1
iff ]e : order(e) & agent(e) = Tom & goal(e) = Bill &
hFot(e) = A (w, x).V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is compatible
with the expressed desires of x in world(c) => y' meets Mary in w']
So far, I have spoken exclusively about the second respect in which jussive reports
are de se, and this is the attitude I demonstrated to be obligatory for Mongolian
and Korean in sections 2.3 and 4.3.3, respectively. Let me repeat what this attitude
amounts to. The above imperative report is inapproproate if we want to describe
a scenario in which Tom says to Bill I want Bill to meet Mary thinking that he is
talking to Joe. The infelicity is derived as follows: Worlds w' in which Tom is x' and
addresses a y' who is Joe are compatible with Tom's expressed desires, hence such
triplets (w', x', y') are among the restrictor-worlds of the universal quantifier. At the
same time, for all we know based on Tom's utterance, it is compatible with Tom's
desires that Joe does not meet Mary (Tom's desire is for Bill to meet Mary) - which
means there are antecedent worlds (w', x', y') where y' does not meet Mary, i.e., of
which the consequent is false. Therefore, the report in (75) would be ruled out as
false in such a scenario.
The same requirement holds for the other jussive forms, e.g., voluntatives and
promissives, which express desires that are about the speaker himself: The reported
speaker John in the promissive report Johni told Mary PR O leave-PROM, for exam-
ple, must be aware that he himself is the target of the expressed desire, i.e., that the
desire statement he made is about himself leaving (de me).
However, the desire attitude is not the only de se attitude in jussive reports, albeit
so far I have remained silent about this second manifestation." Suppose Alice says
2 7Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for bringing this to my attention.
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to Bob "The head of the department wants you to file a report", unaware that she
herself is the head of the department. It would be infelicitous to use an imperative
report Alice said to Bobi PROi file-IMP a report to describe this event in Mongolian
or Korean. Notice that this holds even though the desire attitude in this scenario
is - appropriately - de te. (I.e., Alice is obviously aware that her addressee is the
individual targeted by the request, given that she addresses Bob as you.) What we
observe here is that a jussive report is a report of wanting something oneself. The
denotation assumed for JUSSIVE captures this condition in that the content of the
jussive event (e.g., the ordering-event in (75)) is represented as a property of centered
worlds ((se) , t) (cf. the first underlined portion in the denotation of (75)) rather than
a simple proposition (st).
5.5.3 Deriving controller choice
I have established that voluntatives and promissive subjects are controlled by the
clause-external subject (agent), and imperative subjects by the clause-external object
(goal). I encoded the control relation by means of co-indexing the individual variable
inside PRO and its DP controller. Note that in my current system, however, there is
no syntactic mechanism that ensures the right type of Control. To give an example,
nothing guarantees that the voluntative subject in (76) shares an index with the
higher subject (76-a) rather than the object (76-b). How can we enforce Subject
Control and rule out Object Control for PRO[OL]? A similar question arises for the
subject of imperatives, PRO[,P, and exhortatives, PRO[EXH].
(76) a. John3 told Mary [[PRO VOL G 2 X3] leave-VOL]
b. *John told Mary3 [IPRO[VoL 02 X31 leave-VOL]
Let me state the problem more formally. Given a concept generator G for e, the
identity of the individual argument x of G has no direct semantic effect as it does
not appear in the assertion part of G. Thus supplying G2 in the voluntative (76-b)
with a variable co-indexed with the matrix object, Mary, is presupposed to return
the same function A (w', x', y') .x' for PRO[O1, as G2 applied to a variable co-indexed
with the desired controller, John as in (76-a).
I argue that the semantic system we have set up is sufficient to derive the observed
correlation between jussive type and identity of the controller (Subject/Object/Split
Control) shown in table 5.1. Let me demonstrate this using the case of the voluntative
report in (76).
The crucial ingredients are, on the one hand, condition (58-b-ii) of the definition
of concept generators and, on the other, the presupposition PRO carries, cf. (78) for
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PRO[VOL] .
By (58-b-ii), given G for an event e, for any z E Dom(G), agent(e) stands in the re-
lation G(z) to z in the centered world associated with the event (we, agent(e), goal(e)).
Thus, G2 must be s.t. [G 2]9(Mary)((we, agent(e), goal(e))) returns Mary.
At the same time, by the presupposition on PRO[voL] in (78), [G2Jg(Mary) is f,,,,
hence fG2 J(Mary)((we, agent(e), goal(e))) is agent(e). It follows that Mary must
be agent(e). However, agent(e) is in fact John in both (76-a) and (76-b)! Therefore
(76-b) is ruled out. More formally,
(77) Assume an acquaintance-based concept generator G for e as defined in (58).
a. Suppose G(z) = f,,,
b. Assume for any (w, x, y), f,, ((w, x, y)) = x (=(78-b))
c. By (77-a) & (77-b), for any z, G(z)((we, agent(e), goal(e))) = agent(e)
d. By (58-b-ii), for any z, G(z)((w,, agent(e), goal(e))) = z
e. Then, by (77-c) & (77-d), for any z, z agent(e).
(78) a. If g(i)(g(j)) = fvol, [PRO[,V,, G x3jj]]2 g(i)(g(j))(c),
else undefined.
b. f 1 = A (w, x, y) .x
5.6 Predictions and remarks
5.6.1 Locality
Most instances of de re and de se attitudes must be attributed to the local attitude
holder. This includes Obligatory Control PRO, which cannot be controlled long-
distance. Put differently, in stacked attitude contexts, the de re/de se attitude
introduced by an expression in a more deeply embedded clause must be connected
to the predicate selecting the clause and an attitude holder associated with it, rather
than to a higher attitude holder.
The potential for overgeneration is a well-known problem of aproaches that take
concept generators to be variables in the syntax: As Santorio (2014) points out,
nothing more being said, we cannot explain the apparent unavailability of a reading
created by long-distance binding of the concept generator associated with Ortcutt
(79-b).
(79) a. Ralph believes that Ramona believes that Ortcutt is a fly guy.
b. LF: *Ralph believes that [AG1 . G,(Ramona) believes that [AG 2. G 1 (Ortcutt)
is a fly guy]]
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The truth conditions of (79-b) under the assumed co-indexing, as paraphrased by
Santorio, are roughly that Ralph believes that Ramona believes that some individual
that Ramona thinks about under the acquaintance relation that Ralph uses to think
of Ortcutt is a fly guy. That this is not an attested reading is indicated by the fact
that the sentence is perceived as false in a scenario satisfying these truth conditions
such as (80).
(80) Ortcutt and Shortcutt. Ralph and Ramona see Ortcutt perform. Ralph is
impressed and says "That guy is a fly guy"; Ramona is unimpressed and
says "That guy is not a fly guy". Ralph also thinks that Ortcutt, who is
exceptionally short, is the shortest fusion drummer that they have ever seen.
Ramona disagrees: "You're wrong. Shortcutt is the shortest fusion drummer
we've ever seen, and he, differently from that guy, is fly." (Santorio 2014)
The same point can be made for jussive subjects and their controllers. Consider
the Mongolian equivalent of example (81), where the imperative subject (by way of
x 4) is bound long-distance by the matrix goal Mary, and the connected G2 is bound
long-distance by JUSSIVE 2 in the higher clause. The proposed indexing would yield
the following reading: John told Mary that he would tell Bob that he (John) wants
the matrix agent's (John's) tu, i.e., Mary(!), to leave. A corresponding reading is
unavailable in Mongolian.
(81) John, told Mary 4 [JUSSIVE 2 IPRO[vOL] G2 x1I tell-VOL Bob [JUSSIVE 3 [PRO[IMPI
G 2 x4 )] leave-IMPI]
I am agnostic about the grammaticality of corresponding jussive constructions in Ko-
rean. There is, however, evidence that Korean PRO clauses marked with keyss, whose
meaning closely resembles that of voluntatives, do indeed disallow long-distance bind-
ing. This is shown by Madigan's (2008:111) example (82).
(82) Inhol-ka Jwuhi 2-ka PRO 2 +/*1+ yeses-si-ey moi-keyss-ta-ko
Inho-NOM Jwuhi-NOM PRO six-hour-at gather-VOL-DECL-C
yaksok-ha-yess-ta-ko sayngak-ha-yess-ta.
promise-do-PST-DECL-C think-do-PST-DECL
'Inhol thought that Jwuhi2 promised PRO 2+/,+ to gather at 6.'
Locality does not fall out naturally under my current analysis. For now, an
extra condition requiring concept generator variables to be bound by the closest
abstractor would do the trick.2 8 Santorio (2014) capitalizes on this shortcoming of
28 0ne may wonder if the locality of Control falls out independently from binding requirements of
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syntactic approaches h la P&S (2003a); his proposal to handle concept generators by
way of an additional assignment parameter on the evaluation function seems to draw
much of its motivation and appeal from its capacity to circumvent this problem.
5.6.2 Accounting for different modes of presentation
I analyzed de se as a special instance of de re assuming a P&S style account of
de re attitudes. The problem addressed in this section concerns de re reports in
finite complements. As so far, my discussion of predicates as sets of events has been
limited to non-finite complementation, this requires me to say a few words about
the application of an event view to finite complements. Maintaining the assumption
that attitudes are introduced in the complement, I take the complementizer that to
function the way attitude predicates do in P&S's original account (or want in (28)),
and view that as an existential quantifier over concept generators. Its meaning is
assumed to be regulated by a syncategorematic entry (83), which is modeled after
the interpretation rule for JUSSIVE introduced earlier.
(83) [that' ]1c'9 = Ae.AG s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) EO Iqj is defined &
(iii) -Fcont(e) = [4
However, this entry is characterized by a certain shortcoming in the analysis of
de re attitudes: It is not sensitive to the choice of lexical item that the actual speaker
uses for a de re description of an individual that is the subject of someone's attitude.
To give an example, in using (83), my account attaches the same truth conditions
to all three variants of the sentence in (84) regardless of the form of the embedded
subject, which may be Leonard Bernstein, or a free pronoun he that maps to Leonard
Bernstein (imagine the speaker pointing at Leonard Bernstein), or a definite descrip-
tion the composer of West Side Story.
(84) Context: Sue sees Leonard Bernstein conduct a concert on TV but mistakes
him for Herbert von Karajan.
Sue believes that5 [G5 Leonard Bernstein/he2/the composer of West Side
pronouns in cases where they are used to spell out PRO in Korean. This does not seem to be the
case: Apart from the fact that overt realization of PRO is never obligatory, relevant items are not
actually subject to locality; caki, for example, can be a long-distance reflexive in non-PRO position,
but must be bound locally when surfacing as a PRO subject. Indexical pronouns, which also occur
in PRO postion, similarly do not require local binding outside PRO clauses.
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Story] is a world-famous German conductor.
While this equivalence is innocent in the above case, my account fails to distinguish
certain readings in other cases and may even lead to the attribution of inconsistent
beliefs. Let me illustrate this:
Sometimes instances of e-type expressions that occur in the same clause and
denote the same individual can map to different acquaintance relations. This can be
two instances of the same lexical item as in (85-a) (from Percus & Sauerland 2003b),
or two different lexical items with the same extension, as in (88). Recall that we
have encountered such "multiguise" readings before, in particular, in the context of
Charlow & Sharvit's (2014) claim that they are critical as an argument for P&S's
analysis, against competing approaches to de re.
(85) Context: John, who has a granddaughter named Liz, dreams he is Elvis.
a. John dreamed that his granddaughter was marrying him.
b. Paraphrase: In John's dream, Liz marries Elvis, who is John's dream-
self.
My account, where that introduces only one binder over concept generators as shown
in the LF (86), cannot yet derive this reading: To capture the targeted reading, the
variable he/his2 needs to be mapped to two different acquaintance relations, the
relation the attitude holder (or his alternatives) bears to the constant John (87-a)
(for he 2) and the reflexive relation, which holds between the attitude holder (or his
alternatives) and himself (87-b) (for his2). (Note that in the adopted account, each
DP in attitude contexts is accompanied by a G variable. Therefore, simply omitting
the first G in (86) is not an option.)
(86) John2 dreamed that5 [G5 his2] granddaughter was marrying [G5 him 2].
(87) a. A (w, x). John
b. A (w, x). x ( self-relation)
Santorio (2014) illustrates the same problem by way of example (88).
(88) a. Scenario: Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under two guises, as the
mayor and as a virtuoso fusion drummer. When appearing as a drum-
mer, Ortcutt goes under the pseudonym 'Tuc Trot'. Ralph is not aware
that the mayor and the virtuoso fusion drummer are the same person.
b. Ralph thinks that Ortcutt is not Thc Trot.
The desired reading makes reference to two different acquaintance relations, shown in
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(90). However, as yet the only LF I can generate is (89), where both G are bound by
the only binder available, that4. Since a given concept generator maps an individual
uniquely to an acquaintance relation, and Ortcutt and Tuc Trot do denote the same
individual, Ortcutt and Tuc Trot can either both be mapped to (88) or to (90-b) -
in the context of the sentence either option leads to the attribution of inconsistent
beliefs to Ralph.
(89) Ralph thinks that4 [G4 OrtcuttJ is not [G4 TUc Trot].
(90) a. A (w, x) . the mayor in w
b. A (w, x) . the virtuouso fusion drummer in w
Recall that this problem, however, can be overcome in a rather straightfoward way
suggested by Charlow & Sharvit (2014): We need to allow for attitude verbs to
quantify over sequences of concept generators using a type-flexible semantics for
attitude verbs (provided in (43)).
Note that Santorio's (2014) framework, on the other hand, has been designed
with the presence of multiple guises in mind: Given that Santorio assumes concept
generator variables to receive their values from a dedicated, elevated assignment,
in multiguise scenarios the e-type expressions are simply assigned distinct elevated
indices.
To resolve the issue in the context of an event semantics, we have to extend the
meaning of thate along the lines of Charlow & Sharvit's semantics for believe. I leave
the task of working out the technical details of this solution for future work.
5.6.3 Restrictions on overt PRO
As demonstrated in section 5.5.3, by using concept generators in conjunction with
a presupposition on the acquaintance relation associated with PRO, we are able to
derive Obligatory Control of the right type - provided the presupposition contributed
by PRO is specific enough. As a result, we can confirm (76-a), and rule out (76-b) as
ungrammatical. However, a well-formed LF does not entail a well-formed PF. Let me
review some of the lexical restrictions on PRO in the target languages and beyond.
As we know, a large number of languages does not allow for phonological realiza-
tion of PRO in canonical PRO constructions. Moreover, we saw that languages may
limit the option of spelling out jussive PRO as well, Mongolian being one example.
Last but not least, even in Korean the range of permitted jussive subjects is only
a subset of the set of DPs coreferent with the controller; for example, Korean does
not allow for examples along the lines of (91), where the controller DP is repeated
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to spell out PRO. It is obvious that something else needs to be said to account for
the attested range of realizations of PRO.
(91) John told Mary [pR[PRO, 1 G2 (*John)] leave-PRoM]
(91) with John as a subject might be relatively easy to rule out once we take it for
granted that only variables allow for de se readings and that R-expressions like John
cannot function as variables. In other words, (91) might be bad for the same reason
that explains the unavailability of a de se reading for (92).
(92) Context: John to Mary: "I want to leave."
??John told Mary that John wanted to leave.
As for the absence of overt jussive subjects in Mongolian in general, a simple and
descriptively adequate solution would be to associate any flavor of Mongolian jussive
PRO with the null output, see (93-a); of course, this would leave open the question
as to what underlies the difference between Mongolian and Korean PRO. In a sense,
I have started walking down a lexical route already in account of Korean overt PRO
in jussives: Recall that I explicitly associate Korean PRO with overt pronouns, cf.
(93-b); full DPs are not included as a possible spell-outs.
(93) a. Mongolian: [[voL/IMP] G a I -+ 0
b. Korean: [[PROM/IMP/ExH) G a I -+ {[overt pronoun with features of a], 0}
To derive the restrictions observed in languages like English, where PRO is always
covert, we may invoke a general condition that disallows overt subjects in non-finite
clauses.
5.6.4 Korean jussive PRO: a refinement
The presence of jussive features on PRO can be exploited to encode a possibly di-
alectal restriction on Korean overt PRO reported by Park (2018) and mentioned in
section 4.3.4: Park notes that the 3PS anaphor caki can realize jussive PRO (provided
PRO also bears a [3Ps] feature) in Subject though not in Object Control construc-
tions. In jussive terminology, this means that caki can be the subject of voluntative
but not of imperative clauses in Park's (2018) dialect. (Madigan (2008) and Park
(2011) do not have this restriction.)
The representations I assume to underlie jussive PRO offer a convenient way of
encoding this constraint: Corresponding dialects may be taken to distinguish between
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full pronouns on the one hand, and anaphors such as caki on the other in the spell-out
of jussive PRO. While regular pronouns (as opposed to anaphors) can be inserted
for any type of PRO (VOL/IMP/EXH) given agreement in q-features, cf. (94-a), there
would be a separate entry for voluntative [3PS] PRO, (94-b), which allows the output
to be either an agreeing pronoun or an agreeing anaphor, thus including anaphors
such as caki. (The addition of [3PS] is necessary to capture the unavailability of caki
as a lexicalization of PRO[OL] marked with [1/2PSJ.) The principle of selecting the
most specific entry ensures that (94-b) is chosen over its competitor (94-a) in the
case of PRO[poM][3pS]. 29
(94) a. [[PRoMI/[IMP]/[EXHI G ce ] -+ {lovert pronoun with features of a], 0}
b. [[pRom] G [3PSI ] -+ {[overt pronoun or anaphor with [3Ps] feature], 0}
5.7 Motivating a Neo-Davidsonian approach to jus-
sive reports
The analysis offered in this work exploits a Neo-Davidsonian framework, see e.g.
Parsons (1990) and Lasersohn (1995): Predicates denote sets of events. Arguments
are "severed" from the predicate and introduced by separate functional heads that
denote thematic roles, such as AGENT or GOAL. A thematic head AGENT, for example,
is assumed to have the following denotation; mutatatis mutandis for other thematic
roles.
(95) IAGENT](vt,(e,vt)) = Af(Vt).Ax.Ae. aget(e) = X & f (e) 30
2 9Interestingly, the long-distance reflexive caki only accepts subject antecedents even in dialects
that accept caki controlled by object DPs; for example, caki used as a long-distance anaphor in
(i) does not permit an object antecedent in either dialect. This divergence between uses as a
subject of jussives versus all other uses could be construed as an argument in favor of the two
being underlyingly different phenomena, in line with a PRO analysis and against a view of jussive
subjects as bound pronouns.
(i) Chelswu1 -ka Yengswu 2-eykey cakil/*2-ka kong-ul tenci-ess-ta-ko
Chelswu-NOM Yenswu-DAT self-NOM ball-ACc hit-PST-DECL-that
mal-ha-yess-ta.
tell-do-PST-DECL.
'Chelswui told Yengswu 2 that he1 /* 2 hit the ball.' (Madigan 2008:242)
30Recall that I take meta-language agent, goal etc. to be functions (ve). For example,
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Clausal complements denote the content Frcot of an event, and are selected by a
functional head in the embedded clause such as that or, in the case of jussives, the
JUSSIVE modal. Embedded clauses are of type (vt) and compose with the matrix
predicate in the same fashion as matrix DP arguments, to wit, via predicate modifi-
cation.
On the one hand, my approach contrasts with a Hintikkan semantics of attitudes
in that attitudes are designated by a functional head in the embedded clause, rather
than by the embedding verb. (I.e., it is the clausal head by means of the JUSSIVE
modal that introduces the desire attitude denoted by a jussive clause, and not the jus-
sive embedding predicate say, promise, etc.) This assumption is, of course, necessary
in a Neo-Davidsonian framework.
However, we might ask whether there are any reasons for adopting a Neo-Davidsonian
semantics in the first place, rather than a standard selectional semantics, in which
the matrix predicate itself introduces the propositional complement.31 I do not claim
that my analysis is technically necessary. However, I argue that a Neo-Davidsonian
semantics is theoretically preferable in that it reflects more aptly the semantics of jus-
sive embedding in languages like Korean, where jussive embedding is not confined to
unmarked speech predicates like say: As shown in section (27), Korean promissives
also occur under promise, and imperatives can be embedded under order and require,
among others, beside say. Importantly, though, the meaning of Korean promissives
under yaksok-ha, lit. 'promise-do', for example, is not captured if we assign to the
embedding verb the semantics of English promise, given my analysis of jussives as
desire statements: To wit, (96) does not mean that "the mother promises the child
that she wants to go to the park".
(96) Eme-nim-kkeyse ai-eykey [kongwen-ey ka-ma-koj
mother-HON-NOM child-DAT park-LOC go-PROM-C
yaksok-ha-si-yess-ta.
promise-do-HON-PST-DECL
'The motheri promised the child PROj( ) to go to the park.'
Rather than a promise of having a particular desire, such a sentence seems to denote
(i) agent(ve) = Ae.tx : x is the agent of e
3 1Note that as long as attitudes are encoded in the complement, a non-Davidsonian entry such
as (i) would be equally successful in capturing the various uses of verbs like say, which allow for
both attitude complements (potentially of various types) and non-attitude complements.
(i) [say' O]'g = Ax.]G for x s.t. x made an utterance in world(c) whose content is [#19i_-G
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a simple speech event whose content is a desire statement. However, to distinguish
promise from unmarked mal-ha 'say(-do)', I tentatively suggest that Korean yaksok-
ha 'promise' incorporates the meaning of say along with an additional semantic
component modifying the meaning of say. Though I am agnostic as to the exact
nature of this additional component contributed by promise, for the sake of the
argument, let us assume that Korean promise adds to the meaning of say that the
speaker, agent(e), takes on a commitment.
Note that Korean promise consists of a nominal expression yaksok 'promise, ap-
pointment' and a light verb ha 'do'. The proposed semantic components can thus
be taken to have syntactic counterparts. I propose a decompositional analysis along
the following lines.3 2 (I assume that ha, when combined with certain nouns such as
yaksok, denotes an act of speaking, along the lines of say, rather than a simple action
do. 33 )
V(Vt)
(97) N(vt) V(,t) Ae. [ha (e) & [yaksok (e) =
I I I Ae: e has an agent. say(e) & agent(e) takes on a
yaksok ha .U commitment
Assuming that a description of the contribution of nominals in light verb construc-
tions as instances of modification is appropriate, a Neo-Davidsonian framework al-
lows for modification much more transparently than alternative views; note that in
an approach that assigns to speech predicates selectional properties, we would need
to resort to additional mechanisms such as Chung & Ladusaw's (2003) predicate
restriction to allow for modification of the above type.
5.8 The problem of identifying jussive embedding
environments
Only a small set of predicates has been found to embed jussives in Korean and
Mongolian, with the class of jussive embedding predicates being slightly larger in
Korean than in Mongolian: While in Mongolian, say accounts for the vast majority
of instances of jussive embedding, Korean jussives are also featured under the verbs
'promise', 'order', 'persuade', 'propose', a.o, though most of them are limited to
32 Thanks to Martin Hackl, p.c., for stimulating discussion and help spelling out this idea.
33 0f course, this raises the question as to what the contribution of ha is in the case of mal-ha
'speech-do, say'.
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embedding one type of jussive (i.e., promissive, imperative, or exhortative).,3 4 This
poses the question as to what determines whether a predicate is able to embed
jussives? Note that this question is not specific to the languages investigated in
this work and similarly arises for other languages that have been found to permit
embedded imperatives.
Given that JUSSIVE as proposed in my analysis comes with certain presupposi-
tions on the events it denotes, the unavailability of jussives under certain predicates
such as believe, regret, realize could be viewed as a consequence of presupposition
failure due to the lack of a goal argument. However, other CP-embedding predicates
such as explain, write to do supply a goal argument, and yet are incompatible with
jussive complements.
Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) addresses the limited distribution of embedded
imperatives in Slovenian adopting Kaufmann's (2012) approach: Kaufmann (2012)
observes that imperatives can only be used felicitously in contexts that result in
performative uses of a modal verb; she implements this restriction in terms of pre-
suppositions triggered by the imperative. Though an analysis along these lines is
sure to eliminate certain environments from the list of candidates for jussive embed-
ding, it does not seem to provide a complete account of the observed distribution:
On the one hand, there are hard-to-explain differences between languages; consider,
for example, the fact that the verb for 'promise' selects for promissive/voluntative
complements in Korean but not in Mongolian.15 On the other hand, also within a
language there is variation that seems to defy purely semantic or pragmatic explana-
tions: For example, it is hard to come up with a reason that explains why say but not
write to can select for jussive complements. This suggests that only by adding cer-
tain lexical stipulations we will be able to achieve descriptive adequacy regarding the
distribution of embedded jussives. The question where to encode such restrictions
- in the entries for verbs or in the entry for JUSSIVE - would then seem especially
relevant in my account, which attributes more power to the PRO clause (by letting it
impose presuppositions on the matrix event and, crucially, decide controller choice)
than standard accounts. For now, I remain agnostic as to the right response to this
question.
"As mentioned before, I do not, however, claim that the list of jussive embedding predicates
cited in this work is exhaustive.
35 0f course, for this argument to be complete, we would ultimately have to show that promissive
and voluntative carry comparable sets of presuppositions and, moreover, that the verb 'promise' is
similar in all relevant respects in the two languages.
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5.9 Unembedded jussives
My analysis has been developed as an analysis of embedded jussives, however, as I
argue, it can be used to inform our understanding of unembedded jussives as well.
The section at hand explores this idea and shows how my analysis can be enhanced
to also yield an account of root occurrences of jussives.
Recall that in my analysis, jussive phrases JussP - which in embedded contexts
are wrapped in a semantically empty CP - constitute properties of events (vt). In
embedded contexts, jussive clauses compose with the speech predicate of which they
are a complement via predicate modification, yielding a modified set of events. This
set of events is subject to the same subsequent mechanism as other declarative clauses,
which I take to involve existential closure at the Aspect level.
I have not addressed the question as to what happens if a jussive clause stands
in a matrix environment. I suggest to exploit a line of thought found in Speas &
Tenny (2003), Hacquard (2006), Miyagwa (2017), Baker (2017), a.o., and propose
that a speech event is represented syntactically via an event pronoun e* at the root
of a sentence.' The speech event pronoun e* has the crucial function of saturating
the open event argument of unembedded jussives."
The remaining structure is identical to the structure of embedded jussives. A
representative LF of a Korean matrix imperative is provided in (98-b).
(98) a. Ney-ka cemsim-ul mek-ela.
you.SG-NOM lunch-ACC eat-IMP
'Eat lunch!'
36Note that these authors associate speech events with their own syntactic projection, which also
contains representations of the discourse participants. The assumption of a speech act projection
has been motivated by pragmatic and discourse phenomena with morphosyntactic reflexes such as
evidentiality, allocutive agreement, indexical shift, among others. In many implementations, the
head of the speech act projection is assigned a clause-typing function: Depending on the assumed
typology of sentences, it may mark a clause as one of several sentence types, such as declarative,
interrogative, jussive, a.o. In Hacquard (2006), illocutionary force is provided by the speech event
pronoun e*. I do not commit myself to any specific assumptions regarding the clause-typing role
of e*. Morevover, I remain agnostic as to the existence of a full-fledged speech act phrase, and the
range of processes it may be involved in.
37 Cf. Hacquard (2006:144f.) for a similar assumption of a default speech event e*, which binds
free event variables in its scope.
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b.
e* JUSsP(Vt)
TPt Juss0
JUSSIVEs
5
PROe (et)
[IMP]
G5 Ax 2
(ece) [2Ps]
ney-NOM To
t2 eat lunch jftttfltte]
-ela
Analogous to embedded jussives, complex PRO contains a concept generator variable
G, which is bound by the JUSSIVE modal, as well as a variable of type e. This
individual variable is left free in matrix jussives, unlike in embedded cases, where it
is bound by the controller DP. Crucially, my semantics, by virtue of the feature on
PRO, ensures the right reference for this variable: The same mechanism that allows
embedded PRO to determine its controller forces the free variable inside matrix PRO
to refer to the speaker in voluntatives and promissives, to the hearer in imperatives,
and to the unit of hearer and speaker in exhortatives; any other way of resolving its
reference woud lead to a contradiction.
This is illustrated below for the imperative in (98-b): The definition of a concept
generator G for e* requires that the agent(e*) stand in the acquaintance relation
G(g(4)) to g(4) in w,* (see first box). Moreover, the presupposition on PRO[,mp]
presupposes that G map its free variable sister to fip (see second box). Taken
together, the two equations yield that g(4) is goal(e*), i.e., the addressee of the
jussive utterance.
Recall that Korean matrix jussives, similar to embedded jussives, allow for PRO
to be overt. In such cases, the free variable and its features predictably surface as a
iPS pronoun in promissives and exhortatives, and as a 2PS pronoun in imperatives.
(99) [(98-b) C?9 - 1 iff e* has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct).
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t
3G s.t. G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e*
(= G(g(4))((we*, agent(e *), goal(e*))) = g(4) )
& G(g(4)((we*, agent(e*), goal(e*)) = goal(e*) I
(by presupposition on PRO, that G(g(4)) fp)
& Fcont(e*) A (w, x) .V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) = TPM5 ((W', X'+,G))]
= 1 iff Tcont(e*) = A (w, x) .V(w', X, y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) = y' eats lunch in w'
Regarding the presupposition contributed by JUSSIVE, part of it is straightfor-
wardly satisfied given the nature of speech events: Any speech event e* has an agent
- the actual speaker, and content - in the case of jussives, the proposition expressed
by JussP. Moreover, assuming that a jussive can be felicitously directed at oneself, in
such contexts the speaker would satisfy the goal and agent presuppositions simultane-
ously. Though I am ignorant as to the actual distribution and felicity of self-directed
jussives in Korean and Mongolian, note that my theory predicts the different jussive
forms to be subject to free variation in such contexts: As the agent and goal would
both map to the speaker, the various forms would be identical in meaning.
The semantics provided above raises one obvious question: It is no different from
the type of meaning assigned to declaratives and could be read as an assertion that the
content of my speech act is that I want you to eat lunch. In other words, the derived
semantics and illocutionary force resembles that of descriptive modal statements and
falls short of accounting for the necessarily performative nature of imperatives. The
following chapter addresses this shortcoming: Following Kaufmann (2012), I enhance
the semantics of the JUSSIVE modal by a set of presuppositions whose role is to limit
jussives to performative uses.
Before closing this section, let me briefly address the role of e* outside jussives,
specifically, in declarative sentences 38 : I take event predicates in declarative clauses
to be closed existentially on the level of AspP, located between vP and TP. In contrast
to matrix jussives, declaratives hence do not have an open argument slot for e* to fill.
I remain agnostic as to any other functionse* may have in the semantic derivation
of declaratives.
38Discussion of other clause types such as interrogatives is outside the scope of my work.
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5.10 Conclusion
The first part of this chapter was devoted to an analysis of the jussive subject in
Mongolian and Korean, which I took to be a version of PRO. Recall that my objective
was to account, above all, for three facts about jussive subjects observed in embedded
environments: (i) Embedded jussive subjects have an antecedent in the higher clause,
whose identity, defined in terms of its thematic role, is relative to the form of the
embedded jussive. (ii) Jussive subjects are interpreted de se. (iii) Jussive subjects
exhibit q-features in Korean, where they can be overt.
My analysis of PRO is a take on Percus & Sauerland's (2003) analysis of de
re DPs in attitude contexts and adopts the idea found in Anand (2006), Santorio
(2014) of analyzing de se as a special case of de re. In P&S account, DPs in attitude
contexts are always accompanied by a concept-generator variable G (of type (e, ce)
in my implementation), which maps individuals onto acquaintance relations. The
semantics of attitude verbs is adjusted correspondingly, and attitude verbs are viewed
as existential quantifiers over concept generators G. In section 5.2.1 I reviewed these
assumptions including the definition of concept generators and showed how they
successfully account for de re readings in belief reports.
Given this background, section 5.2.2 turned to the derivation of de se attitudes
as a special instance within the general domain of de re attitudes. I assimilated the
jussive subject to standard PRO and overt de se pronouns as analyzed in Anand
(2006) and Santorio (2014): All of them were assumed to consist of an individual
variable x along with a concept generator variable G. Addressing property (iii) as
well as part of property (i) above, I took x inside PRO to be bound by a DP - its
"controller" - in the matrix clause. Like regular pronouns, x carries 0-features and
agrees in those features with its matrix binder. I showed how de se on PRO (as on
other pronouns) can be derived via a presupposition on G(x): G(x) must map to
the self-acquaintance relation holding between a centered world and its individual
center.
In section 5.3 I added context to jussive PRO: I introduced the JUSSIVE modal as
the carrier of jussive semantics, along with the idea that the same modal (and hence
modality) is present in all jussive subtypes. The first task confronted in this section
was caused by my view that attitude and speech predicates are sets of events, and that
attitudes are introduced inside the complement clause as the content of these events:
A reduction of attitude predicates to sets of events required reformulating P&S's
concept generators from concept generators for individuals to concept generators for
events. I showed what such a reformulation may look like.
The subsequent discussion centered on the JUSSIVE modal as the silent modal
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operator that provides all jussives with their illocutionary force. JUSSIVE takes the
role canonically assigned to attitude verbs. Fitted into P&S's framework, this means
that JUSSIVE is an existential quantifier over concept generators and also introduces
the "jussive" attitude - which I take to be bouletic.
The difference between the jussive subtypes - voluntatives (or promissives in Ko-
rean), imperatives, and (in Korean) exhortatives, I claimed, is limited to a difference
in features on PRO: Different features presuppose subtly different acquaintance rela-
tions as the value of G(x), which ultimately translates to different Control relations:
Subject (speaker), Object (hearer) or Split (speaker e hearer) Control. Section 5.4
outlined the three different flavors of jussive PRO needed to derive this variation.
A full derivation of an imperative report in section 5.5.1 was followed by a demon-
stration in section 5.5.3 of how the presupposition on jussive PRO leads to Control
being of the right type.
Finally I turned to the question of matrix jussives. To reconcile the proposed
analysis with matrix jussives, I argued for the presence of a speech act projection
SaP at the root of the sentence with the following make-up: Silent Sp* and HR*
arguments represent the discourse participants, and an event pronoun e* stands for
the utterance event. The event pronoun e*, I suggested, saturates the open event
predicate denoted by the jussive clause; Sp* or HR*, moreover, fulfills the function
of the controller and binds the variable inside PRO.
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Chapter 6
Refining the modal analysis of
jussives
6.1 Introduction
Jussives are performative speech acts: Intuitively, by uttering a jussive, the speaker
changes what the world (or, on a narrower level, the utterance context) is like. A
complete theory of jussives thus cannot stop at a denotational semantics for jussives:
It also needs to specify how this denotation is used to update the context (see von
Fintel & Iatridou 2017 for a concise summary of the desiderata involved in analyz-
ing imperatives). Different theories of imperatives vary primarily in the assumed
division of labor between semantics and pragmatics: How much of the meaning and
performative function of imperatives is encoded semantically, and how much of it is
derived in the pragmatic component?
Two major lines of approaches can be distinguished: In "semantic" approaches,
the meaning and force of imperatives is largely a product of their denotation. Schwa-
ger (2006); Kaufmann (2012), representing this line of inquiry, derives the specific
force of imperatives from a covert modal whose presuppositions ensure a performative
use of imperative clauses. In "pragmatic" approaches, on the other hand (cf. Port-
ner 2004, 2007), imperatives are assigned a rather minimal denotation and obtain
their distinguishing force from the specific type of contextual update they perform:
Imperatives update the To-Do-List of the addressee, while other speech acts update
other discourse components.
As laid out in previous chapters, I opt for a modal analysis of imperatives and
other jussive forms in Mongolian and Korean, in line with Kaufmann: Jussive force
is associated with a covert modal JUSSIVE, which is uniformly present across jussive
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clauses. My choice was determined, to a large extent, by the fact that a modal
approach seems better fit to deal with embedded occurrences of imperatives than an
alternative pragmatic approach. Crni- & Trinh (2009) and Stegovec & Kaufmann
(2015) demonstrate the compatibility of a modal analysis with embedded imperatives
in English and Slovenian, respectively.
Note that the semantic treatment given to jussives in the preceding chapter,
so far, fails to encode their performativity: In my analysis, jussive clauses merely
make an assertion about the jussive speaker's desire state. In the chapter at hand,
I confront this shortcoming and attempt to enhance the semantics of the JUSSIVE
modal with the ingredients necessary to derive the performative effect of both matrix
and embedded jussives. Following Crni6 & Trinh (2009) and Stegovec & Kaufmann
(2015), I adopt the approach developed in Schwager (2006); Kaufmann (2012), who
ties the performativity of jussives to a set of presuppositions introduced by the covert
modal.
My analysis relies, to a large extent, on the properties characterizing prototypical
imperatives across languages. Though I do address a few data points regarding
Mongolian voluntatives, in general, the elicited data is insufficient to draw detailed
conclusions about the nature of the modality and force associated with Mongolian
jussives. Moreover, addressing the details of Korean jussive modality would exceed
the scope of this work. Hence, my focus will mainly be on outlining the predictions as
well as the limitations of a presuppositional approach to jussive force when combined
with my analysis.
Recall that I assume imperatives and other jussive forms to involve a uniform
modal JUSSIVE. A crucial challenge will therefore be to phrase the presuppositions
carried by JUSSIVE in a way that would be suitable for both voluntatives and imper-
atives.
I conclude this chapter with a review of an alternative, pragmatic approach to
imperatives as offered by Portner (2004, 2007). After outlining the central proper-
ties of Portner's analysis, I address the problems his view faces in the analysis of
embedded occurrences of imperatives.
6.2 Some background on a modal analysis of imper-
atives (Schwager 2006, Kaufmann 2012)
Schwager (2006); Kaufmann (2012) compares imperatives to priority modals used
performatively. Formalizing this idea, she assumes that all imperative clauses are
characterized by the presence of a covert modal operator OPImp, which contributes
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the specific force of imperatives. As imperatives typically express directives, Kauf-
mann suggests that, among modal expressions, the universal priority modals should
and must most closely approximate the meaning of imperatives.
However, while modal verbs can be used descriptively as well as performatively,
imperatives are limited to the latter option.
Descriptive modality is connected to assertions: Sentences containing descrip-
tive modals describe what the world is like with respect to what is permitted or
commanded (Kaufmann 2012).
(1) DESCRIPTIVE MODALITY (Kaufmann 2012: 58)
a. Peter may come tomorrow. (The hostess said it was no problem.)
b. You should do the shopping today (as far as I know).
Performative modality, on the other hand, is associated with non-assertoric utter-
ances. Intuitively, utterances with performative modals change rather than describe
what is permissible or required. (In (2) through (4) I have replaced must in Kauf-
mann's (2012: 58) original examples with should, which seems more amenable to a
performative reading.)
(2) PERFORMATIVE MODALITY
a. Okay, you may come at 11. (Are you satisfied now?)
b. You must call me!
The analogy drawn between performative modals and imperatives is backed by cer-
tain parallels in behavior. For one, the truth value of performatively used modals
and imperatives seems to be inaccessible, i.e., doesn't seem to be up for discussion.
(3) a. A: You shoud really empty the trash! B: #No, that's not true.
b. A: Empty the trash! B: #No, that's not true.
Moreover, performative modals and imperatives alike are at odds with the speaker
expressing a definite belief as to whether the prejacent is true or false.
(4) a. Sam should really go to confession (#but he is not going to/ #and he
will).
b. Go to confession (#but I know you won't go/ #and I know you will).
Performative modals and imperatives both seem to require the speaker to endorse
the prejacent 0, in the sense of the speaker assenting to the proposition that it is
advisable that $.
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(5) a. Sam should really call Mary (#but in fact I don't think that's advisable).
b. Call Mary! (#but I don't want you to do that).
The alternation between descriptive and performative uses of modals may be con-
ditioned by contextual factors. Imperatives, on the other hand, seem to only be
felicitous in contexts that would give rise to the performative reading of a modal. To
account for this limitation, Kaufmann suggests that imperatives by way of OPimp
come with certain presuppositions which ensure that the context is of the right type.
In the next section, I present a reduced version of her presuppositional analysis
and consider the modifications necessary to reconcile it with the event-based view
adopted in this work.
6.3 A presuppositional analysis of the JUSSIVE modal
Syntactically embedded jussives in Mongolian are also semantically embedded: In
jussive reports, jussive force is interpreted relative to the reported context rather
than the actual context.
As evidence that jussive reports assert the occurrence of a performative speech
act rather than forming performative speech acts of their own, recall that embedded
jussives can occur in matrix questions; in fact, wh-dependencies between the embed-
ded clause and a matrix question operator were used as one of the main diagnostics
to ensure the syntactically embedded status of jussives. The compatibility of embed-
ded jussives with interrogative semantics is a clear sign that the illocutionary force
of embedded jussives modifies the reported context, not the actual context: Interrog-
ative semantics was shown to be at odds with the force of voluntatives in Mongolian
at the very beginning of this work, cf. (6); though I have no positive evidence, I take
the same to hold for imperatives.
(6) *Bi gata togl-iy-iiii?
I outside play-VOL-Y/N
Intended: 'Do I want to play outside?/ Shall I play outside?'
An adequate analysis thus needs to be able to relativize the performativity of jussives
to the reported context.
As noted above, the availabla data is too sparse to allow for definite and detailed
conclusions about the nature of jussive force in Mongolian. Therefore as a null
hypothesis, which is consistent with the collected data, I take Mongolian imperatives
to share the core properties of imperatives across languages, including the properties
illustrated for English in the previous section. I discuss the presuppositions Schwager
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(2006); Kaufmann (2012) develops to address these properties (also adopted by Crni6
& Trinh 2009) and review ways to implement these presuppositions into my analysis
of jussive clauses as sets of events. I also address the question as to what these
presuppositions amount to in the context of voluntatives.
Suppose Mongolian voluntatives and imperatives are like English in that their
truth value is not up for discussion and their truthfulness hence cannot be disputed
(shown for English in (3)). Kaufmann (2012) captures this effect by a presupposi-
tion EPISTEMIc AUTHORITY: It is shared belief between speaker and hearer of an
imperative event that the speaker has a privileged epistemic position regarding the
conversational background used to interpret the imperative. In other words, it is
agreed upon that whatever the speaker believes to be the conversational background
is in fact the conversational background.
What does this condition translate to in my entry for JUSSIVE? Recall that
different from Kaufmann's (2012) semantics, where the conversational background is
an argument of the imperative modal, the conversational background in my analysis
is lexically specified as the set of propositions corresponding to the expressed desires
of the speaker, i.e., as a kind of bouletic background (cf. the underlined portion in (7)).
Though in the end a fixed conversational background could well turn out to be overly
simplistic, I stick with the assumption for the remainder of this work. As Kaufmann,
however, points out, a bouletic background is naturally "speaker-authoritative" by
virtue of describing a non-realistic attitude state of the speaker. Note that for my
analysis this hence means that a corresponding presupposition becomes obsolete in
the case of JUSSIVE: EPISTEMIc AUTHORITY of the speaker comes for free given
the proposed denotation.
(7) JUSSIVE' Jc,9 = Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct).
-3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) j[/AJ- is defined &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A(w, x). V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and addressing y' is
compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) => [# N ((wx y))]
The fact that the speaker of an imperative must be epistemically open to both
outcomes regarding the prejacent (illustrated for English in (4)) is implemented as a
presupposition of EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY in Kaufmann (2012). Let us consider a
simplified version of this presupposition, given in Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015), (8).
(8) EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY(C):
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Given an imperative utterance 'OPmp (you) P' in context c,
before the utterance of the imperative, both [P1c(Ac) and -,I[P c(Ac) are
epistemic possibilities for Sc,
where Sc and Ac are speaker and addressee in context c.
What does this presupposition translate to in my entry for JUSSIVE? I propose the
following semi-formal formulation. In Kaufmann's (2012) original formulation, un-
certainty regarding the prejacent holds of a pre-context c' immediately preceding the
utterance context c. Crnie & Trinh (2009), who constitute a precedent for a presup-
positional analysis of imperatives in an event-based semantics, translate Kaufmann's
pre-context to pre-event, i.e., the event immediately preceding the imperative event.
I adapt their proposal by relativizing uncertainty to the jussive event e itself - uncer-
tainty is taken to hold at-the immediately preceding e; however, I remain agnostic
as to the precise formalization of this circumstance.
(9) EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY(e): 1
JJUSSIVE' 0/cg - Ac :
3 (w', x', y') 3 (w", x", y") : being x' in w' addressing y' and being x" in w"
addressing y" is compatible with agent(e)'s beliefs in world, at the time right
before e & [0]" ((w', x', y')) & -, /](xy+
Crucially, my version of EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY does not distinguish between vol-
untatives and imperatives. This means that I predict voluntatives to share a property
typical for imperatives: By my analysis, a voluntative Let me leave! or Let's leave!
is only felicitous if, before the utterance, the speaker is uncertain as to whether she
or her group would leave or stay. Note that the infelicity of the following Mongolian
voluntatives could be taken as preliminary evidence in favor of the prediction that
EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY extends to voluntatives: A voluntative about becoming
president (10) is infelicitous if uttered by someone under 18, as the speaker is ex-
pected to know that she cannot and won't become president at that age. Similarly,
the speaker of (11) of course knows that she cannot and won't fly; her utterance is
infelicitous as it violates EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY.
(10) Bi jurongxilogch botl-iy
I president become-VOL
'Let me become president.'
a. 01I am an eligible candidate announcing that I will run for president.
'In (9) as well as (18), I abstract away from how to achieve binding between G introduced by 3
in the assertion part of JUSSIvE and G in the presupposition.
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b. #I am under 18.
(11) #Bi nis-iy
I fly-VOL
#'Let me fly.'
Let us continue and explore the relevance of the third observation made for perfor-
mative modals and imperatives in English in the previous section: (5) showed that
the speaker has to be willing to affirm the prejacent for an imperative utterance to
be felicitous. Note that, in my analysis, this property seems to be entailed by the
desire proposition asserted by JUSSIVE q. I argue that an additional presupposition
encoding this restriction would therefore be redundant.
Importantly, the felicity conditions discussed above are all anchored to the agent
(speaker) of the jussive event and her attitudes. In other words, they are not sensitive
to the target (subject) of the jussive, which, as we know, varies across jussive forms.
We can hence think of these conditions as general conditions on JUSSIVE clauses.
Do the above conditions fully capture the specific force of jussives? I would like to
address two additional properties characterizing voluntatives and (directively used)
imperatives.
First, the speaker of a jussive does not simply express a desire: By uttering a
voluntative, the speaker seems to commit herself to the realization of the prejacent
0; analogously, by uttering an imperative, the speaker imposes an obligation on (i.e,
seems to commit) the addressee to the realization of 0.
Secondly, the prejacent q has to be a possible course of action for the target of the
jussive. This is not the same as the prejacent being an epistemic or circumstantial
possibility: An event may be epistemically and circumstantially possible but not
under the control of its main participant; unaccusative predicates describe events of
that kind. To illustrate, talking to a twelve-year old boy, it may be compatible with
my beliefs and the circumstances that as an adult, he will be six feet tall. Moreover,
addressing a friend who always plays in the lottery, it should indeed be compatible
with my beliefs and the circumstances that he wins. Still corresponding directives
are infelicitous: Becoming six feet tall or winning the lottery is not an action the
addressee can opt to take.
(12) a. #Become six feet tall!
b. #Win the lottery!
The same two properties seem to hold for Mongolian voluntatives. While the infelicity
of a voluntative about becoming president (13) in context (10-b) could be captured
by EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY, we cannot yet explain its infelicity in scenario (13-b)
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where I simply have no concrete plan to act on my proposal.
(13) Bi jurongxilogch botl-iy
I president become-VOL
'Let me become president.'
a. OKI am an eligible candidate announcing that I will run for president.
b. #I have no intention to act correspondingly.
Furthermore, the prejacent must correspond to an action the target of the voluntative
can choose to realize. This is exemplified by the infelicity of (14): It is not within
the power of the speaker to achieve the result of winning in the lottery.
(14) #Sugalaa khoj-iy
lottery win-VOL
#'Let me win the lottery.'
I suspect that imperatives in Mongolian are subject to the same two constraints.
Note that these constraints are not accounted for given my current semantics for
JUSSIVE, which assigns to it the meaning of a bouletic modal: The bouletic modal
suffix -meer in Mongolian as well as English would like to (though, interestingly, not
want) freely combine with the propositions that were infelicitous as prejacents in the
imperatives and voluntatives above, cf. (15).
(15) a. OKbi nis-meer baina
I fly-DESID COP
'I feel like flying.' (... that's how good I feel)
b. I would like to take off and fly.
c. I would like to win the lottery.
How can we capture the commitment to realize the prejacent that is imposed
on the target of a jussive, and what explains the limitation of jussives to prejacents
whose realization is within the power of the jussive target? To account for these
properties in the context of imperatives, we can refer to a presupposition proposed
in Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015): Stegovec & Kaufmann, following Kaufmann (2012),
assume that imperatives in context c presuppose ADDRESSEE PRACTICALITY of C,
defined in (16) and split into multiple subconditions. 2
(16) ADDRESSEE PRACTICALITY(c):
2 Kaufmann (2012, 2014) uses a more elaborate version of this presupposition labeled ORDERING
SOURCE RESTRICTION.
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(i) c is Ac-practical,
(ii) c has decisive modality3 , and
(iii) [P]c(Ac) provides an answer to the salient decision problem for a, -a
(i.e., it eliminates at least one cell of ril).
(17) A context c is a-practical iff
(i) 11, is a decision problem for a, written H' (each cell: a future course
of events that a could choose);
(ii) gc is prioritizing (specifies rules, preferences, or goals).
Let us focus on two of the three subconditions in (16), (i) and (iii): By (i), c is
practical for the target - the addressee A, - of an imperative in c, and by (iii) the
prejacent IP]c(Ac) addresses a decision problem for A,, in other words, (by (ii) in
(17)), [P]C(Ac) selects one action out of a set of possible actions for A,.
The imperatives in (12) fail this presupposition in that becoming six feet tall,
winning the lottery, or flying do not correspond to any future courses of events
whose coming about the addressee (in principle) has control over (as required by (i))
and, hence, do not narrow down any decision problem the addressee is faced with (as
required by (iii)). We thus derive the limitation to choosable actions. I argue that
the same presupposition simultaneously accounts for the commitment component
of imperatives; however, I postpone a demonstration of this point and provide the
relevant argument below, where I discuss ways of generalizing the presuppoition to
apply to both voluntatives and imperatives.
Note that the restrictions observed for English imperatives (12) and Mongolian
voluntatives (10) and (14) are restrictions on the attitude or capabilities of the target
' A context c has decisive modality iff c is a-practical for some agent a and CS, entails that f,
and g, jointly characterize the modality considered relevant to resolve fl'. The authors explicitly
omit a definition of what it means for f and g to jointly characterize the decisive modality, but offer
some conditions that are entailed by it, stated in (i) below.
(i) If f, and gc jointly characterize the modality considered relevant to resolve 11", this entails
that
a. If a is S or A, then for any q e rl', a tries to find out if f',9q.
b. If a is S or A, then a will try to realize q if a believes that Lf'9q.
c. If S (or A) believes that Of'9q, then it is not the case that S (or A) wants that ,q.
According to Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015), a context is a septuple c = (S, A, w, CS, H, f, g), with S,
the speaker, A, the addressee, wc the world in which the context is situated, CSc the context set (the
set of possible worlds compatible with mutual joint belief for purposes of ongoing conversation of
all actual participants, Stalnaker 1978), rIc the question under discussion, represented as a possibly
trivial partition of CS,, f, the salient modal base, and g, the salient ordering source.
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of the jussive - which is the addressee in the case of imperatives, but the speaker in
the case of voluntatives. Crucially, ADDRESSEE PRACTICALITY as defined above is
anchored to the addressee and its scope thus confined to imperatives. As I surmise
that the infelicity of the voluntatives in (14), however, is of a similar nature as the
infelicity of the English imperatives in (12), it would be desirable to weaken the
presupposition and turn it into a more inclusive condition of PARTICIPANT PRACTI-
CALITY holding for both jussive forms at the same time; a more general presuppo-
sition would also be in accordance with the underspecification of JUSSIVE regarding
its target.
Let me consider such a reformulation. I propose that JUSSIVE presupposes the
PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY of the events it denotes, as defined in (18). Differ-
ent from the original presupposition, however, PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY leaves
the individual subject to the decision problem open between agent(e) and goal(e).
The presupposition is split into three subconditions, which correspond, roughly, to
the three subconditions of Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) ADDRESSEE PRACTICAL-
ITY(c) above (referenced in parentheses in (18)). Since the conversational back-
ground of JUSSIVE is lexically specified as bouletic, decisive modality (Stegovec &
Kaufmann's (2015) (ii)) can be shortened to a condition that bouletic modality is
suitable to resolve the decision problem ((ii) below).
(18) PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY(e):
JUSSIVE 01c,9g Ae :
(i) 311" of type (c, (ct)) s.t. UH' is a decision problem in world(e) for a
and a is agent(e) or goal(e) (each cell: a future course of events whose
coming about a (in principle) has control over), (Stegovec &
Kaufmann 2015: c is Ac-practical)
(ii) f characterizes the modality relevant to resolve r0'
(for any (w, x, y), f((w, x, y)) := A (w', x', y'). being x' in w' and ad-
dressing y' is compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c)),
(Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015: c has decisive modality)
(iii) /4gi-G((world(e), agent(e), qoal(e))) is an answer to fl.a
(Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015: answerhood)
The merits of subcondition (ii) in (18) can only be appreciated once we under-
stand what it means for a conversational background to resolve a decision problem.
Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) mention several things that are entailed by this notion
(see fn. 3); I focus on two of them: If a is agent(e) or goal(e), by (19-a), a tries to
find out, for any possible answer 0 to a's decision problem, if 0 is desirable, i.e., if
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Df@. If a believes that !fV is the case, by (19-b), ce will try to realize V).
(19) If f characterizes the modality considered relevant to resolve I6,, this entailse,a'tienal
that
a. If a is agent(e) or goal(e) then for any V, E H , a tries to find out if
OL'9,.
b. If a is agent(e) or goal(e), then a will try to realize 0 if a believes that
The last part is important and explains the commitment imposed on the target of
a jussive. Let me illustrate this for imperatives. I assume that, in the case of an
imperative event, it is the addressee of the imperative (the goal(e)) who is faced
with a decision problem.4 The addressee will believe that the prejacent 4 of the
imperative is necessary (recall that the truth of the desire statement made by an
imperative is not up for discussion). Hence, by (19-b), the addressee will try to
realize 0. I propose that this captures the fact that the addressee is subjected to an
obligation if an imperative is uttered.
My proposal raises a general question: What exactly is the semantic structure of
events, and how rich can we assume it to be? While it is relatively uncontroversial
to associate events with participants such as agent and goal, this is less clear for
my assumption that events also specify a decision problem (viz., a question under
discussion); note that the latter is typically a property of contexts. I put this question
aside as an issue to address in future work.
4This is a presupposition in Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) account (by way of (16)(ii) in con-
junction with (17)(i)). As I would like to retain a general JUSSIVE semantics, I cannot set a to
goal(e) (corresponding to the jussive addressee) in the presupposition. However, it seems that in
many cases assigning to a the alternative value agent(e) would lead to failure of a different pre-
supposition, namely, condition (iii) in (18), upon utterance of an imperative: Suppose the decision
problem at e is whether agent(e) will go home or not. It seems infelicitous to utter an imperative Go
home! - which would target the goal(e) - in this scenario. Can we correctly predict the infelicity?
I argue that we can: An imperative Go home! would violate condition (18)(iii), which requires that
the proposition goal(e) go home (the meaning computed for j'i ] G ((agent(e), goal(e), world(e)))
in the context of the imperative sentence) address the decision problem whether the speaker will
go home - which it fails to do. Therefore, the presupposition is failed and Go home! is correctly
predicted to be infelicitous in this context.
However, Irene Heim (p.c.) points out that (19) may still be too permissive: Suppose the speaker's
decision problem is whether or not to invite the hearer, and he utters the imperative 'Be invited by
me!'. This imperative seems infelicitous, but the above hypothesis fails to make this prediction.
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6.3.1 The projection behavior of the performativity presup-
positions
We have seen that sentences containing an embedded jussive clause do not constitute
performative speech acts of their own, but have the properties of declarative clauses.
The analysis put forward above is in accordance with this fact as long as we allow for
the presuppositions on e to be locally accommodated below the existential closure
operator at the root of the clause. Granted local accommodation, the presuppositions
become part of the operator's nuclear scope and are asserted as properties holding
of the jussive event. This is shown below.
(20) [Tom ordered Bill [meet Mary IMP JUSSIVEIc'9 = 1 iff
3e : EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY(e) & PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY(e) &
order(e) & ...
Root jussives, however, are performative speech acts. The analysis developed
in the preceding chapters was incomplete insofar as it was not able to derive this
component and did not distinguish imperative utterances from descriptive modal
statements. The presuppositions proposed in this chapter are devised to add the
missing piece.
Recall that root jussives were taken to be statements about the actual utterance
event. Compositionally, this involved the assumption of a covert speech act projec-
tion SaP, with one of its constituents a silent pronoun e* representing the utterance
event. e* was taken to saturate the open argument position of JUSSIVE. Given this
background, the newly introduced presuppositions will apply to the utterance event
e * and, through mediation by e *, to the discourse participants agent(e *) and goal(e*)
Should the presuppositions be failed, the jussive will be rendered infelicitous.
(21) [e* meet Mary IMP JUSSIVEcg I iff
EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY(e*) & PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY(e*) &
Fcont(e*) = ...
6.3.2 Summary
Let me summarize the conclusions reached in this section. I enhanced the semantics
of JUSSIVE with two additional presuppositions EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY and PAR-
TICIPANT PRACTICALITY, building on proposals in Kaufmann (2012) and Stegovec
& Kaufmann (2015): By EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY, [O JUSSIVE] presupposes that,
before the jussive event, both []J and -i#]j are epistemic possibilities for the speaker
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of the jussive. Moreover, by PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY, roughly, the jussive pre-
jacent must address a decision problem (a question under discussion) tied to e. On
the one hand, PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY guarantees that the jussive is about an
action whose coming about can be controlled by the target of the jussive - a property
that holds, for example, for playing in the lottery but not for winning the lottery. On
the other, PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY also derives the commitment to act that a
jussive imposes on its target.
The updated JUSSIVE entry is provided below.
(22) JUSSIVE 0c19 =Ae :
a. Presupposition: e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type (ct) &
EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY)(e) & PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY(e).
b. Assertion: ]G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) H0 9'-G is defined &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A(w, x). V(w', x', y') [being x' in w' and address-
ing y' is compatible with the expressed desires of x in world(c) ->
In the next section, I review the main features of an alternative, semantically min-
imal analysis of imperatives as offered by Portner (2004, 2007) and briefly describe
the difficulties it has handling jussives in embedded environments.
6.4 Against a minimal semantics for jussives
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, analyses of imperatives vary in
the degree to which imperative force is attributed to their semantics as opposed to
post-semantic processes. As discussed in detail above, Kaufmann's modal approach
to imperatives, which is the approach adopted in this work, assumes a rather rich
semantics for imperatives: Imperative force is the contribution of a silent modal
operator together with a set of presuppositions it comes with, which ensure the
performative use of the modal. On the other end of the spectrum is Portner's (2004,
2007) analysis: Semantically, imperatives constitute mere properties. Their distinct
illocutionary force is the result of the specific pragmatic mechanism properties (as
opposed to other semantic entities) are subjected to.
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6.4.1 Portner's (2004; 2007) analysis of jussives
Let me outline some of the details of Portner's proposal. The proposal is based on
the assumption that a Discourse Context C is universally comprised of (at least)
three discourse components: the Common Ground CG (a set of propositions), the
Question Set Q (a set of sets of propositions), and the To-Do List function T (a func-
tion from individuals to sets of properties). To-Do-Lists record for each discourse
participant the set of properties they are publicly committed to attaining; not be-
having accordingly is judged as irrational (cf. Kaufmann 2014 on Portner 2007).5 A
plain imperative Sit down! expresses the property of sitting down. The target of the
imperative, which is the addressee, is encoded as a presupposition on the individual
argument.
(23) [Sit down!] = Aw.Ax: x = addresseec. x sits down in w
Imperatives q#imp are associated with the pragmatic function (Kaufmann (2014) calls
it a condition of use) in (24), which adds [Oimp] to the To-Do-List of the addressee,
T (addressee).6
(24) Where C is a context of the form (CG, G, T),
C + Oimp = (CG, Q, T[addressee/( T(addressee) U {f imp]})I)
A similar rule can be devised for jussives with targets other than the addressee:
As Portner (2004) explains, a promissive, for example, would be taken to denote a
property presupposed to hold of the speaker and, correspondingly, would modify the
To-Do-List of the speaker (or else lead to infelicity). 7
5 Specifically, the role of To-Do Lists is to impose an ordering on the worlds compatible with the
Common Ground, (i). This ordering determines what actions an agent is committed to taking, by
the principle in(ii). (Portner 2007:358)
(i) Partial ordering of worlds:
For any w1, w2 E nCG and any participant i, wl <i W2 iff for some P c T(i), P(w 2 )(i) = 1
and P(wi)(i) = 0, and for all Q E T(i), if Q(wi)(i) = 1, then Q(w2 )(i) = 1.
(ii) Agent's commitment:
For any participant i, the participants in the conversation mutually agree to deem i's actions
rational and cooperative to the extent that those actions in any world wi E nCG tend to
make it more likely that there is no W2 E nCG such that w 1 <i w2.
6 Note that this is a simplified version: Portner's (2007) final rule involves an additional parameter
h as the salient selection function in a context C. h provides the conversational background for the
interpretation of jussives.
7 Portner is not explicit as to whether he assumes other jussive forms such as promissives to be
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6.4.2 Embedded jussives in Portner's (2007) analysis
Are embedded occurrences of imperatives and other jussives amenable to Portner's
analysis? Portner (2007), addressing Korean embedded jussives, argues that they are.
He proposes a syncategorematic treatment of jussives embedded under verbs of saying.
For example, imperatives embedded under say are subject to the interpretation rule
in (25): The contextual update initiated by an imperative under say applies to a
context C compatible with the content of the reported speaker S's utterance to hearer
H. The condition on the resulting context is a proposition, which can be used to
update the CG component of C. (Updating CG is the canonical function Portner
assigns to declaratives as sets of propositions.)
(25) iS say to H kimp= {w: C is a context representing what [S says to [H
in w & C + i.f = C}
Let me make a few remarks regarding this treatment of embedded jussives. First,
a potentially problematic feature of the rule in (25), as noted by Kaufmann (2014),
is the fact that say acts like a monster and induces a shift to the reported context to
update To-Do-Lists there. As she points out, we therefore lose access to the actual
context, which would be needed to interpret strict indexicals. This is a relevant con-
cern for jussive-embedding languages where no or only selected indexicals can shift.
Korean, Mongolian, and Slovenian, among others, are all of that type: They lack
indexical shift yet their compatibility with embedded jussives needs to be accounted
for.
One of my main tenets was to capture the de se interpretation of embedded
jussive subjects. In its current form, Portner's analysis does not account for this
component. Let me try to illustrate this point. In discussing the connection between
performative modal statements and imperatives, Portner (2007) remarks that must
used performatively adds a property to (someone's) To-Do-LIST.8 Assuming that
must can have that function also with respect to To-Do-LISTS for third person
subjects, then if A (thinking he is talking to C) says to B, "B must sit down", the
property of sitting down should become part of B's To-Do-LIST. Although it is
not entirely clear to me how to read the rule in (25), my understanding of Portner's
analysis is that A said to B [sit-IMP down] should be intended to be true by this rule
(in other words, the proposition denoted by this imperative report should be part of
regulated by a separate rule. It seems desirable to ultimately have a uniform rule that covers all
cases.
8 Though according to Portner, updating a To-Do-LIsT is never the sole function of an overt
modal, i.e., performative modals are not functionally equivalent to imperatives.
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the Common Ground) since, given the reported Discourse Context C, the reported
addressee's To-Do-LIST T(addresseec), which corresponds to T(B) in our example,
would indeed contain the property [Ax. x sits down] (i.e., C+ [Ax : x is addresseec.x
sits down] = C would be true).
Taking a step back, Portner's interpretation rule for imperatives makes reference
to "what the reported speaker said to the reported hearer" but not to the reported
speaker's attitude. In the current set-up, establishing the truth of an imperative re-
port mostly involves looking at the To-Do-LiST of the reported hearer T(addresseec)
and checking whether or not the update of T(addresseec) with, for example, the prop-
erty of sitting is reflected in the reported Discourse Context C "representing what
the reported speaker said to the reported hearer". It seems that under this approach,
the only way to prevent imperative reports from felicitously reporting non-de se at-
titudes would be at the level of the original utterance: In the case of an original
utterance "B must sit down" of A to B, the update of B's To-Do-LIST itself would
need to be blocked given that the speaker relates to his addressee as a third person.
To sum up, it appears that in Portner's current model significant additions would
be necessary if we were to take a shot at encoding the de se property of imperative
reports.
Another point of criticism regards the limitation of the current rule to the pred-
icate say. As Portner (2007) already indicates by providing a separate rule for im-
peratives under order (which he takes to make the additional semantic contribution
of specifying the selection function as deontic), we would supposedly need multiple
rules to interpret jussives under different embedding predicates.
Finally, the rule in (25) seems technically deficient: C in this rule is an unbound
variable. It is unclear if it corresponds to Portner's Discourse Context index C, and
what the relationship is between C and worlds w in this rule.
Based on the difficulties an analysis a la Portner has in dealing with embedded
jussives and given the preliminary success of a modal analysis in handling them, I
conclude that choosing the latter is in the interest of our theory. Ultimately, of course,
a fair and complete comparison would need to pay more attention to the derivation
of the illocutionary force of imperatives in a modal analysis: The presuppositional
account laid out in this chapter is but a tentative sketch, which would need to be
solidified and proven to be fully workable before we can declare the matter settled.
In the preceding discussion I have ignored so-called "weak" uses of imperatives ex-
pressing acquiescence (26-a) or indifference (26-b).
138
(26) von Fintel & Iatridou 2017
a. A: It's getting warm. Can I open the window?
B: Sure. Go ahead. Open it!
b. Go left! Go right! I don't care.
Imperatives in such uses resemble possibility statements. Their existence therefore
creates obvious problems for analyses that tie imperatives to an underlying neces-
sity modal. At the same time, such uses seem suggestive of approaches that leave
imperative force unspecified by assigning to them a minimal, non-modal semantics.
While in the past, weak imperatives have indeed been used as an argument against
a modal approach and in favor of a minimal semantics for imperatives, Oikonomou
(2016) shows that this argument may be flawed and demonstrates that imperatives
whose modal force fluctuates are in fact amenable to a modal treatment provided
one crucial innovation: The modal associated with imperatives must have existen-
tial force. To account for the default, obligation reading of imperatives, Oikonomou
(2016) proposes to resort to pragmatic strengthening by way of exhaustification.
Oikonomou's (2016) argument carries over to my analysis: Nothing in my ac-
count hinges on the JUSSIVE modal being a universal operator. Therefore, the same
innovation could be used to save my modal account should we encounter weak uses
of jussives. I currently lack knowledge regarding the availability of weak readings
of jussives in Korean and Mongolian. Attempts to elicit judgments for Mongolian
imperatives uttered in contexts that are characterized by speaker acquiescence or
indifference remained inconclusive. However, as weak uses are cross-linguistically
common, it appears important to point out that my analysis can, in principle, be
reconciled with such uses.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I addressed the illocutionary force of jussives in English and Mon-
golian, and dicussed possible ways of deriving their force under a modal approach
to imperatives. I hypothesized that Mongolian voluntatives and imperatives behave
similar to English imperatives, and suggested that their performativity can be bro-
ken down to, at least, the following five properties: (i) Their truth value is not up
for discussion, (ii) they require the speaker to be uncommitted before the utterance
as to whether or not the prejacent is true, (iii) they are at odds with the speaker
expressing a lack of approval regarding the prejacent, (iv) they are limited to propo-
sitions whose coming true can be effected by the jussive target, and (v) they impose
an obligation (a commitment to act) on the jussive target.
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Given that these properties are not inherent to the semantics of a regular modal,
Kaufmann (2012) adds them in the form of presuppositions contributed by the im-
perative. Adopting her proposal, I proposed two presuppositions EPISTEMIC UN-
CERTAINTY(e) and PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY(e), which JUSSIVE imposes on its
event argument. EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY was taken to account for property (ii),
and PARTICIPANT PRACTICALITY for property (iv) and (v) above. Property (i) was
argued to follow automatically from the fact that the speaker, as the holder of a
bouletic attitude, is an authority on the truth of the asserted modal proposition.
Moreover, property (iii) - the desirability of the prejacent - seems to be entailed by
the semantics of JUSSIVE and therefore does not require a separate presupposition.
In the final part of this chapter, I outlined some of the features of Portner's (2004,
2007) pragmatic approach to imperatives. I discussed his treatment of embedded
occurrences of imperatives and pointed out several shortcomings, which led me to
dismiss his analysis in favor of a modal analysis.
More work would need to be done both in the empirical and the analytical domain
to complete the analysis started in this chapter. On the one hand, the collected
Mongolian data is too sparse to allow for in-depth conclusions about the semantics
and specific usage conditions pertaining to Mongolian jussives. More research would
be necesary to fill this gap and test whether the proposal put forward in this chapter
in fact makes the right predictions. By adding Korean jussives to the picture, we
could create a further benchmark against which to test and potentially refine the
proposed analysis. A more thorough investigation of the semantics and use of Korean
promissives and exhortatives would, furthermore, help us settle the question as to
whether the parallel drawn between those forms and Mongolian voluntatives is indeed
warranted.
From an analytical point of view, several issues omitted in my sketch would need
to be addressed by a fuller version of my account: First, note that my proposal makes
heavy use of the event argument of JUSSIVE, and attributes to events a rather rich
internal structure. The presuppositions were stated as presuppositions on events as
opposed to contexts in Kaufmann's original proposal. The semantics assigned to
JUSSIVE made it necessary to tie to events most of the components that are typically
associated with contexts. Apart from the rather uncontroversial assumption that
events have participants, I thus also made the more contentious claim that events may
be connected to a question under discussion (a decision problem). Substantiating
this claim by way of independent evidence would be desirable.
A more rigorous discussion would, further, have to fix a technical imprecision in
the representations of the added presuppositions and show how to achieve binding
of the concept generator variable G mentioned in the presupposition, whose binder
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is introduced in the assertion component of the JUSSIVE modal.
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Chapter 7
Previous accounts of embedded
jussives: Korean and beyond
I characterize approaches to jussives and their embedded occurrences along three
dimensions, to wit, (i) the syntactic and semantic properties associated with the
jussive subject, (ii) the derivation of jussive force, and (iii) the properties of the
embedding context and how it interacts with the semantics of the lower clause.
Regarding the first dimension, relevant questions concern the interpretation of
the subject - crucially, while in Korean, the subject is dependent on the embedded
context, this is not obviously the case in Slovenian -, its featural make-up, and the
derivation of its de se semantics.
As for the second dimension, we have seen in the preceding chapter that ap-
proaches to jussive force roughly split into two classes: Semantic approaches to
jussive force take jussives to be covert modal elements. Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015)
follow this route in their analysis of Slovenian, from which my work has drawn impor-
tant insights. Pragmatic approaches, on the other hand, couple a reduced semantics
for jussives with more specific assumptions about their illocutionary force, commonly
framed as their context update potential. An application can be found in Pak et al.'s
(2008b) and Park's (2011) analysis of Korean.
7.1 Korean
I discuss two proposals addressing Korean jussives and their embedded occurrences,
to wit Pak et al. (2008b), and Park (2011); though Park (2011) closely follows Pak et
al. there are some differences in her implementation, which are worthwhile spending
some time on.
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7.1.1 Pak et al. (2008a,2008b)
Covert subjects in jussives are analyzed as silent indexical pronouns equipped with
corresponding features [lPs] or [2Ps], respectively. Features constrain the domain of
the pronoun by way of a presupposition h la Heim & Kratzer (1998).
Jussive subjects enter into an agreement relation with a dedicated functional head
Jussive, which carries the h-features of a shiftable indexical. Different features are
spelled out by the three familiar jussive particles, cf. (1).
(1) a. Jussiveh -+ /-ma/
b. Jussive hiftable:2  -
c. Jussivehifable:1+2 ] -+ /- ca/
The only difference between promissives, imperatives, and exhortatives consists in
the person features associated with them. As outlined earlier (section 4.2), Pak et
al. justify a unified view of jussives based on behavioral parallels in various domains,
including identity in the marking of negation, incompatibility with evaluative and
evidential particles as well as with temporal marking, and the ability for different
jussives to undergo coordination. (Recall that my decision to treat Korean jussives as
different forms of the same underlying category was inspired by Pak et al.'s argument
to that effect.)
Jussive subjects are taken to enter into an agreement relation with the Jussive
head, as shown below. (XP stands for any functional projection that may intervene,
such as Aspect or negation.)
(2) JussiveP
XP Jussive0
vP X
DP[0
VP V0
Recall that Korean jussives allow for both overt and covert subjects. A central
claim is that covert but not overt indexicals are shiftable in Korean. This derives
the distribution of overt subjects in embedded jussives (see section 4.3.4 for details):
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Even in the presence of matching person features, in embedded jussives an overt
indexical such as nay, marked as [unshiftable:1], is compatible with a Jussive head
[shiftable:1] only if the referent of Jussive coincides with the referent of the strict
first person indexical. This is because [shiftable:1J refers to the reported speaker,
while [unshiftable:1] refers to the actual speaker. Hence either the reported speaker
is the actual speaker, or the result is semantically inconsistent. In matrix jussives,
the difference between shiftable and unshiftable features is taken to be semantically
obsolete.
Pak et al. follow Portner (2004, 2007) in assuming that jussives form one of three
clause types, along with declaratives and interrogatives. The force of jussives is
tightly connected to their clause type status as a separate clause type. Recall from
section 6.4.1 that Portner (2004, 2007) assumes that a Discourse Context is made
up of three discourse components: the Common Ground (a set of propositions), the
Question Set (a set of sets of propositions), and the To-Do-List function (a function
from individuals to sets of properties). The illocutionary force associated with a
clause type is defined by the way it manipulates the Discourse Context C: Declar-
atives, which are propositions, update the Common Ground, interrogatives - sets
of propositions - update the Question Set, and jussives, taken to denote properties,
update the To-Do-List of a discourse participant. As alluded to earlier, the person
features in jussive clauses dictate whose To-Do-List this update is performed on by
imposing a presupposition on the individual argument of the property denoted by
the jussive: For example, a Jussive head marked with a first person feature (i.e.,
what we called a 'promissive') restricts the individual argument to the speaker.
Zanuttini (2012:1265) provides a formalization of the property semantics assumed
by Pak et al. (2008b): The Jussive head is viewed as an abstraction operator, which
binds the argument it agrees with (the jussive subject), reminiscent of Chierchia's
PRO.1 , A JussiveP in a promissive clause, for example, will have the following mean-
ing.
(3) Jussive[111 3 [vP Pro[lps)3 . . Ax : x = speakerc. [vP]lu 3 -x],c
Conditions of use, which are post-semantic rules, regulate the update process
for each clause type. As discussed in section 6.4.2, the interpretation of embedded
jussives is derived via a syncategorematic interpretation rule.
I formulated my critique of Portner's framework and how it handles embedded
jussives in section 6.4.2. As all points of criticism also apply to jussive embedding
in Korean, among other languages, I refer the reader to that section for further
'This idea is already alluded to in Pak et al. 2004, but never fully worked out.
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discussion of the proposal.
Moreover, by treating the jussive subject as a regular pronoun, Pak et al. are
forced to assume a new category of covert indexicals that can shift. As I have made
clear before, such a move seems undesirable.
7.1.2 Park (2011)
Park, following Portner (2007) and Pak et al. (2008b), takes jussive subjects to enter
into an agreement relation with a Jussive head that carries person features. Jus-
sive clauses involve obligatory abstraction over the subject and consequently denote
properties; the person features carried by the Jussive head impose presuppositions
on these properties.
Park's (2011) analysis differs from Pak et al. (2008b) in how she derives the
dependent interpretation of jussive subjects: Putting forward a proposal made by
Baker (2008), Park holds that first and second person pronouns (overt as well as
covert) receive their interpretation through binding by a Speaker or Addressee op-
erator OPsp and OPAd, in a Perspectival/Speech Act projection Sp/AdrP located
between CP and JussP (or between CP and a corresponding functional projection in
declaratives).
(4) [CP [Sp/AdrP OPSP3 JussP [TP prO[1ps]3 T0 I Juss ] Sp/Adr0 CJ
t I
The following assumptions are made to account for the dependent interpretation of
jussive subjects: (i) The Speech Act projection Sp/AdrP projections can occur in
embedded position. (ii) Sp/AdrP varies in the operators it contains, and embedding
verbs can select for a specific variant (regardless of the intervening CP). (iii) First and
second person pronouns are bound by the closest operator matching their features,
in line with Baker's (2008) Person Licensing Condition (5-c). 2
(5) Person Licensing Condition (PLC)
a. A DP/NP is first person only if it is locally bound by the closest c-
commanding S [= OPsp], or by another element that is first person.
b. A DP/NP is second person only if it is locally bound by the closest c-
commanding A [= OPAdr], or by another element that is itself second
person.
2Baker introduces this condition to account for optional indexical shift in Amharic, Zazaki, and
obligatory shift in Slave, a.o. Optionality is taken to be apparent and arises if an embedding verb
has both a context-shifting and a non-shifting lexical variant.
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c. Otherwise, a DP/NP is third person.
However, though much attention is paid to the derivation of the right antecdent for
the jussive subject, its de se property remains unaccounted for in Park's analysis.
Different jussive embedding verbs select for different Speech Act projections, cf.
(6); this derives the selectional restrictions of predicates regarding the jussive forms
they may embed. In cases such as say, which allows for jussive complements of all
three types (6-d), the flavor of Sp/AdrP is taken to be contextually determined.
(6) a. Verbs of commitment (e.g., yaksokha- 'promise'): select for {OPsp}
b. Directive verbs (e.g., meynglyengha- 'order'): {OPAdr}
c. Verbs of suggestion (e.g., ceyanha- 'propose'): {OPSp(DOPAdr}
d. Verbs of communication (e.g., malha-'say'): { OPsp, OPAdr, OPspeOPAdr}
Park's (2011) hypothesis involves some unconventional assumptions: The Speech
Act operators Opsp and OPAdr themselves seem to require binding, unless they are in
the root clause. They may either be bound by a higher DP, or the next-higher opera-
tor of their own type; the appearance of shifted indexicality arises if the highest link
in the binding chain is a DP whose person features do not match the person features
of the operator(s) it binds. Given that operators are not normally bindable, however,
this approach raises the question what type of object these operators constitute. 3
Some additional assumptions are necessary to derive the fact that overt indexicals
are strict indexicals: Park adopts Pak et al.'s view that overt indexicals carry a
feature [unshiftable], while covert indexicals are [shiftablej. It is implied that these
features are able to determine further binding of the operator which itself binds the
indexical, yet the details of this mechanism are not spelled out. The envisioned
outcome is that shiftable indexicals allow for their antecedent operator to be bound
by higher DPs of any person, while unshiftable indexicals are claimed to limit the
binding operator to being bound by one or a chain of higher matching operator(s).
Park's (2011) analysis does not offer additional insights into the derivaton of
jussive force. Moreover, although the de se interpretation is demonstrated to be
a distinguishing property of jussive subjects, no attempts are made at capturing it
semantically.
3Baker (2008) speaks about operators being controlled rather than bound by a higher operator
or DP, and refers to Koopman and Sportiche (1989) and Adesola (2005), who deploy the concept
of controlled logophoric operators to account for logophoricity in Abe and Yoruba, respectively.
147
(Baker 2008:126)
7.1.3 Further accounts: Madigan (2008), Zu (2018)
Madigan (2008) focuses on providing a typology of Obligatory Control (OC) con-
structions in Korean, though his analysis remains largely syntactic. Madigan views
jussive marking as an instance of mood marking, whose presence is characteristic of
Korean OC complements: Korean is commonly taken to lack unmarked OC akin to
infinitival OC (see also Park 2018). I do not provide the details of Madigan's account
here, as this would exceed the scope of my work. However, ultimately, it would be
worthwhile to explore to what extent my analysis can also handle non-jussive Control
in Korean. I leave this as a task for future work.
Zu (2018), in her recent dissertation, provides a differentiated view of de se phe-
nomena in a variety of languages, which includes a proposal for embedded and unem-
bedded jussives in Korean. Parallel to my proposal, Zu's account assimilates jussive
subjects to OC PRO under attitude verbs. Her analysis successfully derives both
the featural make-up of jussive subjects and OC PRO, and their de se interpretation.
However, the implementation is different: Zu assumes a feature geometrical approach,
which involves a highly articulated left periphery. This includes a projection repre-
senting a perspectival center, dominated by a series of Sentience projections that
mirror an implicational hierarchy of different types of semantic relations (knowledge,
responsibility, and internal perspective) that may hold between the perspectival cen-
ter and the reported event and its participants. The function of concept generators in
my analysis is transferred to those Sentience projections. Unfortunately, the recency
of Zu's thesis, published after large parts of my own work had already been written,
prevents me from doing full justice to her account in this work.
7.2 Slovenian (Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015)
Slovenian (addressee-directed) imperatives 4 can be embedded under say (8), as well
as in restrictive (9) and non-restrictive relative clauses. 5 Imperatives embedded under
say are introduced by a complementizer da.
(7) Pospravi sobo!
tidy-up.IMP.2.SG. room!
'Tidy up your room!'
4Though Slovenian also has directive speech acts targeting the speaker ("first person imperatives"
in Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015), Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) investigation is limited to addressee-
directed imperatives.
'Imperative embedding in relative clauses is cross-linguistically rarer than in speech reports;
Ancient Greek (Medeiros 2013) is another language allowing for imperatives in relative clauses.
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(8) Mama je rekla, da pospravi sobo!
mom is said.FEM.SG that tidy-up.IMP.2.SG room.ACC
'Mom said that you should tidy up your room!'
(9) Na mizi so vsi clankii, ki jihi preberi do jutri.
on table.LOC are all papers.NOM that them read.IMP.2.SG by tomorrow
'All the papers that you should read by tomorrow are on the table.'
Slovenian embedded imperatives differ in one central respect from embedded jussives
in Mongolian and Korean: The (covert) imperative subject remains anchored to the
actual speech context rather than being relativized to the reported speech context.'
This, of course, restricts the range of directive situations that can be featured in
imperative reports: The actual addressee of an imperative report is always also the
target of the original, reported directive, cf. (10). (Note that, as seen in (10), the
reported directive can be a modal statement targeting a third person. 7 : As expected
of genuine instances of indirect speech as opposed to quotes, faithful imperative
reports may be mere paraphrases of the reported utterances.)
(10) Context: Paul says to John, "George should really listen to you." John turns
to the target of Paul's directive, George, and passes on Paul's directive.
Paul mi je rekel, da me poslugaj!
Paul me.DAT is said that me.ACC listen.IMP.2.SG
'Paul said to me that you should listen to me!'
Unlike in Mongolian and Korean, the imperative subject in Slovenian may hence be
a strict indexical pro[ 2ps], which is also the analysis Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) opt
for.
(11) [pro[2PSJC 8Addresseec8
At the same time, Slovenian resembles Mongolian and Korean in that the (perfor-
mative) force of an embedded imperative is interpreted against the reported speech
6 The same holds for all temporal and spatial indexicals in Slovenian.
7For example, the reported utterance could have involved an overt deontic modal:
(i) George bi te moral poslugati.
George would you.Acc should listen.INF
'George should listen to you!'
8 Recall from the previous chapter that expressions are evaluated relative to contexts c, which
are tuples designating a world, speaker, addressee, a variable representing mutual joint beliefs, a
question under discussion, a salient modal base, and a salient ordering source.
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context: In other words, imperative-reports are assertions of performative speech
acts rather than performative speech acts of their own, and the deontic or bouletic
attitude they express is an attitude of the reported and not the actual speaker. To
illustrate, in (8) it is mom who wants the addressee to tidy up his/her room, and
not the actual speaker.
The simultaneous dependence of embedded imperatives on two contexts creates
a particular set of challenges for Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015).
Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) follow a modal route to imperative meaning; their
assumptions, based on Kaufmann (2012), have been reported in much detail in the
preceding chapter. Recall that in their account, the imperative modal comes with a
series of contextual presuppositions, which equip imperatives with their characteristic
performative force.
The context targeted by the majority of presuppositions is the embedded con-
text9 : To wit, the relevant (shared) beliefs and questions (addressed by EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY and EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY) are tied to the reported discourse par-
ticipants, and so are the deontic attitude and its conversational background. How-
ever, the subject as a strict indexical is evaluated against the actual context. The
conclusion is that both the actual and the reported contexts must be accessible in
the computation of the embedded imperative clause.
The pursued strategy can best be appreciated by considering the entry given
to the imperative operator, which is a shiftable indexical at the same time as a
universal modal quantifying over contexts i (type k); note how both the evaluation
context c and a context argument i are available and deployed in saturating the
different presuppositions. In embedded imperatives, these presuppositions are locally
accommodated, in line with the non-performative nature of imperative reports.
(12) [OPrmp = Aik.AP(k,t): EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY(i) & EPISTEMIC UNCER-
TAINTY(i) & ANSWERHOOD(C) & DECISIVE MODALITY(i). Vh[wiRf-9iwh ~>
p(h) = 1] (Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015: 633)
To grant embedded imperatives access to multiple contexts, Stegovec & Kaufmann
(2015) adopt a modification of a proposal by Sudo (2012). I shall briefly summarize
the involved components: Slovenian say (13), analyzed as an attitude verb, is a
context shifter: Note that its accessibility relation is anchored to wi rather than
we. However, no expression ever overwrites the actual context as the evaluation
parameter; this allows for the existence of strict indexicality in the scope of context
9An exception is ANSWERHOOD, i.e., the presupposition that the prejacent be a possible action
for the addressee, which can be shown to hold of the actual context.
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shifters. Instead, expressions take context arguments (as seen in (12) and (13)), and
context shift is induced through binding of context pronouns.
(13) Jrekel 'say' ' = Aik.Ap(kt).Ax.Vj compatible with what x says in wi: p(j) = 1
(ibid.:632)
Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) stipulate that context shift only takes place through
binding of context arguments by attitude predicates.10 say, being an attitude pred-
icate, hence qualifies as a context shifter and can bind the context argument of
OPImp." (14) illustrates the structure assumed to underlie imperative reports.
(14) [Ah [John [say h] [Ai that [[OPImp i Aj [PO[2p ] [listenI
7.2.1 Predictions and remarks
Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) semantics does not seem to enforce a de te attitude
of the speaker towards the embedded subject: Though Slovenian say quantifies over
contexts as complex entities which, among others, specify speaker and addressee, the
jussive subject as a strict indexical only allows for a de re interpretation.
Consider the following non-de te scenario. Suppose Alice gets to talk to her em-
ployee Bob in person for the first time. Unaware that she is talking to Bob, she says
to him: "Bob should contact Cesar". Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) semantics pre-
dicts that an eavesdropper could remind Bob of Alice's directive using an imperative
report (15) - regardless of the fact that Alice as the reported speaker does not hold
a de te attitude towards Bob as the imperative subject.
(15) Alice said to you [OPImp prO[2ps] contact Cesar]
Luka Crni6 (p.c.) informs me that a corresponding usage is in fact ungrammatical.
This indicates that Slovenian jussive reports impose the same de se requirement on
the relationship between the speaker and the embedded subject as similar reports in
Mongolian and Korean. In its current form Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) account
fails to capture this fact.
I would like to raise another interesting case involving ignorance on the part of the
reported speaker. Imagine the following situation: Alice believes that her employee
101n other words, whenever context pronouns are not bound by an attitude predicate, they are
indexed to the top-most context binder.
"To rule out that OPimp's context argument is indexed to the top-most binder when in the
scope of say, Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) hypothesize a ban on vacuous quantification or a more
specific locality condition as in Percus (2000).
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Cesar is sick and has stayed at home for the day. She is aware that some employee
is currently in the break room having lunch and really needs someone to help her
new employee Dora getting oriented (a task originally assigned to Cesar). She says
to Bob, "The person in the break room should really help Dora". Alice is unaware
that the person in the break room is in fact Cesar, who, contrary to her beliefs, has
come into work. Note that Alice wants Cesar to help Dora is true of Cesar de re
but not de dicto in this scenario. Would it still be felicitous for Bob to relay Alice's
directive to Cesar in the following way?
(16) Alice said to me [OPImp prO[ 2P5] help Dora]
My interpretation of Stegovec & Kaufmann's (2015) account is that, again, we predict
this report to hold true of the described scenario, though at first glance the scenario
may appear to violate one of the presuppositions imposed on the reported context i
by the imperative: To wit, by EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY(i), both the prejacent and
its negation must be epistemic possibilities for the reported speaker (Speakeri) before
the imperative is uttered (see section 6.3 for a discussion of this presupposition). The
prejacent is pro[2Ps] helps Dora, which, given the strict reading of pro[2Ps, translates
to the actual addressee helping Dora.
Is it compatible with Alice's utterance that both the actual addressee helping
Dora and the actual addressee not helping Dora are epistemic possibilities for Alice?
It certainly seems so: The fact that Alice does not believe that Cesar de dicto should
help Dora goes unnoticed in the given approach.
It would be important to know if the derived predictions are empirically adequate,
or if the assumed de re semantics for the imperative subject needs to be changed
and the subject made sensitive to doxastic alternatives after all, analogous to PRO.
To conclude this chapter, let me add that the observed variation in the nature of the
jussive subject generates an interesting question: Note that once we admit the possi-
bility that imperatives have a pronominal subject in some languages (e.g., Slovenian),
and a PRO subject in others (e.g., Mongolian and Korean), we need to examine how
this distinction may be acquired. As far as we have seen, matrix imperatives do not
betray which of the two structures is underlying. Evidence from embedded impera-
tives would consequently be pivotal for children to extrapolate the right analysis.
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Chapter 8
Extending the analysis of jussives to
canonical Obligatory Control
constructions
In this chapter I propose that my analysis of jussive reports may also offer a new
perspective on regular Obligatory Control (OC) constructions. I explore the question
to what extent an analysis that parallels my account of jussive reports in all major
respects is simultaneously able to capture the range of properties associated with OC
constructions.
Recall that my analysis of jussive reports has the following crucial characteristics:
(i) Jussive clauses have a structurally complex PRO subject. The de se interpretation
of PRO and the choice of PRO's controller is secured by a presupposition on PRO.
The variation in controller choice across jussive forms is the result of feature varia-
tion on PRO, which results in subtly different presuppositions. (ii) Jussive clauses
involve an additional functional projection JussP above TP. JussP is headed by a
modal JUSSIVE, which quantifies over concept generators G and binds the G variable
inside PRO. (iii) Predicates, including predicates of speech, denote sets of events,
and the desires expressed by jussive clauses constitute the content of those events.
Composition of a predicate with its arguments proceeds via event modification.
I propose that the built of canonical OC contructions may be very similar: (i)
Their PRO subject is complex and comes in at least two flavors, marked by features
[SUBCON] and [OBJCON]. These features map to presuppositions, which simultane-
ously secure PRO's de se interpretation' and determine the choice of controller as
'As Landau (2018) points out, this statement needs to be qualified: Against common belief,
there are instances of OC PRO under non-attitude verbs such as start, be able to, which lack the
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the matrix agent ("Subject Control") or the matrix goal ("Object Control"). In anal-
ogy to jussive clauses, the choice of controller is thus relocated from the embedding
verb (in traditional accounts) to the PRO complement. (ii) The attitude denoted
by (intensional) OC complements is introduced inside the complement by a comple-
mentizer CONTROL in C, which maps events to their propositional content. Like
JUSSIVE, CONTROL quantifies over concept generators and denotes a set of events
whose content is expressed by the TP. Note that CONTROL is therefore reminiscent
of that analyzed as a set of events with attitude content, which we discussed in ear-
lier chapters. (iii) In keeping with a Neo-Davidsonian semantics, I take the Control
verb to compose with the PRO clause (as well as with its other arguments) via event
modification. In the course of my discussion, I will make certain refinements and
additions to this inventory.
The OC phenomena addressed in this chapter are divided into two classes: The
first part of this chapter 8.2 is devoted to OC verbs whose complement involves
complex PRO and covers Subject and Object Control constructions, as well as so-
called psychological causatives such as convince and persuade. The second part,
section 8.3, introduces OC verbs whose complement can be argued to be smaller and
lack a subject. In this section, I consider extensional Control verbs and how they
fit in my analysis. Moreover, I offer a brief discussion of how their restructuring
behavior speaks in favor of the proposed analysis.
As suggested by this division, a central goal of this chapter is to demonstrate
that complex PRO as defended in this work is the only type of PRO subject across
different types of OC: OC clauses either have this type of subject, or they lack a
subject altogether (thus bringing us back to Chierchia's (1989) proposal).
The assumption that OC PRO is complex, and that its de se property derives
from a presupposition on a concept generator inside the PRO clause is congruent
with accounts of OC PRO found in Santorio (2014) and Landau (2018) and has
been anticipated by Anand (2006). At the same time, my analysis differs from pre-
vious accounts of OC in its other assumptions: Both Santorio as well as Landau rely
on a more traditional propositional (Hintikkan) semantics for attitude complements,
where the attitude is selected by the embedding predicate and composition corre-
spondingly proceeds via standard functional application. Though an account of this
type, which combines the assumption of complex PRO with a Hintikkan semantics
for Control verbs, has already been outlined in section 5.2.2, I will remind the reader
of its detail in the next section.
de se property. Landau's analysis is geared towards accommodating this difference. I ignore this
complication in the main part of my analysis but will return to this issue in section 8.3.
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8.1 Reminder: Obligatory Control in a Hintikkan
semantics for attitudes
As discussed in detail earlier in this work, the joint appearance of two properties on
OC PRO - its de se interpretation and the presence of 0-features - is an argument
for analyzing PRO constructions as a special case of de re reports in the manner of
Percus & Sauerland (2003a). Before I outline my novel take on OC constructions, let
me recap how OC would be analyzed in a Hintikkan semantics for attitude reports
using the example of Subject Control want in (1) (corresponding to the derivation
of (29) in section 5.2.2).2
(1) [TP Mary3 [T' wants 2 [TPt [pRo, G2(ece) X3(e)] to win the competitionl]
Recall that in a selectional framework, the attitude verb, want quantifies over concept
generators G for an attitude holder x.
(2) want' qJc'g = Ax.3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for x in world(c) &
(ii) pi-+G is defined &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in world(c)
(3) a. If g(2)(g(3)) = fself, f[Ro G2 X 3 ]"9= g(2)(g(3))(c), (by ICG)
else undefined.
b. felf= A (w, x).x
(4) [Mary 3 wants 2 [PRO G2 X3 to win the competitionicC9
Ax.3G s.t. (by rule (2))
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for x in world(c) &
(ii) [[pRo G2 x 31 to win the competitionj 2-G is defined &
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with the desires of x in world(c)
= [PRo G2 X3 1 to win the competition 2 +G 3 Mary((W ) (Mary)
(5) (1 )Jc'g = 1 iff 3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for Mary in world(c) &
(ii) G(Mary) = fLelf & (by (3-a))
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w ==>
2As before, I leave out the CP layer of the OC complement as it plays no role in the current
discussion.
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G(Mary)((w', x')) wins the competition in w'
The above meaning can be simplified along the following lines.
(6) [(1)jcg = 1 iff
(iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w -> f sef ((W' , X'))
wins the competition in w'
= 1 iff (iii) V(w', x') [being x' in w' is compatible with Mary's desires in w
-> x' wins the competition in 'I
While the above construction is an instance of Subject Control, the analysis
could be extended to cover Object Control constructions under communication verbs
(which give rise to a de te interpretation of PRO) in a straightforward manner. The
crucial modification (besides an interpretation of the c parameter as doubly-centered
worlds and a corresponding update in the definition of concept generators) would
involve defining another variant of PRO, PRO[oBcoN) (7) (identical to PRO[,,M in
imperatives), which ensures that the embedded proposition holds of the tu of the
attitude holder.
(7) a. If g(2)(g(3)) = ft, [PROOBJCON G,] = g(i)(g(j))(c),
else undefined
b. ftU=A(w,x,y).y
I shall provide a more detailed account of how to derive the differences between
Subject and Object Control in the following sections, in the context of my proposal
for the analysis of OC.
8.2 Obligatory Control complements involving com-
plex PRO
8.2.1 Subject and Object Control
Let me introduce the proposal by illustrating the general built assumed to underlie
OC constructions as well as the semantic types of their constituents.
As anticipated in the introduction to this chapter, I suggest that Control clauses
closely resemble jussive clauses 3 : Like JUSSIVE, the CONTROL head in C binds G
3(In a structural sense) modulo the presence of a functional phrase between CP and TP: Note
that the presence of an (albeit semantically empty) complementizer in Mongolian and Korean
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inside PRO and maps events to their content, which is the set of centered worlds
denoted by the TP. T is marked with the feature [-FIN]; it is phonologically empty in
English. PRO carries a feature [SUBCON] or [OBJCON], which drives the difference
between Subject and Object Control via the presupposition connected to it. Again,
this is identical to the strategy I used to distinguish different jussive forms.
(8) Mary 4 wants ...
CP(Vt)
C TPt
CONTROL5[SUBCON] PROe (et)
[SUBCONI
Ax2 TG5  X4
(ece) [3 s) To
[-FINI
t2 to win
However, in certain respects, the semantics of OC clauses and their central func-
tional head diverge from jussive clauses and the JUSSIVE modal: First, and most
obviously, the CONTROL head is not a modal. The above CP denotes events whose
content is a simple proposition, as opposed to a desire statement in the case of JussP;
this is reflected in the interpretation rule (9) below.
(9) CONTROL SUBCON] c'= Ae : e has an agent and a content of type (ct).
~]G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) []g4G is defined &
(iii) Fcont(e) = [#0
Moreover, unlike JUSSIVE, the CONTROL head comes with an additional specifica-
tion, to wit, [SUBCON] (as in the above derivation) or [OBJCONJ, e.g., in (10). This
differentiation concerns the presuppositions contributed by the CONTROL head: Note
that CONTROL[OBJCON] (cf. (10)) but not CONTROL[SUBCON] (cf. (9)) presupposes that
the denoted events have a goal in addition to an agent and content. The reduced pre-
jussives required me to posit two functional phrases JussP and CP in addition to TP.
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supposition in the case of CONTROL[UBCONJ seems necessary to accommodate the fact
that many (though not all) Subject Control verbs do not select for a goal argument,
cf. want, believe, hope. At the same time, Object Control predicates by definition
have a second argument. It thus seems inevitable to distinguish two versions of the
CONTROL head.4
(10) [CONTROL'OBJCON] c,g = Ae : e has an agent, a goal, and a content of type
(ct).
3G s.t.
(i) G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for e &
(ii) Pigi* is defined &
(iii) Teont(e) = 0i 0
The meaning of Subject and Object Control PRO is straightforward and resem-
bles the meaning of PRO in voluntatives/promissives and imperatives, respectively.
(11) Denotation of OC PRO(s)
a. If g(i)(g(j)) = fheli, [[PRO[sUBcON) Gi xjI]]c' = g(i)(g(j))(c),
else undefined. (= EPRO[VOL/PRMO1J)
b. If g(i)(g(j)) = ftu, [[PROOBJCON] Gi xI]]'9 = g(i)(g(j))(c),
else undefined. (= [PRO[mpII)
(12) a. fseif A (w, x, y) .X ( fvol/prom)
b. ftu = A (w, x, y) .y (= fimp)
Under the assumption of a Neo-Davidsonian semantics for want, we derive the follow-
ing truth conditions for (8). (As outlined in an earlier chapter, in matrix declaratives
an existential closure operator binds the unsaturated argument.)
(13) Jwantc,g = Ae. want(e)
(14) [Mary wants to wincg = 1 iff
3e : want(e) & agent(e) = Mary &
4Interestingly, provided certain assumptions, it may be possible to circumvent this problem
in voluntative/promissive reports: The predicates found to embed voluntatives in Mongolian and
promissives in Korean are all transitive predicates and therefore, in principle, able to appear with
a goal argument. As voluntative/promissive reports are reports of utterances (I am not aware of
counterexamples), suppose that there is no difference between talking to oneself and talking, but
not to anyone: This woukd make it possible to identify the goal with the speaker in situations
where the speaker has no conversation partner and, consequently, would allow for a uniform modal
JUSSIVE with the same set of presuppositions across different jussive forms.
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(i)&(ii) fself((we, agent(e))) = Mary &
(iii) Fcnt(e) = A (w, x). fseif((w, x)) wins in w
= 1 iff 3e: want(e) & agent(e) = Mary &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x) .x wins in w
(14) states the existence of a desire state/event connected to Mary as the attitude
holder. Recall from section 5.3.4 the principle assumed to regulate the interpretation
of a statement that Fwn0 t(e) equals a certain set of centered worlds: If the content of
Mary's desire state is the set of centered worlds (w, x) s.t. x wins in w, this means
that Mary as the agent and attitude holder self-ascribes the property of winning in
her desire worlds. 5
Object Control sentences are derived in a parallel fashion; for good measure, the
meaning assigned to an Object Control construction involving ask is provided below.
The featured functional head is CONTROL[OBJCON] (10).
(15) [Peter asked Mary3 [CONTROL OBJCONJ [PRO[OBJCON] G2 X31 to buy tickets1 9
1 iff 3e : ask(e) & agent(e) = Peter & goal(e) Mary &
(i) & (ii) ft,((we, agent(e), goal(e))) = Mary &
(iii) Fcont (e) = A (w, x, y) .ft.((w, x, y)) buys tickets in w
= 1 iff 3e : ask(e) & agent(e) = Peter & goal(e) = Mary &
(iii) Fcont(e) = A (w, x, y) .y buys tickets in w
Regarding the right choice of controller, recall that the definition of G for e together
with the presupposition on PRO guarantees that the selected controller corresponds
to the controller indicated by the feature on PRO. For example, if PRO bears a
feature [OBJCONJ as in (15), the system we set up makes sure that x inside PRO is
co-indexed with the goal argument Mary: A different co-indexing would result in a
contradiction. (Refer to 5.5.3 for a proof of this claim.)
5Note that in (14) I took the liberty of presuming a version of G for an event e that does not
presuppose that e has a goal. This adjustment is reflected in the restrictor of 3, specifically, (14)
(i)&(ii), which derives from the condition in the definition of G that the acquaintance relation
G(x) hold between the actual centered world and x: While the original definition refers to a
triplet (we, agent(e), goal(e)), (14) assumes a singly-centered world (we, agent(e)). However, as
this variation directly corresponds to the variation in presupposition tied to the respective versions
of CONTROL, it does not constitute a separate hurdle.
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8.2.2 Psychological causatives in contrast to other Object Con-
trol verbs
Not all Object Control predicates entail the same type of de se relation: In the
previous section I exclusively addressed a subclass of Object Control verbs that
require the external argument to have a de te attitude towards the PRO referent.
Verbs in this class are typically verbs of communication such as ask and tell. For
Object Control ask, what matters is the mental state of the asker regarding the askee:
Peter in example (15), repeated below, must think of Mary as the individual that
is subject to his request, i.e., he must relate to her de te (analogous to the de te
attitude observed in imperatives). Just as in the case of de me attitudes, I take this
relation to follow from an interpretation principle that determines what it means
for Fc,,t(e) to be a set of doubly-centered worlds (w, x, y): If the content of Peter's
asking Mary is the set of centered worlds (w, x, y) s.t. y buys tickets in w, this means
that Peter as the agent and attitude holder "you-ascribes" the property of buying
tickets in all worlds compatible with his request.
(16) Peter, talking to Mary on the phone, says: "I think the first person to arrive
at the theater should buy tickets for the entire group." He isn't aware that
Mary has already arrived at the theater and is waiting there by herself.
#Peter asked Mary to buy tickets for the group.
There is, however, a second class of Object Control verbs, known as psychological
causatives, in which the relevant attitude holder is the internal rather than the
external argument: As pointed out by Chierchia (1989), verbs belonging to this
class, such as persuade and convince, entail a de me attitude of the goal towards
PRO. Consider (17), featuring OC under convinve: The fact that convince entails
a de me attitude of the object explains the intuition that (17) is false when used
to describe a scenario where John has watched a video of someone winning a diving
competition and, not realizing that he himself is the winner, says "This guy should
become a professional diver" (cf. Anand 2006:16).
(17) #John'si winning the best diver competition convinced himi PROi to become
a professional diver.
In (17), a de te attitude of the agent is not even an option given that the subject
is non-agentive. The same holds for (18) below. The fact that the relevant attitude
holder is the object makes it generally possble for psychological causatives to have
inanimate subjects.
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(18) The constant noise from the upstairs apartment finally convinced John to
leave. (Anand 2006:16)
The following minimal pair demonstrates that even in the presence of an agentive sub-
ject, the attitude center is the object in the case of convince and, similarly persuade:
The truth of these psychological causatives entails success in creating an intention
in the addressee to bring the complement proposition about, hence the infelicity of
(19-a) (cf. Uegaki 2011). The truth of communication Object Control verbs such as
ask and tell, on the other hand, lacks this contingency and seems to solely depend
on the actions and intentions associated with the subject.
(19) a. #John persuaded/convinced Mary to leave, but Mary couldn't hear him.
b. John asked/told Mary to leave, but Mary couldn't hear him.
Note that in my analysis of Control, it is inherently the attitude of the external
argument that is relevant: This was secured by a meaning postulate according to
which the property that describes the content of a given attitude event is self-ascribed
by the agent of the event. Is it necessary to relativize this assumption?
I argue that it is not. As pointed out by Irene Heim (p.c.), the behavior of
psychological causatives could be captured by a decompositional analysis along the
following lines: A predicate like [persuade y to leave] could have an underlying
structure [CAUSE y to INTEND [PRO[sUBCON] to leavel, sketched in (20). In this
structure, y functions as the (ECM) subject of a silent Subject Control predicate
INTEND and, consequently, would correctly be predicted to display a de se (de me)
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attitude towards PRO.6
(20) John CAUSED ...
TP(vt)
Mary4
Ax3  T'
To VP
t3  V'
V0  CP(Vt)
to INTEND
CONTROL 5U TONISUBCON1
PROe (et)
[SUBCONI
Ax 2  T'
G5 X4
(ece) [3Ps] T0  VP,
[-FIN]
t2 to leave
(21) /John persuaded Mary to leave/ 4=M (20)
I assume that CAUSE introduces a causal chain of events: In my simplified seman-
tics, x CAUSE # is the set of events e with agent x for which there is an event e' such
that e leads to e', in other words, e and e' stand in the cause-relation cause((e, e')),
and 0 (e).
6This line of reasoning could be taken a step further: Might there be just one type of Control, i.e.,
could all types of Object Control, including communication verbs, ultimately be reduced to (possibly
stacked) occurrences of Subject Control? By this logic, [ask y to leave] could be decomposed into
[PERSUADED y to TRY [PRO[sUBCON] to leave]], which would further be broken down to [CAUSE y
to INTEND [PRO[sUBCON] to TRY [PROSUBCONJ to leavel]]. A similar idea is hinted at in Santorio
(2014), though without elaborating on it. One critical advantage of this approach would be the
unification of Control to one single type, i.e., Subject Control. Though interesting, I leave further
exploration of this idea for future research.
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(22) [X CAUSE TP = Ae. agent(e) = x & 3e': cause((e, e')) & [TP](e')
I thus derive the following truth conditions for (20).
(23) [John CAUSED Mary to INTEND to leave =
3e~e' : agent(e) = John & cause((e, e')) & intend(e') & agent(e') = Mary &
Fcot(e') = A (w, x). x leaves in w
8.2.3 Predictions and open questions
The relationship between the matrix predicate and the structure of the
PRO clause
My labeling of the different CONTROL heads suggests a correlation between the de-
fault choice of controller for a given predicate ("Subject" (agent) vs. "Object" (goal)
Control) on the one hand, and the number of matrix arguments as presupposed by
CONTROL[SUBCON] vs. CONTROL[OBJCON (where only the latter presuppposes a goal in
addition to an agent) on the other. While the above examples involving want and
ask are in line with this suggestion, does it hold across cases?
As alluded to above, many but not all Subject Control predicates lack a goal
argument: promise is an example of a Subject Control predicate that denotes events
with both an agent and a goal. Although the goal argument requires no specific de
se relation if the controller is the agent (formally, if PRO is marked with [SUBCON]),
this is potentially different if the controller is split between the agent and the goal
(which could correlate with a de nobis attitude), and is certainly so if the controller
is shifted to the goal - which is possible under certain circumstances, often times
connected to the type of embedded complement, cf. (24): Unless we conclude that
(24) is felicitous even if Peter lacks a de te attitude towards me, the goal argument
would play a crucial role in the interpretation of the sentence and the assumption of
CONTROL[OJCON] presupposing a goal (instead of CONTROL[sUBCONI) hence adequate.
(24) Peter promised mei PROi to be allowed to leave.
This raises an interesting dilemma: We could conclude that the choice of CONTROL
head with the associated presuppositions in fact tracks the valency of the verb rather
than the choice of controller in a given instance. In other words, promise as a predi-
cate with two individual arguments could always involve CONTROL[OBJCON], including
in the default case of agent Control. In other words, we would allow for cases like
the latter, where CONTROLIOBJCON co-occurs with PRO[sUBCON]. This seems descrip-
tively adequate but shows that the choice of CONTROL head cannot be a function of
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agreement with the feature on PRO (which appeared to be an option so far).
This issue reaches into the domain of another, related question: What is the
connection between the identity of the matrix predicate and the choice of Subject or
Object Control, technically, PRO[sUBcONJ or PRO[oBJCONl? My "PRO-centric" account
locates controller choice in the complement clause, i.e., on PRO. While the idea to
resolve the reference of PRO inside the embedded clause seemed intuitive in the case
of jussives, where verbal morphology inside the PRO clause correlates with controller
choice and any choice of controller is allowed in the context of the default speech
predicate (Mongolian khel-, Korean malha 'say'), prima facie, this conceptualization
is less obviously the right analysis for regular Control: To wit, Subject and Object
Control clauses look identical on the surface; moreover, controller choice is not free
but different OC predicates are associated with a default choice of controller. Let
me focus on the latter point.
In my analysis, the factual "power" an OC predicate seems to have in determining
the type of controller may seem unexpected: Matrix predicates do not select for their
complement in my analysis. However, my account could simultaneously be used to
reinforce the need for semantic explanations of controller choice: My account retains
the option of explaining any lack of flexibility as a consequence of semantic require-
ments; under this view, promise would be argued to normally disallow PRO[objcon]
since the resulting meaning would be semantically ill-formed. Though this approach
might seem like begging the question, it has been repeatedly argued that there are
correlations between the semantics of a given predicate and the choice of controller
(see e.g. Postal 1970 in Landau 2013). I leave a fuller answer to the question of con-
troller choice as well as controller shift in an approach along my lines for future work.
However, I would like to point out one prediction a purely semantic explanation of
controller choice would make: There should be no pair of OC predicates with the
exact same lexical content L in the same or different languages, which differ in the
choice of controller for embedded PRO. To give an example, Mongolian khel- and
Korean malha 'say' must differ in their semantics from English tell, given that the
latter is by default associated with Object Control complements, while the former
show no such restriction.
A remark on the modality of canonical Obligatory Control constructions
I would like to draw attention to a certain difference between canonical occurrences
of OC, e.g., under English promise, order, ask, German versprechen 'promise' on the
one hand, and OC under corresponding verbs in Korean such as yaksokha 'promise'
and myenglyengha 'order': Korean yaksokha 'promise' and myenglyengha 'order' both
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allow for jussive complements (promissives and imperatives, respectively). Jussives
have been analyzed as modal in nature and taken to correspond to desire statements.
In section 5.7, discussing Korean 'promise', I took this to mean that Korean yaksokha
'promise' is a non-modal speech predicate with the basic meaning of say modified by
a condition that the speaker takes on a commitment.
Crucially, to render a Korean promissive report involving yaksok-ha in English
(and, similarly, in German), we use a simple infinitival complement rather than a
desire statement of wanting to go to the park, cf. (25); mutatis mutandis for OC
complements under English order.
(25) Eme-nim-kkeyse ai-eykey [kongwen-ey ka-ma-ko]
mother-HON-NOM child-DAT park-LOC go-PROM-C
yaksok-ha-si-yess-ta.
promise-do-HON-PST-DECL
'The motheri promised the child PROi( ) to go to the park/#that she wants
to go to the park.'
Sticking to the case of promise, this points at a difference between OC in English
and German, on the one hand, and Korean jussive Control, on the other: Assuming
that the equivalence suggested by the translation in (25) holds, either the meaning
of English promise itself already accounts for the meaning contributed by the jussive
in Korean, or the infinitival complement contains a silent modal elementakin to the
Korean JUSSIVE modal. My analysis of English promise and its OC complement does
not make this explicit: In my account, the English sentence in (25) simply asserts
the existence of an event of promising whose content is the property of oneself going
to the park.
It has been pointed out before that infinitives may contribute modality, for ex-
ample, in infinitival questions and infinitival relatives (cf. Bhatt 1999, Hackl & Nis-
senbaum 2012). The fact that the English counterparts of Korean jussive reports
lack an overt modal could be taken as evidence for the presence of a covert modal
in infinitival contexts. At the same time, the fact that modality does not disappear
if the complement is a finite clause (cf. (26)) shows that it is far from clear that
the modal component is contributed by the infinitive rather than the matrix verb.
The conclusion seems to be that the presence of an additional modal component in
English OC constructions is likely, however, its location is yet to be determined.
(26) a. Liz promised to leave.
b. Liz promised that she would leave.
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8.3 Obligatory Control complements without a sub-
ject
The analysis proposed above does not cover the entire class of OC predicates: It is
well-known that not all OC verbs create attitude environments or report utterances;
in other words, not all OC verbs embed intensions. The absence of attitudes, of
course, also renders the de se/de re distinction inapplicable.
OC verbs that have been analyzed as extensional mainly belong to four lexical
classes - modal, aspectual, implicative, and evaluative - and, by conventional wis-
dom, include verbs such as able (modal), begin (aspectual), manage, succeed, fail,
force (implicative), rude of someone (evaluative) (cf. Landau 2018, a.o.). Crucially,
extensional OC predicates are not captured by the analysis of Control presented
in previous sections: Recall that the functional CONTROL head defined earlier de-
notes events with propositional content. While attitudes and utterances can easily
be conceived of as propositional content (a set of worlds), it is not obvious what a
corresponding content would be, for example, in the case of start events. The sec-
tion at hand addresses this complication and how it relates to the theory of Control
outlined in previous sections.
A central objective of this section is to demonstrate that the assumption of only
one type of PRO - complex PRO - is sufficient to account for the range of empirical
facts in the domain of OC. The absence of a complex PRO subject and its concept
generator variable is theoretically necessary in the case of extensional OC comple-
ments, given that concept generators have no place in non-attitude environments.
Now, in light of my assumption that complex PRO is the only type of PRO, infiniti-
val complements that lack complex PRO must lack a subject altogether. I argue that
there is evidence supporting this prediction: Extensional OC verbs have been noted
to typically display restructuring behavior in languages like German. Crucially, un-
der the standard analysis of restructuring, 'restructured' complements are subclausal
units that lack a syntactic subject position.
8.3.1 The (ir)relevance of de se attitudes
Let me start by illustrating the behavior of some members of the above-mentioned
lexical classes with regard to de se attitudes.
As attitudes de se presuppose awareness, the felicity of a given OC verb in the
absence of animate matrix arguments is a clear indicator that a predicate fails to
enforce de se, cf. be responsible, force in Landau's (2013) examples below. (PRO
in these and the following examples is used for illustrative/interpretational purposes
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only and does not represent the syntactic analysis I assign to these examples.)
(27) a. The accidenti is responsible [for PROi causing the ship to sink].
b. The transmission problem forced the cari [PROi to stop].
However, insensitivity to de se can also be found among predicates with animate
arguments: In the context described in (28), Bob lacks a de se attitude towards the
individual he observes in the mirror, which is Bob himself. The fact that the sentences
in (28-a) and (28-b) involving begin and able and their German counterparts are
perceived as true in the described scenario suggests that these predicates do not
specify the nature of the subject DP's (Bob's) attitude: Their truth solely relies on
whether or not the embedded predicate holds of PRO's controller Bob de re. In this
they contrast with the attitude predicate believe, German glauben in (28-c), which
entails that the external argument has a de se attitude towards the referent of PRO.
(28) Context: Bob, looking at his reflection in a window, sees a guy raising his
arm. He does not recognize himself nor is he aware of his body movements.
He believes that he is looking at his brother Bill.
a. Bobi hat begonnen, PROi den Arm langsam zu heben.
Bob AUx begun PRO the arm slowly to raise
Bobi began PRO, to slowly raise his arm.
b. Bob war in der Lage, PROi den Arm langsam zu heben.
Bob was able PRO the arm slowly to raise
Bobi was able PROi to slowly raise his arm.
c. #Bobi glaubte, PROi langsam den Arm zu heben.
Bob believed PRO slowly the arm to raise
#Bobi believed PROi to be slowly raising his arm.
Aspectual verbs are generally clear instances of extensional OC verbs, cf. also con-
tinue, resume, finish, stop, etc.7
7Aspectual verbs have traditionally been analyzed as ambiguous between Raising and Control
(Perlmutter 1970, Wurmbrand 2002, Landau 2013, a.o.). As summarized in Landau (2013), the
presence of the Raising variant is signalled by non-thematic subjects such as there and headway
(the subject of an embedded idiom), cf. (i).
(i) a. There began to be a commotion.
b. Headway continued to be made in the battle against wildfires.
The Control variants, on the other hand, are related to the transitive verbs and exhibit a thematic,
agentive subject, form grammatical -er nominals, allow VP pseudoclefts, do so replacement, ar-
gument drop, and complement displacement. Landau argues that no Raising verb exhibits these
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8.3.2 An analysis of extensional Obligatory Control predi-
cates
The problem of extensional OC predicates has previously been addressed by Lan-
dau (2018). In analogy to my account, Landau enforces the obligatoriness of de
se in attitude OC complements by virtue of a presupposition on the concept gen-
erator variable present in such complements. However, to allow for the absence of
attitudes and hence de se in certain OC complements, Landau dissociates the pre-
suppositional concept generator variable from OC PRO and instead locates it in the
CP layer (specifically, the C head) of OC complements. Extensional OC comple-
ments are assumed to have less clausal structure than their intensional counterparts:
Though in Landau's account they do have a PRO subject, they lack a CP layer and,
correspondingly, do not feature the presuppositional concept generator variable that
contributes the de se reading of PRO in attitude OC complements.
I make a more radical claim regarding extensional OC complements: they lack a
subject altogether. Let my outline an analysis that accommodates this claim, using
the example of OC begin.
(29) Bob1 began to raise his1 arm.
begin, being extensional, cannot reasonably be viewed as a predicate of contentful
events. Moreover, as pointed out before, the assumption of concept generators and
a functional head quantifying over corresponding variables is inappropriate for the
very same reason: begin does not introduce attitudes and, hence, provides no access
to mental representations the matrix argument might have of certain individuals.
What this means is that both the CONTROL head and PRO as presented in this work
have no place in the analysis of OC constructions such as (29).
options.
(ii) (Landau 2013:158)
a. She began the job./ He finished the book.
b. Sam is a beginner/finisher.
c. What Bill did was begin to paint the fence.
d. Warren tried to begin to work and Jerry tried to do so too.
e. A: Did you wash the dishes?
B: I just began.
f. To clean this mess, I'll never finish.
Although the Control status of the modal able is less certain than that of aspectual predicates (able
does not participate in most of the constructions in (ii)), I include able in my discussion (cf. also
Hackl (1998) for the assumption that able is a Control verb).
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I propose that different from intensional OC predicates such as promise, ask, etc.,
begin selects for its complement - a function of type (e, Vt) - directly, cf. (30).8
(30) Rbegin] = AP(e,t).Ae : e has an agent. 3e' [P(agent(e))(e') = 1 & e is the
beginning of e']
The Control verb begin establishes a relationship between events; specifically, begin
describes a set of events e that are the beginning of some event e' which is an event
of agent(e) P-ing. (Of course, the notion of "beginning" would need to be rendered
formally.) 9 The choice of controller is lexically specified in the entry of the Control
verb such that, in the case of Subject Control begin, P is predicated of the agent of
the beginning event (while in the case of an extensional Object Control verb such as
force, P would be predicated of the goal argument). The assumption that matrix
DP arguments are introduced by thematic heads remains unchanged.
By integrating predication into the semantics of the Control verb, we remove
the need for a semantically active subject in the embedded clause. In a semantic
sense, this move is a return to Chierchia's analysis of Control complements as bare
predicates, though the relevant meaning in the case of begin is an extension rather
than an intension. However, in my view there is no semantically empty counterpart
to complex PRO, counter Chierchia and Landau (2018): In other words, I take begin
to embed a bare VP. Note that the presence of 0-feature agreement between bound
variables in the complement and the matrix controller (cf. his in (31)) receives a
straightforward explanation in such an analysis: Since the complement is a sub-
clausal unit, the binding domain extends to the matrix clause and the anaphor can
8 Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for help with this solution and the following refinements.
9 The meaning in (30) is deficient in a way reminiscent of the so-called imperfective paradox
(Dowty 1979) associated with Bennett & Partee's (1978) semantics for the progressive: By (30),
Mary began to cross the river would entail that Mary crossed the river and hence would incorrectly
be predicted to be false if Mary gave up and returned to the shore within a couple of minutes of
starting her swim.
To amend this shortcoming, one could introduce a modal component into the meaning of aspectual
predicates: For example, begin could be taken to quantify over inertia worlds, in the spirit of Dowty's
(1979) solution to the imperative paradox. The Control verb would select for the intension (s, (e, vt))
of its complement P, and begin P would denote the set of events that mark the beginning of some
P-event in all prototypical continuations (w', t') of the actual world w at interval t (short: in all
(w', t') E Inr((w, t))) or, informally, provided that things take their natural course.
(i) [begin]w" t  = AP(s,(e,vt)).Ae: e has an agent. V (w', t') c Inr((w, t)): le'
[P((w', t'))(agent(e))(e') = 1& e is the beginning of e']
(s ranges over world-interval pairs.)
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be bound directly by the matrix controller.
(31) Bobl3SG.Mj ... VP(t)
began VP(.,(e,vty)
((s,(e,vt)) ,vt)
to raise hisl[3SG.] arm
8.3.3 Obligatory Control complements and restructuring
We have seen that extensional OC verbs are mainly found in the classes of modal,
implicative, and aspectual predicates. Interestingly, these classes form the core mem-
bers of the set of restructuring predicates in Romance and Germanic languages.
Restructuring (also known as clause-union) describes cases of apparently biclausal
structures that act as transparent domains for ordinarily clause-bound processes (cf.
Wurmbrand 2004, a.o.). The most prominent examples of restructuring are clitic
climbing (found in Italian, cf. Rizzi 1978, and Spanish, cf. Aissen & Perlmutter 1976,
a.o.) and long passive (found in German, cf. Wurmbrand 2004). A prominent line
of analysis represented by Wurmbrand (2004) and Cinque (2004) holds that restruc-
turing predicates are generally monoclausal: In particular, Wurmbrand advances
the view that restructuring predicates select for property-denoting VPs rather than
clausal projections such as TPs and CPs.10
The relevance of restructuring for the purposes of the analysis is as follows: Ex-
tensional OC verbs tend to exhibit restructuring behavior. If Wurmbrand's analysis
of restructuring complements as bare VPs is correct, the restructuring behavior of
extensional OC complements provides strong support for the view advanced above
whereby extensional OC complements do not involve a PRO subject.
At this point a remark is in place. There are predicates that crosscut the corre-
lation observed in the previous paragraphs: An example is try, German versuchen,
which show signs of intensionality; to wit, the sentence in (32) involving try is per-
ceived as false in the described non-de se scenario (see Uegaki 2011, Grano 2011 for
a similar view1 1 ). Yet, German versuchen commonly participates in restructuring,
10Wurmbrand (2004) distinguishes lexical from functional restructuring. It is the former category
that the term restructuring usually refers to when not further specified.
"Opinions regarding the intensionality of try are divided; Landau (2018), for example, does not
share this view. This disagreement is based, among others, on the fact that unlike run-of-the mill
attitude verbs such as expect, believe, want etc., try does not seem to create an opaque context for
existential entailments:
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cf. (33) for a long passive configuration as one of the most common diagnostics for
restructuring in German.
(32) Context: Mike, a running coach, studies the race times of his team ranked
from fastest to slowest. Mike doesn't realize that his own race time - which
is faster than that of any of his students - has been included in the table.
Pointing at his own name at the top of the table, which he misreads as the
name of his student Mick, he says "Consider him for the award".
*Mike tried to be considered for the award.
(33) dass der Kontrabass zu stimmen versucht wurde
that the.NOM bass to tune tried AUX.PASS.SG
'that they tried to tune the bass'
If an attitude semantics for try and German versuchen is on the right track, the
compatibility of the latter with restructuring must be taken to mean that even inten-
sional OC predicates may embed smaller complements that, crucially, lack a subject.
This suggests that de se must be derivable in two different ways: One route to de se
involves a functional head CONTROL or JUSSIVE in conjunction with complex PRO.
However, an alternative route is offered by certain OC verbs such as try: Verbs like
try would be taken to have an attitude semantics and quantify over a set of centered
worlds, much along the lines of Lewis (1979); Chierchia (1989); Stephenson (2010);
Uegaki (2011); Pearson (2013), as discussed in section 3.1.1 (cf. in particular entry
(4)). In configurations where versuchen 'try' exhibits signs of restructuring, it must
be this second route that leads to its de se property.
To spell this out, we may use a version of Grano's (2011) semantics for try:
According to Grano, trying # entails intending #: x tries # specifies the set of
events that are events of x intending 4, implemented by way of a universal statement
over corresponding intention worlds, cf. (34). (Note that try in Grano's analysis is
associated with a second entailment, which distinguishes it from intend, namely,
x taking (potentially solely mental) action towards the realization of #. However,
independent of whether or not this component is also appropriate for versuchen, my
central concern can be addressed in the confines of the first, attitude component.)
(i) (Sharvit 2003:405)
a. John wanted to cut a tomato, but there were no tomatoes to cut.
b. John tried to cut a tomato, #but there were no tomatoes to cut.
(ii) #John tried to ride a unicorn. (Pearson 2013:346)
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(34) [versuchen 'try' c', = AP(c,,t).Ae: e has an agent. V (w', x') [being x' in w' is
compatible with agent(e)'s intentions in w, = 3e' [P((w', x'))(e') 1]
(& the degree of realization of P((we, agent(e)))(e) > 0)
(adaptation of Grano 2011)
This alternative analysis of de se in the context of try makes an interesting predic-
tion: Bound variables in the complement of try should only have a de re reading.
To illustrate, according to my analysis the sentence in (35) lacks an embedded sub-
ject; therefore himself must be bound directly by the controller Mike and hence is
interpreted outside the scope of try.12
(35) Mike tried to have himselfi be considered for the award.
I leave a more complete discussion of this alternative analysis of intensional OC pred-
icates, including the implications it has for the availability of de se interpretations
for bound variables in the complement, as a topic for future work.
2 1f anaphors such as himself in (35) turn out to have a de se interpretation as well, this would
suggest that try is ambiguous between an attitude predicate (34), and an event predicate with a
clausal CONTROL complement and complex PRO. However, absent positive evidence, I stick with
the more minimal assumption of try being associated with only one denotation (34).
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Conclusion
This dissertation has advanced the view that the domain of Obligatory Control (OC)
extends to phenomena whose inclusion in this category may, at first glance, seem
surprising. Jussive reports, I have argued, are an instance of this kind: The rela-
tionship between this sentence type and canonical OC constructions is obscured by
the morphologically distinct nature of jussive verbs and infinitives, as well as by the
common association of jussives with root contexts. Yet I have shown that a Control
analysis can elegantly capture a complex combination of properties characterizing
jussive reports in Mongolian and Korean, which in their entirety would be difficult
to account for under alternative approaches.
In what follows I shall sum up the main components that constitute my anal-
ysis of jussive reports and recap how they can be seen as instances of regular OC
environments.
The main empirical contribution of this work consists in the presentation of pre-
viously unreported data showing that Mongolian allows for the cross-linguistically
rare phenomenon of jussive embedding. Chapter 2 provided detailed discussion of
two jussive forms - a speaker-oriented voluntative and a hearer-oriented imperative
- in embedded environments, including an investigation of the semantic properties
of the jussive subject. In chapter 4, I widened the empirical domain by drawing a
connection to similar data concerning embedded jussives in Korean, a move that was
facilitated by the comparably rich amount of data on Korean jussive reports found
in the literature.
The analysis I have developed in response to this data situates the phenomenon
of jussive embedding in the general domain of OC. I suggested to analyze the jus-
sive subject as an instance of PRO, based on parallels in behavior between the two
elements concerning the dependence on an antecedent and the requirement of a de
se interpretation. The specific analysis I chose assimilates PRO to complex de re
DPs in attitude reports (cf. Percus & Sauerland 2003a) and departs from an analysis
of PRO as a semantically empty element in the style of Chierchia (1989). I demon-
strated how this analysis of jussive PRO is able to capture both its dependency on a
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binder and its de se interpretation. In deriving the de se property of PRO, my work
differs from prior work (Pak et al. 2008b, Madigan 2008, Park 2011) on embedded
jussives in Korean, which has focused on the dependency of the jussive subject on a
matrix antecedent while neglecting to account for its special de se semantics.
I explained in detail why an analysis of PRO as a semantically and syntactically
complex expression is preferable over a Chierchia-style semantics for PRO clauses:
Not only did an analysis of PRO as complex allow me to capture certain (otherwise
unexpected) effects involving bound de re pronouns, but it also made it possible to
maintain the conceptually simpler view that #-features are interpreted at LF - a
view that would not have been tenable under a property analysis of PRO clauses. In
demonstrating that #-features on PRO are semantically interpretable, my analysis
complemented recent claims whereby, even in focus contexts (which have been central
in the argument for vacuous features), q-features have semantic content. Taking
these together, this may well be suggestive evidence against the theoretical necessity
of semantically vacuous q-features.
In light of the observed parallels between canonical PRO clauses and jussives,
I sketched an account of OC constructions according to which the resemblance to
embedded jussives is rooted in certain commonalities in the underlying structure
that go beyond the presence of complex PRO: In particular, OC complements under
intensional predicates, similar to JUSSIVE clauses, were taken to denote a set of
contentful events introduced by a functional element CONTROL in C.
Finally, an event based treatment of embedded jussives also afforded a natural
extension to matrix occurrences on the assumption that the content denoted by
matrix jussives is anchored to the utterance event. An interesting point coming
out of this thesis is therefore that the behavior of embedded jussives simultaneously
offers crucial insights into the semantics of jussives in an environment where they are
cross-linguistically more common.
The proposed generalization of an analysis of jussives to OC constructions provides
rich ground for further exploration and generates a variety of questions in different
domains of inquiry. In what follows I shall highlight some of them.
As evidence for the kinship between embedded jussives in Korean and Mongolian,
and infinitival OC complements I have repeatedly pointed at the semantic parallels
connecting their respective subjects. Meanwhile another semantic affinity, which is
more subtle in nature and obscured by differences in morphology, may have gone
unnoticed: Jussives are modal in nature; however, so are bare infinitives in certain
174
environments such as infinitival questions and infinitival relatives (cf. Bhatt 1999,
Hackl & Nissenbaum 2012).
(36) a. What to cook?
b. The documents for you to prepare are in the top drawer.
We could adopt the view that infinitives contribute a covert modal in corresponding
environments. Though the flavor of "modal" infinitives varies and depends on the
specific context, in infinitival complements of canonical OC verbs such as promise,
ask, hope, the modal would be disambiguated towards bouletic modality of the type
characterizing the JUSSIVE modal in Mongolian and Korean. In terms of the func-
tional make-up, the CONTROL head assumed to underlie canonical OC complements
in English could be replaced with a covert modal.
However, there is a caveat to this view: Though the fact that we routinely used
canonical infinitival OC constructions to translate Korean and Mongolian promissive
reports may suggest the presence of a modal component somewhere in the construc-
tion, certain data could be used to argue that modality cannot be tied directly to
the infinitive: As pointed out earlier in this work and illustrated below, the modality
detected in OC constructions is preserved if the infinitive is replaced with a finite
clause - which makes one wonder if the modality is in fact encoded in the embedding
verb.
(37) a. Liz promised to leave.
b. Liz promised that she would leave.
(38) a. Peter hat mich gebeten das Formular auszuffillen.
Peter AUX me asked the form fill-in.INF
'Peter asked me to fill in the form.'
b. Peter hat mich gebeten, dass ich das Formular ausffille.
Peter AUX me asked that I the form fill-in1.SG.PRES
'Peter asked me that I please fill in the form/to fill in the form.'
Though I cannot provide a definitive answer to the question where modality is located
- if it is part of the embedded clause or encoded in the matrix predicate -, the presence
of a modal component in OC constructions and the observation that infinitives trigger
covert modality elsewhere, should eventually be accounted for.
In section 5.7, I proposed that the fact of Korean promise combining with jus-
sive complements could be used as an argument for the choice of a Neo-Davidsonian
semantics over a standard selectional analysis. Recall that in Korean jussive reports
involving promise, the bouletic modality contributed by JUSSIVE seems to be "swal-
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lowed" by promise; i.e., a Korean sentence [leave-PROM promise] is rendered as a
promise to leave, rather than as a promise to want to leave. I pointed out that this
behavior could suggest that Korean promise is a subtype of say, which involves an
additional component deriving its richer meaning; for example, promise could denote
an event of saying whose agent makes a commitment in relation to the content of
what is said. Though this specific proposal is speculative and of a preliminary nature,
it can be used to make my general point: In a Neo-Davidsonian semantics, where
predicates are sets of events open to modification by other event predicates, seman-
tic relationships of the type existing between say and promise would be expected.
I noted that a Neo-Davidsonian semantics is not theoretically necessary to account
for the facts; however, in a selectional view, where a verb such as promise selects for
a propositional argument, the relationship between marked subtypes of speech verbs
and an unmarked verb say could not readily be derived compositionally.
While the case of promise described above is just one example, the reasoning can
be extended to other marked speech verbs such as order and advise, which allow for
jussive embedding in Korean similar to promise.
My proposal advances a new perspective on the widely discussed question of
controller choice: While the canonical view assumes controller choice to be driven
by the embedding verb, I offer an account that assigns this function to PRO as
an element in the embedded clause. A priori, we therefore expect full flexibility
regarding the choice of controller for a given matrix verb (as long as the resulting
meaning is consistent with its conceptual content). This prediction is borne out in
the case of embedded jussives under say: Both Subject Control (by way of volun-
tatives/promissives) and Object Control (by way of imperatives) are possible under
say; the choice in any given circumstance is expressed by overt morphology on the
embedded verb. Against this background it seems natural to attribute controller
choice to the embedded clause.
My analysis suggests that jussives under say are representative of the general state
of affairs. This, of course, confronts us with the task of accounting for the lack of
flexibility regarding controller choice in traditional OC complements, in particular, as
they do not provide morphological clues for controller choice, unlike jussive clauses.
This task is non-trivial. We may wonder if the absence of certain combinations
falls out from principles of semantic well-formedness. This, of course, predicts that
minimal pairs, where synonymous predicates require distinct choices of controller,
should exist. This, for example, would mean that the Korean and Mongolian verbs
for say cannot have the same semantics as English tell, as only the former allow for
both Subject and Object Control.
Attempts to explain controller choice for PRO as a pure function of locality face
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obvious problems, given the possibility of Subject Control verbs such as promise that
also feature a (more local) object argument.
A related question arises regarding the phenomenon of controller shift, which has
been correlated with the semantics of the PRO complement and, in particular, with
PRO being non-agentive (cf. Uegaki 2011). Of course, defining a controller as shifted
requires that there be a designated default controller as our point of reference. My
system does not provide such a point of reference as the identity of the controller is
solely encoded on PRO itself.
The problem of how to capture selectional restrictions in the advocated Neo-
Davidsonian framework extends to the distribution of embedded jussives: A priori,
the only restricting mechanism supplied by my system is the presupposition carried
by the JUSSIVE modal that the events it denotes have an agent a goal, and content.
Apart from the class of events that cannot reasonably be taken to denote events with
propositional content, more promising candidates such as believe, regret, realize could
be excluded based on the absence of a goal argument. However, in light of predicates
such as explain and write to, which do provide a goal argument but do not embed
jussives, the assumption of certain lexical specifications may be necessary to describe
the full range of distributional facts. The question where to encode corresponding
restrictions does not have a straightforward answer in my account, which relies on
modification as a heavily flexible compositional mechanism.
I made a case that complex PRO is superior compared to an empty alternative
in accounting for jussive reports and intensional OC predicates, while also stating
that no other type of PRO exists. At the same time, I noted that neither complex
PRO, which makes reference to mental concepts (acquaintance relations), nor the
CONTROL head, which designates events with propositional content, are appropriate
in the case of extensional OC predicates (represented by aspectual and implicative
predicates, as well as the ability modal able), which do not describe attitudes. Rather
than introducing a second, semantically empty PRO element, I suggested that corre-
sponding predicates embed VP complements and therefore lack an embedded subject
entirely. Their restructuring behavior was taken as evidence in favor of the assump-
tion of such sub-clausal complements. However, the complements of an intermediate
class of predicates represented by try show signs of intensionality and seem sensitive
to the de se/de re distinction, while syntactically behaving like bare VPs. I con-
cluded that there must hence be a second path to de se, represented by try, which
involves direct quantification over centered worlds, possibly along the lines of Chier-
chia (1989). I pointed out that the adequacy of such an analysis could be evaluated
by examining available interpretations for bound variables in the complement of try
in configurations where try displays restructuring behavior: Given the assumption of
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a subject-less VP complement in such cases, any bound variable in the complement
would be bound directly by the matrix controller. As a result, the only available
interpretation would be de re. If this prediction proves to be viable, it would provide
evidence that de se can indeed be arrived at in two different ways.
Following Kaufmann (2012), I adopted a modal analysis of jussives assuming
a uniform modal JUSSIVE to underlie the various morphologically distinct forms in
Mongolian and Korean. Building on Kaufmann's (2012) and Stegovec & Kaufmann's
(2015) presuppositional approach to the performative component of imperatives, my
work aimed at reconciling their analysis with the inherent flexibility of the JUSSIVE
modal, whose target varies between the speaker and the addressee. In this context
my account made salient a conceptual question: How rich is the semantic structure
of events? It is conventional wisdom that events can have participants such as agent,
goal, theme. Morever, the assumption that events have propositional content is
natural in the case of speech events and attitude states. However, in my account of
jussive performativity, I attributed to events the ability to also designate entities such
as a question under discussion, which is typically viewed as a property of contexts.
It will have to be determined if this assumption can be upheld.
Finally, as this thesis is a thesis about jussive embedding, let me end with a
pressing question that inevitably arises in any study of the phenomeon: What deter-
mines whether or not a language can embed jussives? Maybe it is a matter of the
lexicon and requires the availability of exactly the type of modal JUSSIVE represents.
A more likely answer, though, seems to be that it arises from a complex interaction
of factors. The question as to which components may conspire, and in what way, to
allow for this result, however, will have to be left open.
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